"AVOID 10 RISK TO SHORTEN THE WAR"

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 203, 27 August 1943, Page 3

"AVOID 10 RISK TO SHORTEN THE WAR"

BRITAIN'S POLICY

Allied Campaign One Grand, Strategic Concept

Rec. 2 p.m. RUGBY, Aug. 26. An assurance that all Allied activities—British, American and Russian—against Germany were "carefully co-ordinated in one grand, strategic concept" was given by the Home Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking at Douglas, Isle of Man, to-day.

"It would be misleading to assess the scale of the effort of the Allied forces in the recent operations in the Mediterranean or the effect of these operations on the war against Germany as a whole merely by the number of divisions engaged on either side or by the casualties they sustained," he said. "On our part the effort should be reckoned not only by the number of front-line troops engaged but also in terms of men, women, vehicles and ships required to convey the men and supplies to battle, including the part of the navy and R.A.F. is safeguarding the long sea routes. But for our continuous pressure the Axis southern flank and the bulk of the German resources we have been pinning down in the Mediterranean would have been employed on their eastern front, where their army is engaged in mortal combat with the Russians."

The German Army must be broken before the Nazi tyrants would collapse, and the overriding consideration which governed every decision and every action was to cause the maximum diversion of German strength and the maximum attrition of the German war machine, Mr.

Morrison said air bombardment of enemy production, communications and facilities, like amphibious operations, represented a far greater share of the war potential of the country delivering it and resulted In very much greater strain and war economy of the country suffering it than might appear from the comparatively small numbers of men engaged in actual operations. The conquest of Sicily had resulted in the collapse of Italian Fascism, which before long might lead to the collapse of Italy as a fighting partner of Germany, and from that there may follow other consequences still wider and still more embarrassing for the German High Command.

"The pressure of the Russian Army on the eastern front, the pressure of the British-American thrust from the south and the weight of the British-American air attack on the German war machine, which are all carefully co-ordinated in one grand, strategic concept, will before very long, we hope, lead to conditions which will pave the way for the overthrow of the Wehrmacht," he added. "There is but one single pattern in the whole Allied strategy, and it is our intention that every man, woman and machine shall exert their whole force in the onslaught on the German citadel of Europe. "It is the object of our strategy in the west that we shall be able to play our part in bringing the war to an end at the earliest possible moment, then, in consultation and collaboration with our Allies, help in the Pacific and the restoration of Europe. We shall shrink from no sacrifice and avoid no risk that will shorten the war provided we are satisfied it really will shorten the war and not lengthen it. It is the Government's belief that when the whole pattern is unfolded and we can look back upon it as a completed thing we shall find the time has been well used and the resources well applied."