LONG STRUGGLE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVIII, Issue 248, 19 October 1937, Page 6

LONG STRUGGLE.

U.S. VIEW OF CHINESE WAR. WASHINGTON, September 2. Tlie President stated recently that the Government had information on the Far Eastern situation which some of the organisations pressing for the invocation of the neutrality law lacked. The War Department is making n O statement of what that information may be, but military experts, here and on the scene, make one prediction: The battle of Shanghai is more than a battle. It is a little war in itself. And it will be a long one. Possession, aays the adage, is nine points of the law. Defence, in military matters, everything eke being equal, has at least two strikes on offense. And there ie another adage, believed by 'most military men, which says that all the air bombs and high explosives in the world don't make a victory unless there ie a eoldier on the spot with a gun and ammunition to hold what has been won. The Military Situation. Military experte interpret these axioms in terms of the situation at Shanghai this .way: The Chinese are in possession. The other jxiints that favour them are numbers. They have about 100,000 troops, at least 50,000 welltrained regulars, they have lines of communication in their own territory, and they have a favourable terrain. The Japanese offensive has been limited chiefly to warships, which, however, are not of great value, since their munition is limited to what they can carry. Xaval guns are made to pierce armour plate, not to "blow men out of the ground," which the World War taught was etep number one. Until Japanese troops were landed at the mouth of the Yangtse the Japanese force at Shanghai was chiefly made up of bluejackets and marines landed from the warshipe. These landing parties are not ae well equipped, organised or complete as an army unit such as the Chinese have in the area. While the added effectives tend to move the scale in favour of the attackers, there is still the problem of dislodging the defence. Military experts believe that, as in the World War, this will have to be accomplished by a double flanking movement, with two Japanese armies forming a pincers that will squeeze the Chinese out of the port area. This strategy, however, will be difficult. The terrain is. unfavourable. There are some roads around the Shanghai area, but once forced off the roads, troops find the land crisscrossed with streams and canals. Men can wade or swim them, but artillery doesn't float. Ft would be a simple matter for the Chinese to sink boats in the river and stop the entrance of the Japanese troop ships. Hence the predictions of a long "war," although there are always the "imponderables," One is the danger of a successful "barrage of gold," which might lure away Chinese leaders, as it has so often in the past. Fate of the "heart of China," as Shanghai has been called, depends chiefly on the hearts of its defenders. Army-Navy Rivalry. Strangest of all for the military mind to comprehend is why Japan started this thing as she did. with warships, when in 1932 they failed at the very same job. One explanation is suggested: The Army and the N»vy in Japan are controlled by two hereditary clans whose rivalry goes back to the daye of the Samurai. The Army won Manchuria for the Mikado. The recent advance in Northern China was accomplished with little opposition. Was the Imperial Navy jealous? A strange .reason for a military move, but another of the nnpredictables of the Orient. Occidental Shortsightedness. Aβ foreign lives are lost and foreign property destroyed in the Far East, the State Department can answer the question: "What can be done?" only with another: "What can we do ?" And out of the past comes an answer: "You might have done something, once." At the Washington Disarmament Conference, when tliu Nine-Power Pact guaranteeing the integrity of China was signed, the United States as well as other parties to the pact refused to give up their territorial rights in China. '"Inwillinji t<> end the struggle in the Far Ea»t or to withdraw from it, the Western Powers armed Japan with the weapons with which to eliminate them from it." So wrote Nathaniel Petfer. long-time student of the Orient. 'Occidental diplomatic shortsightedness, , ' lie concludes, "fidelity to the creed of Imperialism and political" and economic greed. were God's gifts to the Japanese General Staff.— (CopyrightN.A.X.A.) Wβ-