FUTURE IN EUROPE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 253, 26 October 1938, Page 10

FUTURE IN EUROPE.

CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY. FIRST TEST OVER SPAIN. (By SIR ARTHUR WILLERT.) LONDON", October 4. The statement that Great Britain will never again disarm unilaterally, that, in fac*. she will continue to build up her fighting ; power until other countries are prepared to j talk disarmament, is regarded among diploj mats here as the key passage in Mr. Chamberj lain's speech in the House of Commons last , night. The statement shows that the Premier j means to try to follow what has been called in these articles his policy of the olive branch in the mailed fist. Behind the friendly and constructive consultations which he hopes have been inaugurated with the dictators will be the spectacle of Britain and France drawing upon their superior economic and financial resources to do their part in 1 lie armament race, the strain of which (lerniiiny and Ttaly are far less able to bear. Tn other words, the economic factor bulks large l>ehind London's visions of political appeasement. Tt is liojied that, especially if economic conditions now improve in the democracies, tlie dictators may have second thoughts about self-suHiciencv and find in them I another reason for wanting' to do business ! with the democracies over disarmament and ! other appeasement measures. The Anglo American trade treaty comes • info this picture. it has been in abeyance 'during the crisis, but there are signs to-day jthat Whitehall would like to expedite its signature. One reason for this is that according to the time table arranged last summer at the time of the Austrian debt settlement, the negotiations for an AngloGerman trade agreement were scheduled to start soon. It is felt that the spectacle of the English-speaking countries increasing their trade might strengthen the hands of important interests in (Germany who want to return to freer international trading. Redrawing Europe's Map. Regarding Mr. Chamberlain's political plans, the most important passages in the speech are considered to he those in which tlie Premier dwelt upon the co-operation between tlje "Big Four" at Munich and upon his conviction that sincerity and goodwill existed on both sides during his , conversation with llerr Hitler. These passages | are held to foreshadow an effort to create a j system of consultation and co-operat ion between Cleat Britain. France. Germany and Italy for European appeasement. That would mean the final abandonment of the League of Nations and of any real effort of co-operation with Soviet Russia, two institutions for which Mr. Chamberlain lias never shown much sympthy. That in turn might well mean the redrawing of the political map of Europe. It would strengthen the hands of those in France who want to cut loose from Russia and base French policy upon recognition of the fact that the inability of the Western Powers to protect Czechoslovakia smashes the French system of alliances in Eastern Europe, inevitably sending countries in that part of the Continent scrambling after the German bandwaggon. Germany then would dominate Europe and everything would depend upon whether moderation will be forced u[>on them bv economic considerations.

The first tost is likely to come ovor Spain. There is reason tn believe that Mr. Chamberlain is about to try again to persuade Siguor Mussolini to bring enough Italians out of Spain to justify putting the Anglo-Italian agreement into force. Nn <lata arc available upon which to base an estimate of his change of fiiceoss. Tlie general belief in London, however, is that the dictators will now at the worst •give tlie nerves of Europe a rest. Separate Britain and France? Those who doubt dictatorial good faith are inclined to look for the next trouble in the Mediterranean. Tt might conic over Spain, or it might on me further afield. It is feared, especially if Britain and France drop Russia and thus fulfil what to the dictators is the chief object of the projected Four-Power system, the dictators would then try to separate France and Britain. Signor Mussolini might, for instance, suddenly discover that the plight of a large number of Ttalian citizens in the French protectorate of Tunis justified him in starting a movement for the annexation of Tunis to Tripoli. He would then try to persuade Britain that the nationality of a third-rate North African State is not worth a world war. Tbese and similar considerations, together with a smarting conscience regarding Czechoslovakia. account for the growing volume of criticism of Mr. Chamberlain now that the emotion of last week is yielding to thought. Xobodv denies him full marks for his courage and pertinacity. It is recognised that he had a great share in defeating TTerr Hitler's first plan, namely, the obliteration of Czechoslovakia bv a quick victory before France and Britain intervened. It is recognised that his success in persuading Herr Hitler that Britain meant to fight probably did as much as anything to save peace. But that is not preventing a rapid increase of popular support of liis Parliamentary critics, but Mr. Chamberlain would win an election just as he will carrv Parliament.— (X.A.X.A.)