MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1940. ITALY'S POSITION.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 100, 29 April 1940, Page 6

MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1940. ITALY'S POSITION.

The grave speculation concerning Italy's future attiturin to the war will be increased by reports publi a ho<l to-day. Both the speech by Count Granrfi and the broadcast to Italian troops riigge-it strongly that Signor is on the pvc ft' a momentous tleei-ion, and in the light o£ recent events that decision could only lx> to abantlon the state of "non-belligerency ,, which Italy declared in September. For weeks the Italian newspapers, imilf-r Government direction, have been publishing report? designed to persuade the people that the British and French have been outclassed by the .-o-r-al!pil "young, vigorous Germans." They have placed emphasis on German successes, and at the same time they have minimised the achievements of the Allies. Nearly a fortnight ago, referring to this

hostile attitude of tho Italian Pre.-s, tho British Minister for Economic Warfare said bluntly that "we should like to know where we ?t{ind with Italy." To that there has beeri no reply, but tho campaign ngauist the Allies ha~ not boon rli-r-ontiniiPd.

It is a campaign which appears perfectly consistent with u ili-f-i-ion that a reluctant public must be prepared for active intervention. There is. however, another possible explanation.

Italy, avowedly, hopes to get something out of this war for herself. She cannot get it from Germany, but' only from Britain and France. It is therefore to her interest that she should increase her strength, and her barg-aining-power, by every method available to her. Those methods include the method of diplomatic "squeeze." By building up the impression that the Allies may quickly have to deal Avith a new belligerent, Italy may hope to reduce the pressure which the Allies are exei-ting to dislodge the Germans from Norway. That is a service ■which Signor Mussolini could perform for his partner of the Axis without committing himself and without disadvantage to his country. On the other hand, it is possible that he has convinced himself that active intervention at this time offers possibilities which might not be open later. But to reach such a decision he must accept the task of convincing his own people, who are against intervention, that not only their patriotism (of which he is assured) but their national and individual interests woeld be served by fighting by the side of Nazi Germany, and her other ally, atheistic Russia. And, finally, he would have to face the fact that there are British and French fleets in the Mediterranean, and neither has been weakened by a single ship because of the Norwegian campaign. If these considerations, plus the strong restraining influence of the Vatican, have not prevailed, Signor Mussolini will be judged as considerably less astute than his reputation and his record suggest.