JAPAN'S CHANGE OF TONE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 228, 25 September 1943, Page 4

JAPAN'S CHANGE OF TONE

than three months ago a Japanese military observer was heard to say from Tokyo that "We are ready to attack Australia at any moment now. Since February Japanese forces in the Pacific area have been readjusting their operational bases for fresh ventures. All the necessary preparations are now complete." On that very day, June 30, the Allied forces launched the operations, in the central Solomons and New Guinea, which resulted in the capture, inter alia, of Munda, and of Lae and Salamaua. Now, the Japanese are not talking of "fresh ventures"; they are being told, with remarkable but impressive candour, that their general position is grave and that they must work as never before to strengthen the defences of Japan itself. The first statement quoted can be seen, in the light of events, to have had importance only as propaganda, self-defeating propaganda; the second, from Tojo himself, is not to be criticised for insincerity. No leader, after long telling his people of the triumphs of their forces in a war thousands of miles away, would without good cause abruptly warn them of grave dangers threatening them at heme.

What was the cause of Tojo's warning? Probably the greatest single event prompting it was the surrender of the Italian Fleet, and the prospective alteration in the naval situation in the Pacific. Irrespective of that event, that situation has been steadily changing in the Allies' favour. On the one hand there has been the persistent whittling away of Japanese strength in the series of naval engagements, great and small, associated with the Solomons campaigns. On the other there has been the enormous increase in the strength of the United States Navy. The magnitude of American shipbuilding operations, both for the Navy and for the Merchant Marine, is one of the most striking features of this war. According to an official statement this week, the United States Navy in 1940 had 353 fighting ships; now—in spite of losses and transfers to the Allies—it has 613. No other nation, certainly not Japan, has a shipbuilding capacity nearly sufficient to enable it to rival the achievement represented by those figures. It is small wonder that Tojo sees some ominous writing on the wall. To build ships and aircraft and raise armies is one thing; to bring them to bear against the enemy is another. The military strength of the Powers engaged In the Pacific war stands in remarkable contrast with the small part of that strength which each has been able to bring to bear igainst tie other.. The difficulties raised* by the vasteess of the Pacific, are staggering in* their , complexity. Relatively small forces can be maintained in the field only by the exertions of enormously greater forces organised for thousands of miles behind them. It is this feature in the character of the Pacific war which makes its course and duration unpredictable. All that is certain is that the United Nations are better able than Japan to sustain the burden of the conflict, and that their advantage is constantly increasing. It is, most probably, appreciation of this tendency, as well as knowledge of fresh offensives being prepared, that has impelled Tojo to warn the Japanese of danger to their homeland. It is a gratifying development, but we should not dwell unduly on the admission of weakness implicit in it. Rather should stress be placed on the nature of Japan's reaction to it. A people whose manpower already has been mobilised for war service in a very high degree is to be still further mobilised. A people already working hard is to work harder, and—as one measure—"the Saturday half-holiday is abolished, and Government offices will work on Sundays and Aveek days, all day and all night." This is an indication of the determination of our enemy. It is a sign of the quality for which, when exhibited by the people of Britain in 1940, excited admiration. It is a warning that the nations which will in the end defeat Japan may not hope ito do so quickly or easily, but only by maintaining a similar inflexible determination—and by work.