The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1937. WHAT CAN AMERICA DO?

Auckland Star, Volume LXVIII, Issue 301, 20 December 1937, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1937. WHAT CAN AMERICA DO?

For the cause that tacks assistance, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And. the good that we can do.

While Washington awaits Tokyo's answer, Americans are furiously speculating concerning the action their President may take if that answer is unsatisfactory. Meanwhile, resentment of the Japanese attack on the gunboat l'anay becomes hotter as accumulating evidence seems to wipe out the possibility that a "mistake" was made. It is impossible to imagine the state of mind of those Japanese who, if they did not know at the outset of the attack, knew soon afterwards that they were attacking an American ship, persisted in bombing and machine-gunning her, and even the survivors making for the shore. For such an outrage much more is needed than apologies jand promises of reparation, and President Roosevelt is apparently resolved that there 'shall be more. His attitude, which the majority I of Americans are said to support, is defined by 'observers as that of "the utmost firmness, short iof war." But as to what this may mean there lis room for an ocean of speculation.

The President's task is indeed a difficult one. If he is resolved to keep the United States out of war, then he must so design and temper his actions that they will not be treated by Japan as a cause of war. His position, indeed, is reminiscent of that of the League Powers in the sanctions campaign. They wished to do everything, "short of war," to force Italy to break off her aggressive campaign in Abyssinia. It was widely believed that if they could have cut off Italy's supply of oil they would have succeeded. But the oil sanction would probably—it is impossible to be certain—hare meant war. Similarly, if Japan threatens to regard the course of action upon which the President decides as an act of war—what then? The United States is not a regimented nation, nor is it on a war basis, and much could happen before public opinion was mobilised to the point of virtually unanimous support of the President.

The President is further hampered by the neutrality law. Up till now it has not been applied, because the President has not chosen to take official notice of the fact that a war is in progress between Japan and China. If Japan at this moment formally declared war on China, the neutrality law would apply— and it would react more to the disadvantage of China than of Japan. American trade with Japan and China would then be on a "cash and carry basis," which would be impossible for China, but not for Japan. Moreover, Japan could then legally blockade Hongkong, the port through which the Chinese are receiving the greater part of their supplies from abroad. In these circumstances it is possible that the President has in mind a naval demonstration, which would probably be "safe," because of the fact that naval manoeuvres in the North Pacific had been arranged before the Panay incident. But it is to be hoped that the mere possibility of such a demonstration will result in Japan's answer to the American Note being "satisfactory" to Washington.