What England Is—And Isn't

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 81, 5 April 1941, Page 1 (Supplement)

What England Is—And Isn't

QNE day in a London club a v distinguished civil servant, graduate of an ancient univer«ty. said: "The masses are all "B*; it is only the upper masses that are soft and lack'"B! in guts." He referred espe- «% to the small group of yjiwervatives who then were ,n we saddle and were losing J»y battle in the field of *plomacy, hoping that somelow they would nevertheless *» the last one. It seemed odd that the under-paid ""ttney workers, the ill-housed miners, fle slum-dwelling factory employees, 'little shopkeepers should form the *»' substance of the country, while * educated, travelled, well-to-do, the "-appointed leaders, should fail the ' atl °n. Yet that was what this highly npetent upper-class observer conhimo aDd eVeDtS S6em to have borne *■* leadership lead° d v Britain fi ? hts under a double ari,r P ' Winst ™ Churchill, an partT at Wh ° lOnS WaS a P° litical Er * mon S his own class, and « Bevin and Herbert Morrison l?** tm ß labour. It seems likely W 1 Will for » e ' s °cially, a new 'ess feudal and less castle-ridden oritam

that ' 8 pertinent to Point out don'r 8 Vefy Conservativ e "LonDttrh UneS " ° nCe pUt i 4 in discussin S last am * thC industrial leaders of the »ith Century often seemed completely bat"? Benße of social obli g ation ( a «rea, T ibly Visible in the depressed « tne last two decades), it is *»e n'rto t0 ad(l that much progress W »'M \L be , Uveen two' World •* th! "'""Wing alum* nml in rai•otkerfc btandard of living of the

What do wo know of England? The writer, who was one of the American journalists who visited New Zealand last year, asked that question of his countrymen in this article, condensed from the "New York Times." His own observations of the Old Country make interesting reading. D.. 17 7 7 r 77 7

by Harold LaUender Even Conservative Governments

helped subsidise working-class housing, a device once frowned upon as socialistic. The governing class, as it was traditionally called, may have failed sadly in leadership in recent years, but it retained the merit of knowing when to give way in time—though sometimes only in the nick of time— to avoid revolution; and in this way it contributed to Britain's peaceful advance. Americans sometimes think of Britain as a land of slums and feudal class-consciousness. For three generations or more the pursuit of wealth created misery and vast waste of human resources. Progress seemed slow, the patience of the workers seemed amazing, the complacence of Conservatives fantastic. But even the workers believe in gradual progress; this writer has sat in "pubs" and listened to unemployed men in derelict towns argue against revolution, just as bankers did. The British consider that their strength lies in cautious advance. Such is their temperament.

The "underprivileged" masses, Britain's "forgotten men," believe in their country, with all its faults. The way they have calmly continued working (at moderate wages) amid murderous bombing is one of the wonders of the century. Timt drastic social changes will en&ue later, .nobody in Britain doubts.

While some in America have criticised Britain as hopelessly conservative, others lately have looked askance at her for being—at least prospectively—socialistic. Britain moves slowly, yet in social security measures she preceded the United States by 20 years. It is likely that she will grow more socialistic in some ways, but in a gradual, highly individualistic fashion; not in the Russian or German fashion. She will never do anything in the way continentals do.

The British habitually change the substance while retaining the forms, remodel institutions while pretending they arc unaltered; hence Britain may seem more conservative than she is. Semi socialistic measures have been adopted while the structure and trappings of a feudal monarchy remained intact. Illusion of Conservatism The most radical British revolution conceivable probably would preserve the Crown and the State coaches and the fiction that the King is still (as he is officially proclaimed) the "liege lord" of his people. Thus is the illusion of conservatism made compatible with social change and the attack on privilege becomes the less painful.

It was in foreign policy that the ruling group went furthest astray in the years before the war, that democracy was more grievously misled. As the Government kept making concessions to dictators, strengthening them at every opportunity while keeping Britain inferior in air power, many in London shook, their heads and asked if the Cabinet placed the Conservative party's interests above those *jf the Empire. The British Government saved Mussolini in I'Xio by preventing full sanctions against him. It condoned Hitler's seizure of the Khineland in 1930, his first step toward the conquest of Europe. It helped Hitler's puppet, General Franco, to conquer Spain, in spite of his German-installed guns aimed at Gibraltar. In 1930 Stanley Baldwin confessed that he had refused to ask rearmament during the election of 1955 for fear that his party would suffer defeat. One consequence was that Neville Chamberlain ga\c away Czechoslovakia

in 1938; another is that. K.A.F. boys to-day go up to fight against odds of four to one, even ten to one—in their own skies. Incredible Casualness The explanation is to be found first in an incredible casualness in important things, a traditional and complacent sense of lazy power inherited from the days when Britain, safe behind her wall of ships, could take her time and fight when she would. It seemed impossible to doubt that Britain somehow would triumph in the end, however many might Ik> her blunders. The blunders were as much taken for granted as the ultimate triumph.

Secondly, there was a deep fear of Communism, intensified in the Conservative classes but not confined to them, which led to the widespread belief that Fascism was preferable and perhaps not so bad as it was painted. This was the root of the persistent hope of coming to terms with Hitler.

Third, there was a sense of guilt for the Treaty of Versailles and, as a counterpart, a disposition to excuse violent breaches of that treaty without foreseeing their menacing consequences. For all these reasons, people as well as Government were confused— though the Government, fully informed, had less excuse.

All these sources of error illustrate eminently British qualities and defects. The easualness testifies to an instinctive confidence in reserves of strength, such as the war is calling forth. The revulsion against Communism was a sign of the innate Conservatism and peacefulness of the British. The guilty feeling about the treaty sprang from that sense of fair dealing which lies so deep, and often, as in this instance, gives the other fellow a good deal more than full benefit of the doubt. What Critics Forget Americans sometimes find it difficult to regard Britain as a democracy when she clings to monarchy, retains vestiges of social feudalism and rules over dependent peoples. They forget that the real political power lies in the elective House of Commons, not in the King or House of Lords; that America, too, rules dependent peoples and that in these violent times there are many in both the Philippines and India who do not yearn for independence.

They forget sometimes that the Empire is an oddly loose and variegated structure, that the white Dominions are virtually independent, that India has received an instalment of responsible Government and is on the road to Dominion status. But Americans can hardly be expected to understand an Empire which few of the British themselves can explain.

Much of the ant i-British fooling in America is traceable -to memories of violence in Ireland and such events as the massacre at Amritsar, attributable to Governments or isolated officers rather than to the British people.

It seems fair to recall that against all such offences, as apainst the war in South Africa, British voices have been vehemently and bitterly raised, and Government has paid heed. There are no severer critics of Britain than the British; one may almost say that nobody is more anti-British than the British.

Britain has been guilty of many faults and crimes. Often lias this writer heard Britons enumerate them ■ —more ftilsomely and more bitterly than any American has done. She has permitted much social injustice. Her Government has made almost every possible fumble in diplomacy. If it he argued that she should pay for her faults, the answer seems to he that she is paying with usurious interest. Were Too Trustful If the British were slow in reform, they were also slow to anger, slow to arm for defence. If they had been less trustful of their neighbours, less fair, less decent, they mi<rht have armed sooner and been in less peril. When one looks at the brave new world of Totalitaria. dive bombing at Britain from across the Channel, and compares its methods and manners and institutions witli those freer and looser and less efficient and more humane ones which Britain has evolved —then Britain, with all her sins and defects, seems to represent one of the high points in human achievement.

So it appears to an American who has long lived in Britain and whose upbringing has taught him to value those free institutions which Britain (in spite of feudal trappings) and America (without those trappings! have alike developed and defended and esteemed.