The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1943. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE NAVY

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 295, 13 December 1943, Page 2

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1943. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE NAVY

QF all the great achievements of the British Navy in this war, none is so remarkable as its decisive defeat of the U-boats. Last week's battle in the Atlantic, when, in an attack on two large convoys, five U-boats were sunk, with the loss of only one ship from the two convoys, is one of the most striking and most heartening proofs of the fact that the "Battle of the Atlantic" has turned completely in favour of the Allied forces. Earlier in the war Britain faced a situation almost comparable with that of 1917, when the under-water highwaymen brought the nation to verge of defeat. As recently as March of last year the sinkings were so great as to arouse very grave fears on both sides of the Atlanlic.

That was the tui'/iing point, however, the beginning of a swing towards victory, which has gone on increasingly in our favour ever since until, within two months, the Admiralty has been able to announce the two greatest successes, which must inevitably have a very damaging effect upon the morale of the U-boat crews, coming as they do after the absolute failure to stop the American Army crossing to North Africa and the very long series of individual sinkings or of counter-attacks which have forced the Germans to run away without getting within range of their prey. New tactics have been evolved by the U-boat leaders, the lone raider gave way to the squadron-leader with half a dozen boats under his control, he in turn gave way to the wolf pack of twenty to fifty, and, after some of the success which follows surprise, this has in turn broken up into smaller units, with only an occasional return to the pack. The aerial scout has been used to discover the size and route of the convoys and the measure of their protection, and the mid-ocean points at which attacks could be launched with the greatest safety. An answer has been found to every one of the new phases of strategy; the hunter has become the hunted. The enemy has increased the size and the range of his pirate craft, he has strengthened them to withstand depth charges, has armed them till instead of submerging they can stay up and fight it out with corvette or flying-boat. But the British Navy countered each move, and never has its power been more conclusively proved than in the recent battles.

Those days are gone, a great ally has come to our aid, hundreds of ships have been built, equipment has been improved and a great personnel has been trained. Particularly is that the case in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Western approaches, where the complicated pattern of the attack on the U-boat is woven. Here the battle has been won by the development of a reasoned but ever-changing tactical policy, by more long-range shore-based aircraft and escort carriers, by close co-operation with the Coastal Command and the Admiralty, by scientific training and by better personnel, the keenest men seeking the escort groups rather than the fleets. The use of the Azores is another factor in the changed situation, and the brilliant work of the Canadians in the western half of the Atlantic has been no less a contributor to the success of the anti-submarine campaign. But that battle, though, it goes so well with us, is by no means over. The U-boats may leave the North Atlantic for another sphere where there are not enough escort vessels for the convoy system. Or a new system of attack may be evolved, and the design and armament may improve so that they can better withstand the weight of present attacks. At the moment, however, the Allies have a firm grip of the war on the sea, and though Germany has such formidable fighters as the Tirpitz and the Potsdam they are not balanced by cruisers, aircraft-carriers and destroyers, and there is yet no sign that Admiral Doenitz is prepared to use" them in concert with U-boats. In the early stages of the war mistakes were made, chiefly because we had not the ships. Too much was attempted with too little, and we paid the price.