STRONGER DEFENCE

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 75, 30 March 1939, Page 6

STRONGER DEFENCE

URGENT NEED.

DOMINION'S DANGER INVASION POSSIBLE. LAND FORCE FACTOR. EXAMPLE OF AUSTRALIA. (By F.C.J. No. I. How great is New Zealand's need for stronger defence forces? Against what kind of danger is defence needed? These are questions which the man in the street is asking himself these days. It is common •knowledge that in Australia the ; Prime Minister has warned his | countrymen more than once that ! they have to face—and prepare for—the possibility of an invasion. And Australia is preparing, ' fast and comprehensively, on land, sea and in the air. But what of New Zealand? What is her danger, and what is | being done to prepare against I This article, the first of a ! series, has been written after dis- ! cussion with, and questioning of j men who by their close contact I with the defence problem in New Zealand—and in some cases abroad—and their study of the international situation are most competent to express opinions. The aim in writing the articles I has been to err on the side of I under-statement rather than overj statement. If the opinions expressed and the facts stated seem to some people startling or exaggerated, the reply must be that responsible and patriotic men in our community believe them to be true. They believe, too, that they are doing no less than their duty trying to make the com- > munity realise the dangers with | which suddenly the Dominion might be brought face to face. The conclusion which will be drawn is that whatever else is done, the Dominion must at the same time strengthen land forces. The First Point. The first point to be stated clearly is that so much ha& the international position worsened in the past few years that there is now a possibility that this country might actually be invaded. Let us marshal the facts that support this grave assertion. It is seriously to be doubted whether, in the event of war both in the East and in Europe, Britain, at the outset of trouble, would have a I navy strong enough to enable her to dispatch a formidable force into the I Pacific and still keep lieT interests in home and Mediterranean waters secure. The dispatch of force into the Pacific might be possible after supremacy had been won in European waters, but much could happen in the Pacific in the interim.

This is true despite the fact that Britain is building war vessels, including capital ships, as fast as she can. Such added strength would, of course, to a degree alleviate the position, but it must also be remembered that other nations are increasing their naval strength too, so that Britain's gain in strength is not absolute.

The knowledge that she must first attend to a menace in home waters undoubtedly underlies Britain's plain statement to the Dominions that they must be responsible for their own home defence—and the Dominions, some more than others, are awakening to the real significance of that warning. f The days are gone when the. greatest danger that New Zealnd might be expected to have to face would be an attack from an enemy raider of no greater, strength than a cruiser. Thati Assumption was true only when Britain was so strong at sea that of all the naval forces of the potentially hostile lowers only a vessel of the calibre of a cruiser could have been spared for raiding purposes from the main fleet. British ; naval supremacy, in all circumstances and in all places simultaneously can no longer be taken for granted, so that the position to-day is that against all the comparatively meagre forces at present stationed in or near the Pacific there could be measured the entire navy of an Eastern Power which has, navy for navy, one of the strongest in the world. That is the navy of Japan.

What of the United States? Some will argue that this statement of the facts takes no account of the navy of the Uflited States; but, despite some verbal expressions of sympathy and support for Britain, the attitude which America would take in the event of another world war is problematical— and even the most sceptical will surely admit that a conclusion, whether concerning defence or anything else, must be based on premises, or facte, that are known and not on possibilities. Some indication, too, is given of America's conception of the limits of her defence responsibilities by her recent decision not to fortify Guam. It is true thait hostilities in the East would almost certainly involve Holland because of the strategic and raw material importance of the Dutch East Indies; but, by comparison with other nations, Holland is a negligible naval Power. Then, what of the Singapore base ? The answer is that while the base is of vast strategic importance, it is at present, from the naval point of view, little more than a base, like a bank without money. It is also, of course, a land fortress and an air base, the value of which by no means should be depreciated. Britain at present has not enough ships to station there, which would be adequate to deal with such strength as Japan could dispatch as an attacking sea force. Apparently this fact has been realised by at least some members of the British House of Commons, for when, the Naval Estimates were introduced last month, Lieutenant-Com-

mander R. T. Fletcher said that British interests in tiie Far East had gone up in smoke because pressure at home forbade the sending out of ships." "If we had to fight in two hemispheres," he added, '"it would be necessary to let events rip in the Far East." That might not lie the position when Britain's armament plans are complete; but it is the position to-day, and it is to-day's danger which in list be faced before any plans can be made for tlie future. Should a war take place—notice that the expression "declared" in relation to war has been avoided, since wars to-day are not formally declared —the Australian and New Zealand divisions of the Royal Xavv would probably be eventually sent to Singapore. They might be useful to meet any raiding force which Japan perhaps would send down as a preliminary to any projected invading force, while they would lie useful in keeping sea communications open pending the arrival of that larger force. But in the face of such an overwhelmingly strong force as Japan could send, tbev would be sunk. No, when their period of preliminary usefulness was past, they would be safe at Singapore, and. like every other naval vessel that would be there., would be more useful in combination than as scattered units elsewhere. To sum up, then, as far as the navy is concerned, there would not be a great deal to oppose the intentions to invade New Zealand of an Eastern Power. (To be continued.)