"A DAMP SQUIB"

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 111, 12 May 1943, Page 3

"A DAMP SQUIB"

Rome radio states that the Japanese, after taking Buthidaung, captured a great number of prisoners and a large quantity of booty. It adds that the capture of Maungdaw, which is being attacked from the rear, is a question of a few days. The threat to India's east door is becoming more and more serious.

CAMPAIGN IN BURMA African Battles Prevented Seaborne Assault N.Z. Press Association —Copyright Rec. noon. LONDON, May 11. Nothing can be gained by trying to explain the British reverse hi Arakan as other than a failure, says the Daily Telegraph Calcutta correspondent. The Indian Associated Press, surveying the position, calls it "a damp squib." The Japanese are now almost back where they were before the British offensives of last December. A consoling feature is that the failure is on only a small scale, which undoubtedly will be redeemed triumphantly when we have sufficient men, planes and ships for a real offensive. The failure can be ascribed basically to causes outside the India Command's control. We could have made a successful seaborne assault against Akyab, if the available shipping had not been needed for the African campaign. The Japanese could not have counter-attacked strongly enough to push us back, as they have nowdone, if we had held Akyab. Secondary causes of the reverse must be sought partly in officers' errors of judgment and partly in the troops' inefficient training > for Arakan conditions. Some local commanders at the outset under-esti-mated, not so much the numerical strength of the Japanese, as their fighting qualities. Lacked Jungle Training The Daily Telegraph correspondent adds: "I was convinced on occasions during my first visit to Arakan in the New Year that the employment of a few additional companies would have given us complete success in the limited objectives. then sought. "Difficulties of supply are doubtless the reason why we didn't use additional troops, but there was also unfounded confidence among the officers on the spot that they had sufficient men for the job. They realised their mistake too late, when even bringing a fresh brigade could not compensate for the shortage of a few hundred men a couple of months previously. "High officers admit frankly that the men needed a considerably longer period of training. Many were lacking in any previous experience of jungle warfare. The Japanese facing them were not only fully trained in jungle fighting, but seasoned in the Burma campaign. Our troops, man for man, were at a disadvantage."