BRITAIN'S STRONG NOTE TO GERMANY.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 151, 29 June 1939, Page 12

BRITAIN'S STRONG NOTE TO GERMANY.

JVO ENCIRCLEMENT.

Explanation Of Recent

Commitments.

NAVAL TREATY QUESTIONS

United I'ress Association.—Copyright. (Kecelved 1.30 p.m.) LONDON, June 28. The British Government, in a strong Note to Germany, published to-niglit, formally denies pursuing a policy of encirclement and denies that it is inevitable that Britain must always be hostile to Germany in event of the Reich being involved in war. The denials are contained in a memorandum to (iermany in reply to Germany's denunciation of the naval agreement with Britain. The text was issued by the Foreign Otlice. The British text recalls Germany's justification for the denunciation in the memorandum of April 27, and proceeds: '•It is not the case that in whatever part of Europe Germany might be involved in a war-like conflict Britain must always take up an attitude hostile to Germany. Britain could only be hostile if Germany were to commit an act of aggression against another country, and the political decisions to which it is understood the German Government refers, involving guarantees to certain countries by Britain, could only operate if the countries concerned were to be attacked by Germany. Misunderstanding Indicated. "In the German memorandum the claim is made to descril)e British policy as a policy of encirclement. This description is without any justification, and indicates a misunderstanding and a misreading of British purposes, which must be corrected. The German Government's recent action to incorporate certain territories in the Reich, whatever may have been held by them to be )• tifying reasons, has undoubtedly resulted in a great increase in. anxiety in many quarters. "Actions subsequently taken by the United Kingdom Government have no other purpose than to contribute to the removal of this anxiety by assisting smaller nations to feel secure in the enjoyment of their independence, to which they have the same right an Britain or Germany herself," the Note continues. "The commitments which Britain has recently undertaken in pursuance of this purpose arc limited, nnd could only become effective if the countries concerned were victims of aggression, nor has Hi« Majesty's Government the intention or denire to restrict the development of Germany's trade."

The Government points out that under j the British-German payments agreement a considerable supply of free exchange has been made available to Germany for the Requisition of raw materials, and suggests that further measures for the improvement of Germany's economic position could lie discussed if confidence and goodwill could \ be established. Needs of Both Countries. "The consistent desire of His Majesty's Government, far from being promotion of war with Germany, has been and is the establishment of relations between Britain and Germany on a basis of mutual recognition of the needs of both countries, with due regard to other nations." Turning to the naval treaty, the Govenmcnt stresses that it was expressly stated to be of permanent character, and a contribution to the solution of the problem of naval limitation. The text refers to Notes and exchanges l>etween Sir Samuel Hoare and Herr von Ribbentrop to this effect, and the fixing of a ratio of 3.) to 100 as a permanent relationship, and adds that the only provision contemplating modification of the ratio was a. violent <T;«tnrb»nce of equilibrium of naval armaments. The German Government, however, had not maintained that such conditions did exist, and still U*s had they invited His Majesty's Government to examine the situation before taking its action, though provision was made for such I consultation.

Qualitative Provisions. Dealing with the qualitative provisions, which, presumably, the German Government desires to remain unaffected in principle, the Government points out. that the retention of these would notp alone suffice to' create the feeling of mutual security, which was the purpose of the Xaval agreement, and with which the provisions for the exchange of information were associated. Hia Majesty's Government, however, has always be?n ,-eady to consider the possibility of reaching, in the words of the German Xote, "a clear and categorical understanding." on a sure basis. The Government refers to the present uncertainty as regards cruiser limits, but presumes that Germany intends to adhere to 8000 tonner« mounting O.lin guns, and asks for confirmation of this assumption. It proceeds to refer to the Governments past forecasts to Germany of British strength at the end of 1942-3, and says it is clear that no further forecasts are necessary since they were designed merely to allow Germany to make full use of her 1935 quota. "But if Germany was no longer bound to a limit of 35 per cent, His Majesty's Government can no longer be bound by their forecasts of strength, which must be considered to be cancelled. Answering the last paragraph of the German memorandum expressing readiness to negotiate future problems, the British Government states that an exchange of views would help to clarify the situation, which in some respects is uncertain. For instance, besides the cruiser question, it is the Government's desire to "know whether Germany regards herself as bound by all the article* of the ;igreement of 1937, outside those in Part 111. If. however, Gernwuiy contemplates another agreement replacing the provisions now terminated, His Majesty's Government desires to know when, in the German view, the discussions should occur; and, secondly, how the German Government proposes to ensure that any action in the shape of denunciation or modification of the new agreement during its term of validity should carry the consent of both parties.