EUROPEAN TENSION.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 151, 29 June 1939, Page 10

EUROPEAN TENSION.

WASHINGTON VIEW.

HITLER AND POLAND.

(By JOSEPH ALSOP and ROBERT

KIXTXER.)

WASHINGTON', May 2.

There was but one slight faux pas in the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. Hitler's invading army, did it« jot) as though by clockwork. All was prepared in advance, down to the curfew notices in the German and Czech languages which the German troops posted in each town as soon as it was in their hands. But seemingly, after the capture of Prague and the cities of Bohemia, someone grew careless. The curfew notices posted in Moravia to the eastward anticipated a conquest not yet accomplished, being printed in German and Bumanian. Fortunately, the trifling error hardly mattered, „for it was promptly observed and remedied. Such, at least, is a story officially reported by an eye-witness and carrying every sign of authenticity, except its own inherent unlikelihood. True or not. it neatly essentialises the nightmarish flavour of these days of crisis. This is a time when nothing is probable or improbable, credible or incredible, for the simple reason that anything can, and perhaps will, happen to-morrow morning. Under the circumstances, it's quite natural that the experts of the State Department should confess themselves blankly unable to foresee the future. But, since the isolationists seem strangely inclined to take courage from Hitler's recent speech to the Beichstag, it is worth noting that, while venturing no predictions, the men who ought to know are more than ever inclined to fear the worst. Hitler versus Britain. The Polish situation, for example, is regarded as exceedingly threatening. Three essential points are at issue—Danzig, the Polish Corridor and the Anglo-Polish agreement. Hitler wants Danzig, a road across the Corridor and the abandonment of the agreement. To-day it is thought that his territorial ambitions are now subordinated to his desire to defeat the British effort to encircle Germany by breaking the first link in the chain—the agreement. The agreement is still unsigned, but, if the Poles do abandon it. they will be at Hitler's mercy. Meanwhile, partly because he wants them anyway and partly to frighten the Poles, Hitler is increasing his pressure for Danzig and his road across the Corridor. Hitler's pressure is being met, to date, by strong resistance from the Poles. So far as Danzig is concerned, the city is 93 per cent German, with a strongly Xa/.i Government. If Hitler cares to give the order, the Danzig Senate can at any moment proclaim the Free City reunited with the Reich. Then the Poles will have 110 recourse but to march in. or keep quiet. Oil the other hand, if he insists 011 his road across the Polish Corridor, Hitler i will either have to march in or persuade the j Poles to renounce all real sovereignty over j their avenue to the sea. The logic of the situation is that war must come unless one of the two parties backs down, both having declared their uiidviiig determination not to. And that, of course, is only one of the danger points. In the last days, indications have reached the State Department that the German pressure on Poland may he only a "blind," planned to demoralise and distract the other «ide before such an attack on Bumauia as was irpplied in the Moravian curfew notices. Meanwhile, tension is increasing in the Mediterranean. Hopes and Fears. To be sure, there are some rays of hope. It now appears, on positive authority, that the Anglo-Russian negotiations have been misrepresented. The Russians are not demanding any promise of English help against Japan, and the negotiations are limited to the Western front. Nevertheless, due to Polish and Bumanian feeling against Russia, the English must ask the Russians for a sort of blank-cheque commitment, to help the Rumanians or Poles only if, as and when requested to do so. Hope of success, therefore, is still small. | Meanwhile, it becomes more and more obvious 1 that, if Hitler is to fight at all, it will be greatly to his advantage to do so at once. Under the circumstances, it would seem sensible for the United States to calculate the meaning of war in Europe, and to act accordingly. And thus the current state of affairs in Congress adds the final touch of I improbability to the whole incredible picture. 1 Because the Senate cannot settle its mind one : way or the other, this country is apparently I running the risk of being caught, all unpre- [ pared, in a general explosion.— (X.A.X.A.) I