The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1942. AFTER DIEPPE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 198, 22 August 1942, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1942. AFTER DIEPPE

JHE deep longing of the Allied peoples for offensive action against their common enemies—the desire, in Britain, to "give it," after having "taken it" for so long—has been partly gratified this month by the American attack on the Solomon Islands and by the "combined operation" at Dieppe. At last, many people are thinking, the Allies are beginning seriously to harass the enemy, to place him in the state in which he has for so long had us, that of apprehensively wondering where and when and how the next blow will be struck. Such operations as those we have seen this month will do more than make our enemies apprehensive; they will hearten our friends. There has been much talk from time to time of the value of propaganda directed to influence the minds of the peoples of the occupied countries, and the peoples of enemy countries—but there is no propaganda comparable in potency with that furnished by the bold, successful action against the enemy. ■ In the early months of the war there were "leaflet raids" over Germany. If they had any efTect at all it was trifling compared with the psychologic;! I effect of large-scale bombing raids, shattering the Goering-inspired belief that Germans would be protected from bombing. So it may well be with the Dieppe raid, which, though not the first made on the French coast, was by far the largest. The French people, often told of what the Allies would one day do, have now the knowledge that something has been done. It is, of course, not enough, but we may hope that its efTect will be to make Laval's task of persuading the French people to "collaborate" with their exploiters even more difficult than it has been.

The Dieppe raid was on a large scale—for a raid—and it may be described as partly successful. The German defenders were found alert and their weapons formidable. Nevertheless considerable damage was done, and a large part of the attacking force was able to re-embark, and under the protection of the Royal Air Force "umbrella," to return to England. The operation necessarily was a more severe test of the Wliciency of the attackers—who had to carry out their orders within a strictly limited time, than on that of the defenders; and the fact that m c ost °f ,ho objectives were accomplished speaks much for the degree of efficiency which has been attained. If the raid be thought of only as a raid and not as a "dress rehearsal for invasion," the conclusion must be that it amply justified itself.

It will be unfortunate if this "combined operation," because of its larger wcalo, is regarded as a sure indication of an imminent attempt to invade the Continent. If it be so regarded, then the prospects of an invasion, attempted at an early date, are far from encouraging. In the light of the fact that the raid could have been directed at any one or more than one, of scores of points on the French coast, the Germans' But thpv haH 3t p^ nt actua "y attacked was impressive. Jhi* 1? had to meet a relatively small force, and it may be argued that a larger force would have overwhelmed them. But a larger force ™ d m r «! u r . e mor T e shipping, equipment and supplies, and therefore much roore time. In that time the Germans would be able to summon Zf "T' ?* rma rF?' a P* P erha P s even from Russia, great reinforcements of aircraft. The element of surprise upon which raidine forces an n lnva r dinS i°!S fT ?hC , £ nSfng ° f InvasionK imn™«ihi» !° say that the too-much-discussed invasion is impossible. The attempt is possible; its initial succors mav even be regarded as probable. But whether it could be ceaselessly sun an( i sustained—and if it could not it should not # v.i ® reat variety of factors, including principally the availability of shipping, and the margin of air superiority which the Allipd commanders could certainly gain and maintain. The weieht of thosp factors cannot possibly be known to anv hut thl But the suggestion may be made that, if the Dieppe 'raid Was in fact a dress rehearsal for the second front" it is odd that th*™ has been no news of heayy, sustained bombing by the Germans of thP S V on l 0 V °J< S " , The Germans - li^e the British in 1040 wouldnotwait Lash «• They MrT*