WAR IN U.S. EYES.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 69, 21 March 1940, Page 6

WAR IN U.S. EYES.

DECISION IN AIR. ACHILLES HEEL OF GERMANY. WHEN AIXIEB CAN TIP BALANCE. (By a Special Correspondent.) WASHINGTON. With war news so scanty, the widespread misconceptions of the European military situation are not surprising. Nevertheless, it is surprising how far the common picture of the war varies from that of American military and diplomatic experts. These men, whose information is as good ae any in the world, are unanimous on the vital point. Germany's only real weakness lies in her inability to reproduce her heavy industrial factories. The plants making large armaments, unprocessed eteel, and, above all, the huge and intricate tools needed by other plant*, lie exposed to attack from the air at Eseen and Dortmund, Pilsen and one or two other centres. The equivalent English and French plants are just ae exposed, but the English and French have the resources to rebuild, slow and painful as that process would be. Because of its effect on world opinion, each eide has waited for the other to begin the war in the air in dreadful earnest. Sooner or later this caution will be exhausted, and then, as they are etill markedly inferior to the Germans in air armaments, the English and French will suffer eeriously tor a time. Essentially, however, American experts believe that the present stalemate will continue until the English and. French can build up air striking power to attack the Germans where they are vulnerable.

All of which explains the pressing importance of repeal of the arms embargo, which not only prevents the placing of additional aeroplane orders, but is now holding in this country a large number of 'planes bought and paid for by the democracies. Supplies For At Least Two Years. In reaching their conclusion, the experts begin by brushing aside the large, easy misconceptions which the scarcity of war news has nourished. They laugh wryly at the notion that this is, in the distressing language of Senator Borah, a "Phoney War." American military attaches' have not received much more news than anyone else, but they know enough to be sure the democracies are fighting for keeps.

The twin expectations that Germany will soon suffer a social crack-up or be soon starved out are considered quite groundless. Over a long period, the social crack-up is thought possible. There are foci of discontent, such as the miners angered by the stretch-out, the Czech population, and, curiously enough, certain powerful business groups. But three years is the minimum period mentioned by the experts for the discontent to take effect.

As for the notion that German resources are inadequate for fairly protracted fighting. American General Staff statistics proving the contrary were printed in this space several months ago. At that time, the military observers believed that the Germans had supplies for ordinary needs in a war lasting at least a year and probably two. With Rumania's oil and the raw materials of all Russia at her disposal, Germany has

supplies for at least two years aud probably three. In making this forecast, the experts take into account the shortage of German tank cars, the difficulties of transport from Russia into Germany and nil the other hopeful factors so much relied on by wishful thinkers. (The Germans' inability to replace heavy industrial plants is not affected, however, by their successes in Eastern Europe. The Three Wars. With these misconceptions out of the way, the experts note two possibilities of a slightly different class. Germany may change the face of the war by goingthrough Holland, Belgium or Switzerland, but is extremely unlikely to do so since these moves would open flanks unprotected by the west wall. Germany and Russia may also join in a drive down through Southern Russia into Asia, endangering Iraq, Iran, Fren<A Syria and even the Suez Canal. But this too is thought unlikely. Thus the military picture is r?dnoed to a simple stalemate along the west wall and Maginot Line. Aβ Germany is adequately supplied, the war at sea can only have a delayed effect. The war on the land cannot be decisive. The war in the air must end by tipping the balance one way or the other.^-N.A.N.A.