The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1940, THE DEBATE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 109, 9 May 1940, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun.

THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1940, THE DEBATE.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the irrong that veeds resistance. For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

"Germany," said Mr. Chamberlain in the opening; speech of the great debate in the House of Common?, "is so placed that she can at any moment attack at any one of a number of different points. "We want to be ready to meet the attack wherever it may come. , ' That is true, but it was true also a month ago. Seven months had passed then since the outbreak of war, and no less a personage than the Chief of the General Staff, on April 5, had with the Government's approval declared: '"Frankly, we would welcome an attack. We are sure of ourselves and have no fears.

. . . We are ready for anything they may start . . . we would welcome a go at them." General Ironside was .-peaking , more particularly of the Allies' readiness on the Western Front, but bis words and the spirit of them naturally created the impression that the British Government, having been given valuable

time for preparation, felt that its armed forces were ready for anything, and felt justified in letting its people know it. Four days later the Germans struck at Norway. We have learned since that the Government had for months suspected the possibility of such an attack, and for one month had kept small forces ready for the specific purpose of countering it. What has happened since April 9 needs no recapitulation. Ths Commons has been concerned to discover why it happened, and—far more important—to convince itself, if possible, that there Avill be no repetition.

It would be difficult for anyone, reading the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues, to feel confident that the fate of the North-western Expeditionary Force was inevitable. The Ministers made it a strong point that the Nazi air weapon was decisive, and Mr. Churchill declared that air inferiority would condemn the Allies to difficulty, suffering and danger for some time to come. But Nazi air power and its deadly consequences are no new thing. They were demonstrated in Poland. They must have been prominent in the calculations of the Allies' High Command every day since then. They were, on Mr. Churchill's own statement, influential in the decision not to attempt a direct landing of troops at Trondheim, after such a landing had been planned. Nevertheless, fear of the Nazi bombers was not allowed to influence the "diversionary landings" at Andalsnes and Namsos of troops which a fortnight later had to be withdrawn because of the bombers. Such apparent inconsistencies, giving a hint of divided counsels, or of changing counsels, are not few in the Minister's apologia, and they are not to be wholly explained away by decrying, as retrospective wiseacres, those who criticised them. As Ministers on occasion do not hesitate to point out, they have access to information which is not revealed to the public; but that is a stronger reason why they should be called upon to aecount for the decisions they make on the basis of their superior information. They have been called to account, and their statements, satisfactory or at any rate not entirely unconvincing as explanations of particular aspects of the campaign, are not satisfactory as a whole. They are not satisfactory because, as ''The Times" has remarked, they do not remove from the people's mind the "oppressive doubt" as to whether "their rulers are so conscious of the danger and so energetic to withstand it as themselves."

INCONCLUSIVE END.

The vote of the Commons at the end of the debate is the proof that the doubts inspired by the reading , of the Minist-ers' speeches were shared, and felt more strongly, by those who heard them. Judging: by the figures —281 to 200—a considerable number of the Government's sworn supporters was either absent (some on active serviee) or abstained from voting, so that less than a majority of the House entered the Government division lobby. Their abstention is evidence, not of their satisfaction with the Government's record, but of their reluctance to vote against their party. It seems clear that the little group which for nine years—throughout the rise of Nazi power —has guided the destiny of Great Britain is losing its grip. What will follow cannot yet be learned, but the Government in the present ch'cunistances can hardly ignore such a vote. Some reconstruction —much more than a "reshuffle" —will be necessary. In the last war, in days darker than these, a new Government was formed, under an indomitable man who renewed Britain's self-confidence and fired the Empire with fresh purpose. The opportunity for another such seems to be at hand. |