JAPAN'S FACTIONS.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVIII, Issue 98, 27 April 1937, Page 11

JAPAN'S FACTIONS.

A DANGEROUS ARMY. FEARS OF REBELLION. SANITY OR CLASH ? (By FRANK H. HEDGES.) TOKYO, March. The National Government formed by General Sen jura Hayashi, and the policies it espouses, represent a temporary victory for the political parties and the cause of Liberalism in Japan, inasmuch as the parties have not suffered the complete annihilation which they previously faced at the hands of army extremists. It is possible now that the issue between the extremist and moderate elements within army circles will be forced to a showdown. If the moderate*, of whom Premier Hayashi is himself a leader, win out, the. tale of what Japan's army docs and thinks, from now on will be very different from the radical policy of the last live years. If, however, the extremists, as represented by the younger element, are driven too far, it is quite likely that there will be a repetition of the military insurrection of February 20-29, 1930, on an even larger scale.

Army circles, are divided into three general schools of thought—the extremists, who are the fiery young element; the moderates, and a third group that is neutral. The extremists have been in control ever since" September 18, 1931, when the Mukden incident took place, but, with General Hayashi ae Premier, his group is almost certain to wrest control of the military organisation from them. Whether this can be done without bloodshed is uncertain.

Fanatical Extremists. The moderates in the army are the wiser, more level-headed high officers who are at the head of military affairs and supposedly formulate and enforce all military policy. These older men, who are to be found in the War Office, on the general staff, in the Supreme War Council and in command of army divisions, have apparently lost control of their subordinates.

When General Kazumari Ugaki tried to form a Government, following the resignation of the Hirota Cabinet, these high military officials insisted they could not co-operate in a regime headed by General Ugaki because it would "impede military discipline" and be "detrimental to the unity of the army." These explanatory statements, vague as they were in wording, could mean but one thing: If the army consented to General Lgakis assuming the Premiership, it feared that there would be rebellion at the worst, direct action in the form of assassination at the best, on the part of some of its younger fanatical officers. -No lieutenant-general, general or marshal on the active list—from whose small ranks the War Minister must be drawn—had the courage to risk precipitating another military revolt by agreeing to serve as General Ugaki'a Minister of U ar. Here was to be found the true explanation of the army's opposition to the former Governor-General of Korea, five tunes Minister of War himself, in his attempt to form a Ministry This situation had been brought about by the very men who became its victims —the higher officers of the Japanese army For some years they have preached to their subordinates a fanatical programme of super-nationalism. >n which Parliamentary politics, political parties and all other forms of democracy were damned. They have told these .vounger men that military rule directly under the hinperor was the only salvation for the nation. They have castigated the capitalists and capitalism and I'ave urged the redistribution of wealth.

Dangers Realised. <>ffiCC,S ' nonc to ° «cll- ,, it O V VO ", omiP - I' o,it ''«il or world ;;:;■ rd ™<1 believed without question.n ? this extreme doctrine. The mlitary revolt of Fe-.ruary, 1930, was he attempt of a small group of then, to -•it the doctrine into practice. Some of the abl-st .statesmen »,,d financiers in •'apan wore slain by these rebels, but the abortive revolt did serve to awaken the older officers to the dangerous end toward which their preaching of supernationalism was leading. The older officers have since been trying to put the army machine into reverse, to reconvert their earlier converts and to wean them back from the extremist programme. Some of the rebel officers were tried and shot. Others were imprisoned. Some are still undergoing trial by Court-martial. The army has been attempting to purge itself of the Frankenstein monster of its own creation, but so far it has not succeeded, and the younger element looms as a threat impeding the policy which the wiser and older officers now see to be necessary. How the army can be effectually purged of this clement is not clear. To discharge all who hold to extremist doctrines is not feasible. Their numbers are too great; such a. wholesale discharge might precipitate armed revolt; even if it could be accomplished, the discharged officers would remain a dangerous group within the civilian population of a nation where political assassination is still regarded as a semilegitimate political weapon, where such assassination can actually bring about a change in national policy. General Uga.ki has long been known as an army officer honestly believing in the Parliamentary form of government. As a result, he has been one of the especial objects held up to scorn by the military extremists.

A Striking Similarity. When the programme and policies announced by the War Office are compared with those championed by last year's rebels it is surprising to note how strikingly similar they are. Save that the rebels favoured the method of direct action by assassination, and to-day's army leaders prefer to work through political and semi-political channels, they ere one and the same. The methods advocated are different; the ultimate goal of a military rule under the throne and a redistribution of wealth are one and the same. This menace of Japan's own army to Japan itself is a very real menace. Nearly half of the army is now on the Asiatic continent, the greater part of it in Manchiikuo, where it is known as the Kwantung army. The most radical members of the vounger element are to be found in this' Kwantung army, and if a serious military rebellion were to take place, what they misrht do is unpredictable. If the older officers continue to yield to the pressure and demands of the younger element, that group will wax in strength and power. Tt may be the strategy of the War Office and the General Staff to endeavour to wean the younger element away from their present fanatical views and rcotorc them to sanity. Unless this is done an open clash must come sooner or later.—(N.A.N.A.)