CORAL SEA BATTLE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 113, 15 May 1942, Page 3

CORAL SEA BATTLE

JAPANESE REVERSE DISRUPTION OF PLANS <Jsppci.,lly Wri..™ f„ r thp Xew Zc;il ' i c.-.i A.-.>ociat ion.) Apart. I rimi its immediate importance in disrupting the enemy's plans the great naval action in the Coral Sea n notable as being the first nnior de,.Mt, suftered by ,| IC . .| ;ipa nes e t>'' V> "i„,lee!r ,, !h' <l T ; ' S niil > "• ■ nidi t d the first niaiiir reverse experienced by the modern Japanese N.iw .-.uiee its creation half a cen turv more ago. " 'I in' predatory career of modern Japan and the building up of her mm power began in the early 'nineHr 'rM■ century. | n the wars \Mtli (lima in lxjn-n.-, and with Uus-ia in Ptoi-0,-), in the (beat War of b»l IdS. ni the China "afTair" since 1 •'■ '■ | ;il,,i "i the present war up to last. week, the Japanese N'avv had known no check or defeat. Alwavs. hitherto, Japan's success in war has been due to the success of her navv in gaining and holding command (if the >'\i in tho regions in which she has fought.

Kxploiting of Advantages

All that has happened in the Pacific since December 7 from the China Sea In the Indian Ocean and the ap--I'l'nai lies to Australia has shown that I lie Japanese well know how to €■ x|>l• >it the advantages of sea power and ni'ulern ' tactics co-ordinated by sea. ail' and land. The use by the Japanese High Command of their coininanil of the sea in the western Pacitic lias been masterly. They Jiave not hesitated to move large furies across the seas they command. Their combined operations have been well organised and almost uniformly successful. All their landing operations have been good examples of co-ordination by sea. air and land and alTord complete proof of the celerity. the flexibility and the baffling nature of amphibious warfare, of which they have had a loner and vast experience. The Japanese have also ]earnt the importance of shore-based air forces and the last five months have greatly strengthened 'and increased the wide area over which they have complete control.

I,ast. week's action developed from the renewed effort, of the Japanese to extend their control towards the south and south-east. For some montfis their efforts have aimed at expanding their air bases in the Coral Sea region, but, as has been pointed out officially, our air force has consistently and effectively attacked during the last six weeks, dislocating the enemy's plans bv the destruction of installations and aircraft. Meanwhile the Japanese had been assembling warships and transEorts for a great co-ordinated attack y combined forces which was initiated at the beginning of last week.

The lons arm of Japanese sea power reached out across the Coral Sea, feeling its way into waters over which, for the first time, it had not preponderant strength in ships and aircraft. The Allied naval forces, well served in the air arm, attacked in interception and the Japanese met their first reversal. The enemy's long arm was not severed, nor, indeed, paralysed, but the clutching hand was bacily mauled and forced to withdraw. It may well be that the arm will be strengthened for another blow, but most assuredly the Allied strength in those waters will be reinforced to meet it. Japan's first naval reverse may have far-reaching consequences.

Japanese Losses

It seems to be definitely established that the Japanese losses in the Coral Sea were severe while those of the Allied forces were relatively light. It is officially announced .that the enemy lost one aircraft-carrier, one heavv cruiser, one light cruiser, two destroyers, four gunboats and two transports sunk, and that one aircraft-carrier, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one seaplane tender and two transports were more or less badly damaged. The latter present a serious problem to the Japanese since they are far from any dockyard or repair base. Due to the conditions under which the war is being fought in the Pacific and the traditional Japanese policy of close secrecy regarding naval losses it has been difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy what price the enemy has paid for his hitherto successful advance to the southward. In the course of the operations against the Dutch East Indies there were several clashes between Allied and Japanese ships supported bv aircraft, notably in Macassar Strait and the Java Sea. That the enemy sustained losses of and damage to ships is certain, but there was probably some overlapping in the various Dutch, British and American reports. It. has now been officially stated in Washington that since December 7, 44 war vessels of all kinds have been sunk, including two aircraft-carriers, nine cruisers, 13 destroyers and six submarines. Tn addition one aircraftcarrier, four cruisers and five destroyers have been probably or possibly sunk. More or less damaged vessels includc two aircraft-carriers, 12 cruisers and seven destroyers. It was stated further that this list does not, include losses inflicted by the United States Army and by other members of the United Nations.

The underlying strategy of the war in the Pacific is to defeat the Japanese at sea. When the Allied nations can cut Japan's sea communications and regain command of the Western Pacific victory for them is certain. Whatever the number of Japanese naval losses has been they represent something that the enemy cannot replace rapidly. Nevertheless it is going to be a long and difficult task to deprive Japan of her present commanding advantage which derives from her sea power ably used.