The Auckland Star : MONDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1943. RUSSIA'S INTENTIONS

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 235, 4 October 1943, Page 2

The Auckland Star :

MONDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1943. RUSSIA'S INTENTIONS

WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED ©J* Etmiiny iXsxas, iHnrutng Npwb. Sjljp Erho ana ©Sμ- &na

QAN the Soviet forces win the battle of the Dnieper before rain and _ mud impede their heavy transport? If they can—and confidence, inspired by their recent succession of victories, is high—how far beyond the Dnieper will they pursue their offensive? On the answers which events give to these questions may depend in large degree the duration of the war against Germany. As to the first, it is clear that German resistance is stiffening. German propaganda lately has asserted that the withdrawal—the "disengaging movement," as it is euphemistically called—has been planned and timed to end at the Dnieper as the weather breaks, and that, "at the .right time," the Germans will attack again. The Russians, to all appearances, have other ideas, which do not seem to include that of spending the winter on the east bank of the Dnieper Although crossings in force will be difficult and costly, they are to be attempted. Apparently they have succeeded, on a small scale, at some points. The Soviet armies attack with the fierce zeal of men who have already cleared much Russian soil of the invader and know that there is much more to be cleared. If the Germans have planned to hold the Dnieper line throughout the winter, and if they are frustrated, the consequent strategy of the Russians will be of high importance. It is possible, however, that the German withdrawal will continue One conjecture is that they will make their real stand on a line corresponding roughly to the "Curzon Lme," from the Carpathians along the Bug to Brest-Litovsk, Grodno and Riga. They would still be fighting outside Germany, on a shorter line, which would be screened to the east by the Pripet marshes and would have good rear communications, whereas those of the Russians would be long and poor. Whatever the Germans' intentions may be, Russian intentions important. It may be that Stalin, whose strongest are patience and caution, will decide that the objectives to be gained by pressing on from the Dnieper cannot be attained this year—unless Germany is seriously weakened in the west. He may decide that he can afford to wait. There is yet no indication of what he has decided. The indication may come, not from Russia, but from Western or Southern Europe. If the other British-American attacks which are impending, as President Roosevelt suggested, prove to be on a large scale, then Stalin may decide to exploit the German dilemma and press for a final battle in the east. T