SOVIET "PURGES."

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 206, 1 September 1938, Page 7

SOVIET "PURGES."

STATE UNWEAKENED. MARKED ECONOMIC GAINS. TERRORISM STILL RAMPANT. n. (By MARC T. GREENE.) German influence in the Russian military establishment, now very largelv "liquidated/* had been a matter of fact clearly understood by every student of the European situation. After the Treaty of Brest-Liiovsk. the Russian Army was thoroughly Germanised. So far. as that goes, the Oarist forces themselves were always much under German influence. The officers were well-versed in German ta-otics and strategy, the military establishment had been developed, and was maintained prior to the Great War, very largely along German lines.

After Brest-Litovsk it became almost another German establishment. The ground work of wli&t is now beyond any manner of doubt the strongest army in the world was, laid by German officers on German lines. The Russian officers, many of them and some of the highest in the service of the Czar prior to 1917, were pro-German. Not a few had turned Bolshevik for reasons of expediency, or maybe, in some cases, in order to preserve their anatomies intact. Others were career soldiers of the "hard-boiled ,, Russian type,..not so much concerned as to the master they served ae with the. chances, of actively pursuing their profession. In other words, they were not "pood Bolsheviks" at all, and it was fairly certain that, given the opportunity and hope of reward, they would be "treasonable." Furthermore, many were at heart Trotslcyitee, that is, 'advocates of the. world-revolution by force of arms and world-wide intrigue, though they carefully refrained from any part in the Stalin-Trotsky " quarrel. Nevertheless, they were in silent opposition to the Stalin policy of compromise with capitaliem, whether ae a new and lasting orientation of Soviet politico-economic policy or merely as the means to an end. Perhaps they were not even Trotskyites, in some caees, but merely opponents of Stalin's interpretation of "Marxist-Leninism." In which ever case it ie obvious that they were not "good Bolsheviks" and that the Soviet State could not be secure with their influence pervading the army. It was as necessary for Stalin to liquidate them as it was for Hitler to liquidate Roehm, if, that is to say, either was to endure as the supreme head of the State. Facts and Tendencies. Many times in the course of the past 10 or 12 years when I have endeavoured to write objectively of Soviet Russia I have been accused either of submitting a Bolshevik "apologia" or of indulging in direct propaganda. Perhaps a sufficient answer is to remind that, to the violently biased on any controversial issue, objective reporting is always propaganda, pro or eon. This interpellation it seems desirable to make prefatory to what I am about to say regarding 20 years of the Soviet Republic, what has transpired, and how that Republic stands to-day, especially in respect of its military strength.

The subject can, of course, be dealt with in brief space only in cursory and' fragmentary fashion. But salient points can be emphasised. They must, however, be emphasised on the basis either of personal observation or of authentic and authoritative information gathered in places close enough to Russian borders to possess that information. Above all, the reporting must be objective, and that is to-day, and it always has been, the rarest kind of reporting as to "red" Russia.

But there are facts and tendencies that are inescapable, and some of those we shall consider now.

The twentieth anniversary of the October revolution came ten months ago. It was marked by a hideous and alarming succession of trials and- ijiase executions not even yet terminated. To anti-Soviet critics, even to the objec-tively-minded world generally, Russian prestige seemed ie He declining, Stalin's rule to be undermined and—the extreme view—the whole Bolehevik experiment in imminent peril of abject and inglorir

oik failure. Even the tenacious group of "white" emigres in Paris, led by the Grand Duke soniebody-or-other, began to believe that their hopes of ultimate restoration, dimming these many years might after all be realised. „ In .P oi "t of actual fact, the Russian 'crisis" then, and now, existed and continues to exist mainly outside Russia. That is to say, the average Soviet citizen is quite unaware of any sueii thing. He knows, of course, of the "purges," not only in the army, though chiefly there, but also in other departments that have felt the influence of the Germanophile element in the military establishment, or that have included silent though far from inactive Trotskvites ever since the Stalin-Trotsky split.' Citizens See Improvement.

He knows that there have been arrest*, trials and executions, but all thflt is too familiar to him to be surprising. He is far more concerned with tHe marked improvement in economic coml.tions within the last few years with the fact that there is a tremendous increase in consumers' goods, both in quantity and in quality, and a marked ■ eduction „, retail prices. He has, in other words, begun at long Inst to receive definite, reward for the long and narcl years of privation, substantial and encouraging dividends on his investmen; of material sacrifice and fortitude.

So use at all for anti-Soviet progngand IS te to deny this. The fact of the great improvement in Russian economic conditions is irrefutable and supported T y h I T t n - mr e o1 '"Partial statistics The Bulletin of the League of Nations shows that the volume of * Soviet pro ?92 C 7 ,O fl n J"f 1936 ?"- Beven times th *t of Xf ♦ /°. Ur t,mee that of 1929 - and £he rate of increase was maintained last

o S f tati ? ti . c 8 snow that tne rate of pig-iron output in Russia » more than metric tons md.S a f; lod .' of low ebb Soviet ndu.try, of famine and national disturbance and uncertainty as a result of the Stalin-Trotsky feud. Even darker was the fifteenth anniversarv? in 1932 when the world depression, 'drastically forced exports, collectivisation troubles bad harvests and the cost of military preparedness made the outlook sombre and threatening. The third five-year plan, however, according to statistics and investigations from foreign observers not necessarily favourable, like the League of Nations, „ producing much closer to the figures set than either the firet or second plans. And in this connection it must always be remembered that for the purpose of stimulating industry and securing the largest possible output these figures hare been fixed considerably in advance of what is expected by the leaders or even hoped for. Thus we find that in the coal industry, always 'l 2 00 r 0 l nSV ne ' the ° ut P ut is 12,000,000 tons a month, more than double that of 1932, though somewhat below the third plan. Plans Sound Fanciful. The second,five-year plan was completed in April. 1937, nine months ahead of schedule. In the third, to be completed in 1942, the Soviet hopes to produce 32.000,000 tons of pig-iron, thus surpassing the American output, also to produce 200,000 tons of aluminium, an industry nonexistent in Russia until seven years age.

Tt is interesting to note the plans of the Soviet regarding railways, another troublous department of Soviet internal economy. The third five-year plan envisages so much improvement here as to sound fanciful. For example express trains should attain an average speod of 72 miles an hour. All important trains should be streamlined and the cars air-conditioned throughout." Not impressive, maybe, to an American or a Britisher, but startling in a land where only the other day the whole transportation system seemed, for one reason or another, on the verge of collapse, and in which a large number of the operating personnel were Lein" "liquidated." e

These are great gains and they add to notable improvements in education, health standards and social services generally to total definite progress in the Soviet experiment in 20 years. Nevertheless, much of that progress has been made at heavy cost. Industrial productivity is still low. methods of distribution are ridiculously behind those of the "capitalistic" system, and thus a deterrent to economic improvement amonjr the masses, quality is .etill low though greatly improved." and fear of political terrorism is still rampant and nationwide. The individual's personal security is no more assured than in Italy or Germany. Soviet Russia is just as definitely at one pole of political totalitarianism as those two at the other, and that is a long way from either* the Lenin or Trotsky interpretation of Marxism.

(To be concluded.)