AMERICA'S DEFENCE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 84, 11 April 1939, Page 8

AMERICA'S DEFENCE.

ON TWO COASTS. SAFE FROM ANY GROUP. Since 1897 Colonel Frederick Palmer, military historian, the writer of the following article, has been on the scene of action wherever war broke out. He served as an officer of the American Expeditionary Force in France, earning the Distinguished Service Medal. He is the author of numerous books. NEW YORK, March 8. All the soil under the American flag, and that of our neighbours, is safe from attack by any Power or combination of Powers within sight In business-like realism, let us see why this is so. Since we are between two great oceans, with two coasts to defend, we should consider the threat of the rising power of Japan just as niattcr-of-factly as any threat from the Atlantic side. Should we" fortify Guam, our Navy has an outpost 4000 miles from San Francisco, and any worry about what Japan can do to us in case of war is further diminished while Japan begins to wonder what we may do to her. Until the Munich agreement and reported Xazi and Fascist activities in Central and South America, the potential enemy we had in mind was Japan. Our battle 'fleet, our first line of defence, had lonsr l>een concentrated on the Pacific side. Built and building, the strength of our Xavy is about three to two against Japan. That is so far as wo positively know. Xo European Power has ever been able to conceal the hiving down of a major ship from rival intelligence sorvu-es. | The Japanese can, thanks to their racial ', physiognomy. Xo observer not burn with slant eyes can get within ton mile.- of Sascbo. Japan's great naval Isise on her land-locked inland sea. Surveillance sharpen* a* a foreigner ! approaches a shipyard. Every workman is i pledged to secrecy. Wo employ no spies, but other nations are still uncertain whether Japan is actually building two 40.000-ton or 45,000ton battleships, larger than any we are building. Be the report true or a bluff, we should avoid any risk by keeping pace. Tf the need should enmc - ami for that we build—our fleet will not meet the Japanese ill battle off the Pacific coast. Our line of naval defence is drawn far out at sea. from Samoa to the Aleutian Inlands which extend from the mainland of Alaska, towards Siberia. 1 Midway is our key Gibraltar outpost of. Hawaii, with its heavily fortified Army, Xavy nod Air Force bases. Power and Distance. The three-to-onc ratio is not to lie considered on the flat basis of three, dollars to two, three tons of steel to two or three men of equal skill to two. As well, might we consider that, of two prize-fighters of about equal power, one who had fought five hard round-* and was winded should be pitted against the other who was fresh. That is the weakness of a navy far from its bases against a navy close to it-; bases. The loss of power in ratio to distance ha* increased with the increase of the sire of fleets and their complicated requirements on the sea. under the sea and in the air. Our own fleet at sea. ready for battle as it always is, comprises about 1">0 ships, including aft auxiliaries. Where three to two applies tb two navies equidistant from their bases, it may become three to one for a navy close to its bases against a navy, far from its bases. Any fleet at war is dependent upon its supplies. In the final test, it cannot steam without oil. Its, planes cannot fly without petrol. The farther it is from its bases, the farther it has to send, under exposure to attack, any crippled ships for repairs, and the longer line of communications it has to guard against, raids by 'planes, cruiser* and destroyers. Our fleet has a long steaming radius. It is built for action far out at sea. as the soundest means of defence on the vast expanse of the Pacific. The Japanese fleet, built for the defence of home waters, as the German anil Italian navies are, has a shorter steaming radius. With our poKcy strictly that of defence, then, in case of war, the Japanese fleet would have to steam 3000 miles before it reached our naval defence line. Fully protected by the defence guns of Hawaii, we should have the advantage of choosing the battle ground. It takes no war college strategist to see that we should welcome the Japanese fleet steaming past Hawaii, and then cut its communications and strike it in the rear. A Possible Combination. Grant that Japan, all her strength occupied in China.'and ■Germany and Italy, fully occupied in Europe, had cleared the way and had armies to spare and the ships to transport them across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Their transports must have harbour protection. All our harbours, east and west, have coast defence guns which no battleship, let alone a transport, may approach. All on our East Coast are Nature's own gift for mine fields. Our submarines would not all be destroyed. Where we had not a do/en up-to-date 'planes in 1017, we now have 3600. We should establish both a submarine and 'plane danger nine for enemy transports. The three enemy Power.. would have to bring their 'planes on aircraft carriers, and the most they could briirx <>:i their carriers, built and building, would be five hundred. In the present outlook it is a fantastic possibility that any enemy could effect a landing in force or a bombing raid upon our own soil or that of our neighbours.— (Copyright: X.A.X.A.)