PUZZLE TO ALLIES

Auckland Star, Volume LXXV, Issue 308, 29 December 1944, Page 2

PUZZLE TO ALLIES

NAZI AIR STRATEGY

"FLEET IN BEING" THEORY?

By E. C. Shepherd, Aviation Expert ; and Commentator. LONDON. l One of the mysteries of the Ger- ■ man military mind is the continuing s determination to hold back the ; German Air Force. The most elusive ! thing is to find what that force of a . probable front-line strength of 4000 is being saved for. Perhaps the High 1 Command believes there is an air ' parallel to the naval strategy of a "fleet in being." 1 That strategy was pursued fully in the last war and partly in this war, to offer a continuing threat and to tie down large Allied forces simply by owning a fleet and keeping it in a harbour. The object was to keep ' superior Allied naval forces on sentry go or tied up in ports from which they could quickly contact German naval units if these should unexpect- . edly break out on to British shipping routes. A corresponding treatment of the German air arm would • not work out in the same way. Inactivity Over Holland By examining the reaction of the Luftwaffe to recent events, we see only a fraction of its large front-line strength being used. The area in which this relative inactivity is most striking is in Holland, where the airborne incursions were made. Supply aircraft from Britain have been making routine deliveries of arms, ammunition, food and other necessities to troops in this area. These aircraft are vulnerable and, acting as glider tugs, extremely slow. More profitable targets are never likely to present themselves, but generally, the Luftwaffe has ignored them. On most days fewer than 100 enemy aircraft have been sighted over Holland. The total was 150 on September 25, but 100 of these were bent on attacking troops on the ground. German bombers have been even less active. When they did appear, on September 22, at Nijmegen, a mere 20 undertook the raid. It is to be concluded that despite the critical situation on the western frontiers of Germany, the services of the Luftwaffe cannot be claimed in any strength. The Aegean and Baltic Air protection would be valuable in the Aegean and the Baltic where two major evacuations are progressing. Rhodes, Crete and the other Aegean islands are being evacuated by the Germans in the face of persistent Allied air attacks on shipping and transport aircraft at Athens air fields. The Russian Air Force in the Baltic is similarly beating up German transports leaving Estonia. In both\cases the Luftwaffe seems incapable of taking care of its fleeing troops. Off the Dutch island of Den Helder on September 25, R.A.F. Beaufighters caught a 20-ship German convoy and met no opposition except heavy flak. Still nearer Germany, recent heavy bomber attacks in the Ruhr and Rhineland have not been opposed as vigorously as was to be expected. The Luftwaffe's strength is conserved while the war moves on to German soil. It is maintained "in being" at the expense of the very functions it was created to perform. There is thus reason to suspect the high command of reposing an almost superstitious significance in the phrase "in being." If so. it cherishes an illusion. Serious, hope of tying up large Allied air formations for defensive purposes vanished with the arrival of the fighter-bomber, nor has the retention of large fighter forces inside Germany discouraged the bombing of that country. Keeping a Lifebelt Dry Bigger Allied bomber forces now operate against German targets than when the Luftwaffe strongly reacted, and the Allied Air Force retains the freedom to choose its targets. The fallacy of the "fleet in being" theory is found in the ease of replacing losses when the aircraft industry is on a war production basis. Naval ships on patrol run risks from mines and submarines as well as enemy surface ships. If lost, they take months to replace, whereas aircraft losses can, compatible with the efficiency of the aircraft industry, be immediately made good. The only way to check the use of the air forces is to inflict losses exceeding the power of replacement. This may have happened to the Luftwaffe. Yet, when it threatened the R.A.F. in the Battle of Britain, the policy was tp throw everything into the fight and trust to victory to' afford the respite needed for replacement and expansion. The "fleet in being" theory applied to an Air Force is like leaving a lifebelt in its locker to keep it dry.—Auckland Star and N.A.N.A.