British Government's Proposal Of Union With. France

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 199, 23 August 1945, Page 4

British Government's Proposal Of Union With. France

Paul Raynaud's "Why France Fell"—No. 10.

ON the evening of June 14 the.| Ministers arrived in Bordeaux •and settled down in the public buildings. Laval, leader of the partisans of capitulation, was installed in the 1 town hall. My telephone lines were being tapped. At nine o'clock at night I received a visit from the British Ambassador and General Spears, who said that their Government insisted on the pledge given by France, not to conclude any separate ariliistice, being kept. On June 15, in the course of the forenoon, I received a visit from Admiral Darlan. He had come to tell me rather shamefacedly, that he could not move all the transports to North Africa for which I had asked. Before lunch the presidents of the two Chambers came to see me. They were accompanied by Georges Maildel, Louis Marin, Campinchi, and Georges Monnet—the stout-hearted members of the Cabinet. Britain to Stand By Us In Bordeaux I received a very fine message from the British Government that bears the hallmark of Churchill. It read: "We renew our pledge to the French Republic, and we resolve to go on lighting at all costs, in France, in this island, on the oceans, in the air, everywhere where the struggle may lead us, making use of all our resources to the last gasp, and bearing in common the burden of repairing the ravages of war ... "Never shall we give up fighting as long as France shall not have been restored in all her greatness . . . "I also received moving messages from the Dominions. In the afternoon, about three 1 o'clock, I received the visit of General Weygand, still thinking that in him I had to deal with a patriot who was simply mistaken. I told him that my mind was made up. It would be necessary to sound the cease fire at the moment he would • think right, and then cross to North ; Africa. i Weygand said that an armistice was a Governmental act, whereas the ' 'order to cease fire pertained to the I i

A-High Command, and he would not take upon himself the responsibility' of giving it. "If that is all that is stopping srou,"5 r ou," I exclaimed, "I shall take the responsibility myself. I shall give you a written order." He objected that the honour of the Army would be at stake. An amazing notion, that the honour of France must be sacrificed to that of the Army! I decided to relieve General Weygand of his command after the Cabinet meeting to be held later that day. At 4 p.m. on June 15 the Cabinet met under the chairmanship of the President. General Weygand and Admiral Darlan reported on the military situation. Weygand declared with greater insistence than ever that the situation was becoming worse from hour to hour, and that it was urgently necessary to ask for an armistice. Appeal to Sentiments I read out Churchill's magnificent message. Once more I explained that the honour and the interests of France coincided to make it imperative for us to remain in the war. Chautemps appealed to our humane sentiments. He said our soldiers were "shot down like rabbits in a field." I replied that if this was the opinion of the High Command I was prepared to issue the order to cease fire just as the Dutch Government had done, a decision that had not prevented the Government of that country from going to London and remaining in the war. I declared that the solution was to order the cease fire and not to ask for an armistice. It would be impossible to obtain an armistice in less than four days (as a matter of fact, Marshal Petain took eight days to get it), whereas the cease fire became operative immediately. Everyone seemed to agree. Chautemps Stages Coup Petain went to announce this solution to General Weygafid, who was waiting in the next room. The marshal came back a quarter of an hour later stating that he had been unable to convince him. It was then obviously imperative to relieve Weygand of his command, j aiid so I requested that a decision i

By PAUL REYNAUD on the question of an armistice be taken at once. It was at this point that Chautemps staged his coup. He was convinced, he said, that the German conditions for an armistice would be unacceptable, but it was necessary to prove this. For that reason these conditions should be asked for. Afterwards, the French people would understand that its Government had had no other choice than to leave France, and all the Ministers would then follow me to North Africa. Chautemps concluded by saying that there was no question of France being untrue to her word, but simply of asking England's permission to make a necessary public demonstration. My opinion was that to ask the enemy to state his conditions would, even with Britain's consent, break the spring of resistance. Thirteen Ministers spoke in support of Chautemps' motion, and only six supported me. I turned to the President of the Republic and told him that under these conditions I wanted to resign. Petain is Impatient On one side stood Marshal Petain, a Commander-in-Chief whose prestige still remained undamaged, the leaders of the Army, and, within the Cabinet, the two Vice-Premiers and the majority of the Ministers. The President evidently that his constitutional role as arbiter made it his duty to bow to the majority. I was at least successful in obliging the Marshal to admit that to surrender the French Fleet to the enemy, and so permit him to stab our ally, would be an act contrary to honour. At the meeting of the Cabinet that took place at 11 a.m. on June 16, Marshal Petain read out a letter of resignation, giving as his reason the delay in asking for an armistice. I drew his attention to the. fact that it is customary, when one has made so grave a request to an ally, to await his answer, which I hoped to be in a position to communicate to the Cabinet during the afternoon.

} .Rather pitifully, the Marshal put his letter back in his pocket and sat down again. The meeting was then adjourned until 5 p.m. At noon, ihe President of the Republic sent for me. The debate concerned the cease fire order, as the Dutch had given it. Only the next Cabinet meeting could settle the matter. Should I still be in office that evening Weygand would no longer be Commander-in-Chief. Early that afternoon the British Ambassador and General Spears brought me a telegram, granting permission to ask for—not to accept armistice terms. An hour later, the British Ambassador and General Spears came to ask me for the return of the telegram, stating that their Government cancelled the permission to treat with the Germans. During the afternoon I was twice rung up from London by General de Gaulle. He communicated to me a sensational offer by the British Government which filled me with joy because it supplied me with a fresh argument to keep France in the war at Britain's side. I Accept in Principle For this reason I pressed him to ask that the text of this offer should be ready before 5 p.m. so that I might make it known to the Cabinet Council. It was a project for a union of our two countries. I accepted the project in principle, leaving myself free to discuss the details of its application. Union with Britain meant independence for France; Union with Germany meant enslavement. This bold and generous project aroused criticism in England against Winston Churchill. The chivalrous nature of this offer was entirely misrepresented, and, indeed, somewhat basely vilified after the armistice by Vichy propaganda. Winston Churchill himself rang me up. I assured him of my agreement in principle, and, both of us full of confidence, we arranged to meet on the following day somewhere in Brittany. [World serial copyright reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part forbidden.]