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ICELAND'S VITAL ROLE IN SEA WAR

[T is no coincidence that three * engagements between three German submarines and American destroyers and the torpedoing of an American tanker all occurred in that section of the Atlantic Ocean lying south-west of Iceland. On the rlay that the United States formally occupied Iceland as a part of its aid-to-Britain policy, the battleground was established. The Presidential order to the navy to "shoot on sight" German raiders in waters essential to American defence only served to cock a gun already aimed. The establishment of an American base in Iceland marked a change by which American international policy stepped from one of passive aid to Great Britain and her Allies into active participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. The whole line of American bases, from Antigua, Newfoundland, to British Guiana, lies for the most part outside the combat zone of the Atlantic, notwithstanding reports that some long-range German submarines now had been operating off Newfoundland. Iceland, however, by its location, sits astride the Great Circle ocean highway which must be the lifeline for British supplies. I was one of a small group who went with a naval task force to Iceland. Only such a voyage could enable one to comprehend its strategic importance. As ships must sail, the harbour of Reykjavik, on the southwestern corner of Iceland, is more than 3000 miles from any continental United States port. It is only a few hundred miles, however, from Ireland and about 600 miles from Norway. In the hands of Germany, the tinv island would provide a base from which aeroplanes and ships probably could sever the British lifeline. In the hands of Britain and the United -+ —

W-»shmgton newspaperman who ,®*J' * lth a l-S. naval task force to If? .2. rec « nU y tells here of the strategic value of that land in the Battle of the Atlantic.

By Charles Hurd

States it is a base that will make increasingly hazardous the work of submarines. § When German submarines unsuccessfully attacked the Greer, later grievously damaged the Kearny and finally sank the Reuben James, there was belated information made public in Washington indicating that in all cases the destroyers were hunting submarines—the Greer to report where one lay and the other destroyers in an actual effort to destroy them. 'W hen news came through of the torpedoing of the tanker Salinas it constituted evidence that the German Government would strangle if it could, the Icelandic base. ' Formidable Army Base Security restrictions forbid descriptions of the size or type of armed units in Iceland, but the writers who visited Reykjavik have been author•sed to state that the task force wnicn they accompanied was convoving thousands of tons of material to construct a formidable army base. 1 he navy already was in Iceland, i he British were there in strength. These works on the island represen tea in the main defensive precautions against the day when Germany might try to take Iceland by force, presumably with the same tvpe of tactics which subdued Crete It would be more difficult, but the possibility could not be discounted. With Iceland secured as a more or less permanent base of operations, the way was cleared for naval opera-

reported^ 11 haVG led to the attac -'ks f Since naval officials have declined to discuss the issue it is permissible to speculate that two activities bv naval forces led to the brushes with submarines:—-(1) Convoying of additional supplies to Implement the base at Iceland; (2) convoying of British vessels from tne North Amerifanrt i ment a P oi nt south of Iceland, where they come under the tJS? turn of British flying boats. Hoi u n 2•? not developed as a naval fnn i provides safe anchorage f° Vessels and aircraft, and shelter for ranKers and repair ships.

-11 ii? a Z, es American naval vessels piobably a thousand miles in reaching submarine-infested waters. Since destroyers apparently are Sroups, it may be assumed that German submarines will not take a large toll of them, particulaily for the reason that a submarine generally signs its own death warrant by attacking one ship while

other destroyers are in the neighbourhood. One submarine has little chance of getting a destroyer equipped with sonic devices. However, when a destroyer speeds toward one known submarine it may easily present a target for a second submarine. It is unfortunately true likewise that the weather gives submarines the advantage in the near-Arctic regions of Iceland. The nights there are now very long. Ordinary darkness does not obscure the silhouette of a surface vessel when hunted by keen eyes assisted by powerful glasses, but the darkness completely conceals the Deri-

scope wake of a submarine. ... It may be that the German High Command thought a taste of the realities of war might break the morale of the men assigned to the Icelandic patrol. If that impression did exist, the navy's reaction has proved its fallacy. Following close on this report by Mr. Hurd, another U.S. correspon-

dent records: Designation of Iceland as a full-fledged U.S. naval operating base _stirred conjecture In "Washington that extension of American naval patrols and convoy escorts all the way to Britain was imminent. The Secretary of War, Colonel Frank Knox, assigned Rear-Admiral James ii'r , a , u 54-year-old veteran of World war convoy battles against submarines, to command of the Iceland base. . Should the Atlantic Fleet add this job to its present assignment of guarding the sea lanes between America and Iceland, the island outpost would become the scene of even more intense military and naval operations than it has experienced since American forces mov»d in four months ago. Even if American bases are set up on the British Isles themselves—a not unlikely development—

it was considered probable that Iceland would remain the most important fleet base in the eastern Atlantic. "The command of the United States naval operating base, Iceland, shall include all United States naval shore activities, United States naval local defence forces and district naval craft and any additional units as may be," a brief announcement said.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AS19411129.2.92

Bibliographic details

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 283, 29 November 1941, Page 11

Word Count
1,013

ICELAND'S VITAL ROLE IN SEA WAR Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 283, 29 November 1941, Page 11

ICELAND'S VITAL ROLE IN SEA WAR Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 283, 29 November 1941, Page 11

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