A TURNING POINT?

Auckland Star, Volume LXIX, Issue 137, 13 June 1938, Page 6

A TURNING POINT?

| HITLER-MUSSOLINI TALKS. FOR GOOD OR EVIL? (By SIR ARTHUR WILLERT.) LONDON. London is far from, discounting the HitlerMussolini meeting as a picturesque spectacle. It is believed tliat it may mark the turning point for good or evil iii European affairs. • The international controversy which lias arisen over the trouble between the German minority in Czechoslovakia and the Prague Government now dominates those affairs. Germany has announced that the cause of* the German minority is her cause. Can she afford to enforce her wishes in that respect according to the accepted practices of dictatorial diplomacy, that is to say. by confronting the other side by an accomplished fact and asking them what thev are sroing to do about it? Or must the dictators call "a halt to that particular technique, successful ot= it lias been over Austria, Ethiopia, etc.? It i* not expected that the dictators will reveal their minds on this or other questions during their meeting.

It is taken for granted that the RomeBerlin connection will continue. It may even be outwardly strengthened to counterbalance the Anglo-French defence plans. But that won't worry London. Even a military alliance won't worry it unduly. The lengths to which Germany is prepared to go in Czechoslovakia are expected to give the first indication of what really happened at the Rome meeting. And Mr. Chamberlain means to press for early information on that subject. Britain's Moderating Influence. As soon as Herr Hitler is. back in Berlin the British Government will ask Germany to co-operate in an effort to settle the trouble, between the Prague Government and its German minority under Herr Henlein. It will justify its approach by its desire to do everything possible for European peace and by the interest it has always taken in racial minorities in Central and Eastern European countries.

The British Government has already spoken to the Czech Minister here and will soon approach the Czech Government direct. It will urge the Czechs to make every possible concession to Henlein, if Henlein on his side can be prevailed upon to modify his demands. The most unreasonable of these demands is the one that Prague should scrap its defensive alliances with France and Russia. He has also wanted more autonomy than the Czechs could possibly give the German minority.

The outlook for a settlement is not, so far, particularly bright. General Goering has intimated that Germany does not want the Western democracies interfering in the affairs of "Czechoslovakia, and Berlin has given more than one sign that means that warning to apply to the affairs of the rest of Central Europe as well. In that connection, good information reaches here that Berlin is not so annoyed by the projects of Anglo-French defence co-operation as the German newspapers have indicated. It is stated that Berlin really considers that anything that can make the French feel safer in Western Europe is to the good, on the ground that they will be less interested in their alliance with Russia and less inclined to resent German expansionism in the East. Keep the Pot Boiling? People arc unwilling to believe here that Germany is prepared deliberately to risk war by marching into Czechoslovakia to help Henlein, or even that she would encourage civil war there and then help Henlein to win, as she and Italy are helping Franco to win in Spain. But there is fear that Germany may intend to keep the pot of international politics boiling in Czechoslovakia by encouraging Henlein to be unreasonable and at the same time gradually to subjugate Prague by economic asphyxiation. This she can easily do now that she controls the railways of Austria and in view of the fact that Poland has never been friendly with Czechoslovakia and stands to gain certain territories which she thinks ought to belong to her, were Czechoslovakia, to disintegrate. Any such policy on the part of Germany would he doubly disquieting to Mr. Chamberlain. It would involve a standing threat of war owing to the danger of some incident between the Czechs and their German population which' might precipitate bloodshed and outside intervention. It would, also indicate the faihuw of Mr. Chamberlain's approach to Berlin and Prague and thus constitute a sharp reverse for his appeasement policy. And he needs another success for it. Italy and Spain. Mr. Chamberlain's refusal to define in the House of Commons the other day what would constitute a "settlement" of the Spanish question of a nature to justify the British recognition of Itaihrrt Ethiopia has caused suspicion that he may in the end recognise Slgnor Mussolini's Empire before Mussolini has withdrawn his men and materials from Spain. This has increased the criticism of the Labour and Liberal oppositions and Mr. Eden's friends.

Regarding Spain. Mr. Chamberlain's supporters realise that there is nothing to do cxecpt to hope that Oeneral Franco will win as quickly as possible, and latent news from the fighting area indicates that the Republican power of resistance is still considerable. But rs to Central Europe, the possibility that-the dictators may feel that, now London and Paris have thrown over the hatyd League of Nations and arc preparing to exploit the strength of what is virtually a defensive alliance between them, the time has come for them to modify the ruthless roughness of their diplomacy is being anxior.e-Iv discussed. —(Copvright: N.A.N.A.)