EUROPE TO-DAY.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 88, 15 April 1939, Page 12

EUROPE TO-DAY.

BRITISH POLICY.

CHANGES AND CHANCES.

MORE CONCESSIONS POSSIBLE.

(Ky JOHN MULCAN.)

LONDON, .March 25.

Invents in 'Ruropc are now moving with a tempo which in disconcerting to any diplomacy based on nineteenth century conception*. A correspondent writing at this distance is tempted to do co only hecnusn of (lie conviction that certain political realities may still be largely ignored in (he surfeit of cabled events and because of the belief that a recognition of these realities is essential (o the independent survival of a llritish Dominion during the next few years.

The seizure of Czechoslovakia was a logical though unnecessary consequence of the Munich agreement; in the event of war, Germany would have occupied these territories and seized these munitions over-night. Annexation at this moment was determined first of all by (he characteristics of National Socialist Germany, which allow of little compromise; secondly, by a growing confidence in Germany's rulers, particularly after (he fail of Catalonia in January had sounded the "all-clear" in Western Ruropc; thirdly, by a need—comparable to that which inspired November's pogroms —for short profits and quick returns.

The reactions of the British Government must be considered from two points of view. An explanation is first of all necessary as to why this latest "putsch" should have coincided so nstoundingly with a wave of optimistic Government pronouncements. This has perhaps been forgotten in the excitement of what followed after, but a few random examples will easily recall it. On March 0 papers of the left, here and in France, were reporting from Prague the belief that Herr Hitler would march in on the loth. On March 9 the British Government issued to journalists a statement prophesying a "golden age of peace and prosperity." On March 10 Sir Samuel Hoare used the same words in a speech and added, "the policy of Germany and Italy is a policy of peace and' tolerance." Troop movements had already begun, and on March 11 news of this was officially conveyed to the British Government by M. Bonnet. On March 12 the tone of the Government Press, and notably Mr. J. L. Garvin in the "Sunday Observer," was still bright with optimism, and on March 13 the British trade delegation left for Germany with Ministers seeing them off in high spirits. On March 15 German troops reached Prague. It is perhaps unfair to add to this the examples of "Punch," which appeared on the same day with a cartoon showing John Bull deriding pessimists, or "John Bull" itself, which sadly enough goes to press a week before publication, and which appeared as late as March 18 with a leading article denouncing "scaremongers."

It is fairly clear from all this that the British Government had received certain assurances in the time-honoured manner and in a flush of wishful thinking had accepted them. It is also asserted, probably truthfully, that the optimistic announcements were made without the knowledge and probably to (lie horror of the Foreign Office. So much for the opening moves of the "putsch." Next in importance is a consideration of what were the British Government's immediate reactions toi the situation. The statements which were made in the House on March 15 were clearly indicative. Mr. Chamberlain refused to associate himself with any charges of "breaches of faith" and Htated dogmatically that the policy of "appeasement" had not failed and would continue. Sir John Simon, asked whether the Government would not consider taking immediate and urgent steps to form a defensive alliance with peaceloving Powers, including Russia, said coldly that a policy of collective security of this kind was impractical. What Follows After. These points should be remembered and equated against Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham on the following Friday, when his advisers had sensed , opinion in the country, when he himBclf had been threatened with a resurgent "Tory revolt," and when, it is said, unofficial but strong remonstrances had arrived from the United States. They should be remembered and equated also against subsequent Government statements of an intention to form a defensive alliance in Europe. It should bo remebered that the Cabinet is, in fact, decisively split on this issue. Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon have for the moment bowed before a storm. Lord Halifax, who bases Ms politics sincerely on Christianity, has taken a stand againsi "appease ment and is not likely to Yctract; but the junior Ministers are as divided as their seniors, and, while Mr. Hudson talked in Moscow, Mr. Oliver Stanley fought a delaying action in the House of Commons to preserve the new AiifloGcrman trade agreement—an agreement which was made during the week of Czechoslovakia's annexation, an agreement, moreover, which was by its nature hostile to the Anglo-American trade agreement. It would be unreasonable to expect a complete volte-face from appeasement to collective security to have any durable reality. For it to have reality some outward signs would be necessary; the "Tory revolt" would have to succeed; Mr. Eden, Mr. Duff Cooper and Mr. Winston Churchill would have to be back in the Cabinet where they belong; the Labour members would no longer have to send for M. Maisky, the Russian ambassador, as they did last week, in order to acquaint themselves of the truth of the negotiations which are proceeding. All these things may come about and within this year, but they may come too late. Concessions to Italy. The chances of a collective front in Europe are, in fact, not good. Time, as Mr. Etlcn pointed out last week, is desperately short, and every hour counts. There is still an eleventh-hour hope of saving the peace of Europe by forming nil inflexible political and military alliance with Russia and France, with Uie favourable backing of the United Estates and the hope that smaller States IwSS n^ a 5 h . thcm solves to such an i ßut , in this c «eventh hour Mr. men? llTl B( l ctlon o£ the G °vernFrance S M ' Bonnut ' B Allowing in ioSSVtn IT" M that a better j in tZ S. 2 ffer to Italy . Europe to-day, fl222*J|

and M. Bonnet are prevented by political history and outlook from talking the language of collective security.

A battle for Rumania and Poland is now being fought. Poland, watching Czechoslovakia, saw last September the value of an alliance with the Western democracies. Rumania, now a German economic protectorate, keeps some shadow of independence from the slight fact that King Carol is out of favour with the Nazi leaders and from the further fact that Mme. Lupescu is a Jew. Both these countries are bitterly hostile to Russia and sceptical of the practical value of an alliance with England or France.

It would be foolish to pretend that the future is a pleasant one. The immediate prospect for this country is a crisis caused by Italian demands on France, with German backing. This may develop at any moment, certainly between now and the autumn, and will almost as certainly be met by concessions on the part of France and England. These "dane-geld" methods may buy another year. of armed and precarious peace, leading beyond that to a war fought desperately and in isolation. To those who would ask whether at that point such a war would still be worth fighting, the writer of this article would answer yes, having seen enough of Czech and German and Spanish refugees during these recent months to recognise the nature of the two civilisations which are in opposition. History, as 'we hava said before, will have its own verdict on the Governments which made such a war inevitable.