AIR BOMBING.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 15, 19 January 1939, Page 10

AIR BOMBING.

DISADVANTAGES OF SPEED. LESSONS OF SPANISH WAR. Experience in the Spanish war has shown that there are certain inherent disadvantage* in the great speed of modern aeroplanes. Aβ the epeed increases, accurate bombing, and machine-gun fire against other more difficult. The swift machine* of to-day call for greater skill and longer trainiiig : i|iid: make large reserves of skilled pilots urgently necessary (saye the Barcelona correspondent of the London 'TOaily Telegraph"). Spanish Government .-pilots receive twelve months' training before they are allowed to nee their": monoplane ' "fighters'.-. similar to the Boeing P 2*. They are in Spain and are called"ty the Spaniards "Moecas." Formerly ; these ,'plainee wiere"fcowii■: by expert Russian pilots.' --Their short. - wings and the big surface of the radial engine of the Wright Cyclone type used make* them hard to pull out of a dive and difficult to land owing to the high landing speedv '■ *--■;*; . Although there have been examples of remarkably accurate air bombardment in the Spanish war, it should be remembered that much of the insurgent bonrbirig hae been carried out in face-.of little or no-opposition from ground defences. Petrol Tanks Seldom Hit. Despite this, and the remarkably clear atmosphere, the huge aluminium-painted petrol storage tanks at Tarragona—which incidentally doee not poesese a single anti-aircraft gun—were not hit until there had been numerous raide on them aqd the war had progressed for a year and five months. The Barcelona petrol tanke were the object of innumerable attacks, but it was not until June of this year, after nearly two years of war, that a direct hit wae ecored. For purely indiscriminate air attacks against the civil populations of large cities, when accuracy of aim is not essential, speed is a great advantage, eince it makes the bomber more difficult to intercept or to hit with fire from anti-aircraft guns. For* bombing, General Franco hae Heinkel 111 two-motor machines with a speed of about 240 m.p.h. These are flown by Germans. The Italian* use the Savoia 78 and 81 machines. The Spanish Nationalist pilots fly Junkers 52 three-motor bombers. For pursuit the Germane use the Messerschmidt 100, a very fast monoplane, and the Italians the Fiat biplane CR 32. The insurgents have several squadrons of these Fiate. The proportion of foreigners among the Franco aviators, is indicated by the fact that not long ago in Barcelona military prisons there were 35 Italians, 17 Germane and only eight Spaniards. Over a period of 12 months the insurgent aviators taken prisoner or picked up dead and identified consisted of 100 Italians, 50 Germans and Iβ Spaniards. The importance of the training received by the Germans and Italians ie indeed great, for in air fights there is a tremendously high proportion of losses of pilot* who are fighting only for the first or the second time. When the Spanish war began the Government ruled the air. By October, 1930, it had virtually no first-line 'plane* at all. The Russian 'planea received at the end of that month saved the situation. At present General Franco has probably four 'planes to each Government machine.' Yooag Pilots. The Government's pilots are now all Spanish and very young. There ie a bombing pilot flying one of the fast two-motor bombera called by the Spaniard* "Katraskas," who ie only Iβ. To be allowed to join he faked his birth certificate. I met a squadron -leader of 22 who, to show me how things were done, fired a rocket and jumped into hie 'plane. Two and a half minutes later he was leading a patrol of five in close formation over the aerodrome. The new airmen lack experience, but their moral gain in being all-Spanish and feeling that they are fighting a war of independence ie quite considerable. The greatest ambition of all the pilote I met at a Government aerodrome recently wae to fly a Hawker Hurricane. They were filled with enthusiasm at the idea of what they could do to the Fiate and Messerechmidts if they had a few Hawkers. Night and day patrols against bombing of Barcelona have given fair results, but the Government has not enough chasers to keep on permanent patrol for any very clear decision to be taken as to the value of euch defence. But it can be seen that they harass the attackera, who are frequently turned away from their objectives. Having seen the war only from the Government side, I find it difficult to estimate the effect of Government bombing. Light twomotor bombers and eome heavy four-motor monoplanes are used. Most of the machines are American types, manufactured under license in Russia or elsewhere, and sometimes altered in the procees. At present General Franco is believed to haye about 600 first-line fighting 'planes at hie disposal. It is believed, however, that big numbers are being brought in for a new offensive and also for use on Mediterranean -hipping if Si'Tnor Mussolini succeeds in ■htaining belligerent right* for General Franco •s part of the price to rebate the present Jemands for Nice and Tunisia.