HITLER'S REPLY.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 207, 2 September 1939, Page 11

HITLER'S REPLY.

BRITISH "REBUFF." Spurned Nazi Efforts To Win Friendship. THREAT TO MOBILISE FORGES. United Press Association. —Copyright. (Received 3 p.m.) LONDON, September 1. Herr Hitler replied to Mr. Chamberlain's letter on August 23 that Germany had never sought conflict with Britain and had vainly endeavoured for years to win Britain's friendship. The Fuehrer added that he was prepared to settle the Danzig and Corridor difficulties by negotiation on a basis of unparalleled magnanimity, but Britain's allegations regarding German mobilisation against Poland, aggressiveness to Rumania and Hungary, in addition to her declarations about . the guarantee had dispelled the Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis tolerable to Germany.

Herr Hitler continued that Britain's pact with Poland could not change Germany's determination to safeguard her own interests. He shared Mr. C hamberlain's anticipation that a long war was likely in such an event.

Germany, if Britain attacked her, would be found prepared and determined, preferring every misery and tribulation to sacrificing her national interests and honour.

Herr Hitler referring to British and French measures of mobilisation, wrote: "Since Germany had never intended other than defensive military measures against Britain and France, nor had intended any present or future attack, this announcement could refer only to a contemplated act of menace against Germany.

"I therefore inform Your Excellency that if these military announcements are made effectual 1 will order immediate mobilisation of the German forces."

"All my life I have fought," said Herr Hitler, "for friendship between Britain and Germany, but British diplomacy convinced me of the futility of such a battle," continued the Fuehrer. "Nobody could be happier than I should be if there were any change."

A translation of a verbal communication to Sir Ncvile Henderson from HenHitler on August 25 stated that Sir Nevile had expressed the hope that an Anglo-German understanding was yet possible. Herr Hitler said he had again mentally turned things over. He desired a move regarding Britain as decisive as his move regarding Russia.

The assertion, in view of the comparative populations of the nations involved, that Germany desired to conquer the world was ridiculous. Poland's actual provocations were intolerable. It made no difference who was responsible.

Mr. Chamberlain's speech, he said, was not calculated to change the German attitude. Its result at most would be a bloody, - incalculable war between Britain and Germany— bloodier than that of 1914-IS. Germany would not have to fight on two fronts, as had been the case in the last war. The Russo-German agreement was unconditional and signified a change in German foreign policy, rendering Germany economically secure for the duration of war.

Hitler's Three Wishes.

A war between Britain and Germany at the best would bring some profit to Germany but none to Britain, added Herr Hitler.

The Polish problem must and would be solved, but the Fuehrer was prepared and determined, after a solution, to reapproach Britain with a comprehensive offer.

Being a man of great decisions and capable of great actions, he accepted the fact of the British Empire's existence, and was ready to pledge himself personally for its continued life, placing Germany's power at its disposal—if, first, his limited negotiable colonial demands were fulfilled, for which he was prepared to fix the longest time limit; secondly, his obligations to Italy were not touched because he could not withdraw from them any more than could Britain from hers to France; thirdly, he also stressed an irrevocable determination never again to enter a conflict with Russia, and was ready to conclude agreements witli Britain which would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire so far as Germany was concerned, but would assure the Empire German assistance, regardless of where it might be necessary. Guarantee British Empire. The Fuehrer would then be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments, corresponding to the new political situation and economically tolerable. He was not interested in western problems. Frontier modification in the West did not enter into consideration. Germany's fortifications, costing milliards, were her final Western frontier. A blessing for both nations might result if Britain would consider these ideas. If she rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case would Britain emerge stronger. The last war proved this.° "The Fuehrer is a man of ad-infmi-tllin decisions whereby he is bound. This is his last offer." Britain Replies Os.ce More. The British Government replied on August 28 to Herr Hitler's communications of the previous Wednesday and Friday, stating that it fully shared hi« desire to make friendship the basis of Anglo-German relations, and that it believed a mutual understanding would bring blessings to both countries.

The reply added that Heir Hitler'proposals were very general and would require closer definition, but the British Government was fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussions, to which, if the German and Polish differences were peacefully composed, they would be ready to proceed at the soonest practicable moment.

The British Government entirely agreed with Herr Hitler that there must first be a settlement of the GermanPolish difference*, but everything turned upon the method. An understanding on the point was essential. Such an understanding should be effected by agreement between both countries on the lines of

safeguarding Poland, the importance of whose interests Herr Hitler recognised in his speech of April 28.

However, it should be understood that other Powers must guarantee any «ettlement. Britain contributing to its effective operation. Poland Willing To Talk. The British Government thought the next step should be direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on the basis of safeguarding Poland and securing a settlement by an international guarantee. Poland was willing to enter discussions on this basis. Agreement as a result of such discussions would have led to a wider understanding between Britain and Germany. The present tension, accompanied iby frontier incidents, had constantly endangered peace. All such incidents should have been suppressed and unverified reports should not have been circulated. 'The results of a decision to use force had been clearly set out in Mr. Chamberlain's letter of August 22. Doubtless Heir Hitler fully recognised them. Disarmament Hint. The British Government, in reference to Herr Hitler's suggestion for a reduction of armaments, believed that if a peaceful settlement were obtained the world would assist in the resumption of i>eaceful trade in place of war activities. A just settlement of the GenuanPolisli issue might open the way to world peace. Failure might plunge the! world into war-—a calamity without parallel in history. Poland's "Barbaric Acts." Herr Hitler's reply to the British communication on August 28 was handed to Mr. Nevile Henderson next day. It said that the Fuehrer's sug-; gestions were made in older to again express his desire for co-operation and friendship with Britain.

To remove the doubt that it could be bought at the price of the renunciation of Germany's vital interests —let alone the just and honourable demands of Germany—lie had submitted to Poland oral and written proposals up to March, 103U, offering the possibility of a solution acceptable to both parties.

Poland rejected them, using the rejection as a pretext for military measures —since intensified. Poland was in a state of mobilisation in the middle of August, encroaching on Danzig, to which she was making threatening demands. She was perpetrating barbaric maltreatment and persecution, which state of affairs was unbearable to a great Power and had now forced Germany to safeguard her interests.