LAND EQUIPMENT.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVII, Issue 207, 2 September 1936, Page 11

LAND EQUIPMENT.

WEAKNESS EVIDENT.

COAST BATTERIES' DUTY.

XJTTLE ELSE PROVIDED. (By F.C.J.) No. YL If the arguments set out in tile last article are accepted, it would seerii evident tliat a stronger civilian army is needed. The next point concerns the duties and'the equippment of that army; and consideration of this will include an analysis of what was termed the second division of the subject of land defencb (the answer from the land to a raid from the sea) as well as what measures might he taken to cope with a large invading force.

It would appear from what is known of the Government proposals at present, that steps are being taken to guard against only a raid from the sea. There does not appear to be any provision, at present, anyway, against the possibility of an invasion. This is a point which is causing concern in Auckland. Money has been provided for coast batteries at Auckland and Wellington, for a limited amount of anti-aircraft gun equipment and also for ammunition for small arms and heavy guns, as well as other explosives. These, briefly, are the proposals given in the Estimates. As far as Auckland is concerned, a first consideration is the defence scheme proposed for this city. Defences would seem to be specially necessary at this port and at Wellington, because Wellington is the seat of Parliament, while at Auckland is a naval base, with all the concomitant stores, etc. Auckland's Major Defence. Auckland's major defence from a raid from the sea is to bo a battery of Gin guns placed at Motutapu. Work on this coast battery is already advanced, and should be finished next year. In the Estimates for the financial year 1936-37, under the heading of defence, there appears ail item of £GO,OOO, which includes commitments at March 31, 1936, for fortifications and coast defence works and further fortifications at Auckland. It may be assumed that at least part of this sum is being spent on the fortifications at Motutapu, though what the "further fortifications" will be is a matter for speculation. The coast battery will have an effective range high for the calibre of the weapon, and the guns will be so mounted that they will be able to fire almost round the 360 degrees of the circle. The belief is held that they would be a match for the armament of a heavy cruiser, that is, for Sin guns. The extra 2in in calibre, however, is not expected to place the cruiser beyond the range of the shore battery. History has taught that in a duel between a shore battery and a vessel the battery is at an advantage. Through practice and through modern instruments the guns on the shore know the range fairly accurately, while also they fire from the ground, a steady base compared with the sea. It might 'be well for those who see a coast battery never used, and who refer to it in terms of money wasted, to remember that the fewer times the battery hasc to be fired, the greater its value as a protection. Heligoland during the war was a good example of this. It is said that the batteries there were fired about twice. This might be taken as a measure of their potential effectiveness. As far as the batteries on Motutapu are concerned, it is to be hoped that nothing of greater strength than a cruiser will ever need to be answered. Why Motutapu Was Chosen. To the effective range of the battery the distance of Motutapu from the city would have to be added, since it is the function of the battery to protect Auckland. The question might then ibe asked: Why could the battery not have been placed further out, say, on the Great Barrier, thus increasing the range? The answer appears to be that the defence authorities fear that an enemy vessel might be able to work past a battery placed on that island, and approach Auckland in such a way that the battery could not be trained on them. Is ormally, vessels coming down the north coast. approach Auckland between the Little Barrier and Cape Rodney, on the mainland. Another approach is between the Great and Little Barriers, and a third between the Great Barrier and Cape Colville, passing Cuvier Island. For all these approaches there is plenty of deep water, and though a strange vessej would run a certain risk, because existing charts are not absolutely accurate, it is considered that such a risk would be practicable. However, the authorities have prepared for this eventuality to a certain extent. There is another Gin gun battery on North Head, whose duty would be to deal with a vessel in the inner harbour. It is not considered likely, however, that an attacking vessel would be able to reach the inner harbour, because the outer harbour would doubtless be defended by the naval authorities. In the article on naval defence, mines were suggested. The inference to be drawn from the establishment of only 6in guns is that the authorities consider that the likely attacker of the Dominion would not be more formidable than a heavy cruiser, otherwise it is reasonable to suggest that larger calibre guns would have been placed at Motutapu. The question of expense was doubtless a major consideration also. Entrance to Wellington. There is a similar battery intended at the left entrance to the Wellington Harbour, approaching from the sea. Another battery, corresponding somewhat to North Head in Auckland, about half-way in to Wellington from the head, and ofi the same side, would act as an inner defence for the capital city. Are these the only coastal defences intended for the Dominion? The estimates speak of no others. What of the other two ports—Lyttelton and Port Chalmers? What, also, is intended for the west coast? It is likely, however, that that coast may be ignored, because it is not likely that an attacker Would choose that coast in preference to the east. In regard to the two South Island ports, a lead might be gathered from the statements made in the House by the Minister of Defence, the Hon. F. Jones, that defences were specially necessary at .Wellington ajid Auckland^l

No Subsidiary Batteries,

No subsidiary batteries have been provided to ?o to , the assistance of either the Auckland or Wellington batteries. The only mobile guns in the Dominion are those attached to the infantry and the anti-aircraft guns. The former would not be of much use against a vessel at sea- while the specialised use of anti-aircraft guns is obvious. Of these mobile guns there are enough for the equipment of a division, that is, 12 batteries. These are IS-pounders and 4.5 howitzers. In Auckland there are four field batteries and four coast batteries. There are 3.1S pounder batteries and one 4.5 howitzer battery. An important part of equipment is ammunition. From the estimates, again, it is learned that £25,000 is set down for field gun and heavy gun ammunition and other explosives, including the cost of reconditioning. After a certain time the high explosive in certain shells deteriorates and has to be '•'reconditioned," which is done in Australia. As for other ammunition, £32,000 is to be appropriated for small arms. This includes .303 ball, some .22 and .45 ammunition, and some armour piercing ammunition. The sum of £3300 is to be spent on cordite. Heavy Gun Ammunition. It is seriously to be doubted whether there is sufficient heavy gun ammunition in the Dominion for current needs, apart from needs in a possible war. Some years ago the Government appropriated the sum of £5000 to be spent in this way. It was to be an annual vote, but it is hard to find traces of another grant. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that field gun and heavy gun ammunition cost £5 a round. Comparatively few rounds could? be fired for £25,000, leaving out of consideration the matter of reserves. Is the Government awake to the necessity for something like adequate reserves in case of war? Really adequate reserves could come ■only with the establishment of munition factories here; that seems to be scarcely practicable. The practicable suggestion seems to be supply from Australia. The same tale would be told if an investigation were made into existing supplies of other equipment and stores. After the war New Zealand had stores to equip at least a division. The last Government disposed of a great deal of this, which, though deteriorated, was perhaps a little better than nothing. Economy. Commissions have cut down the defence staff required to care for ' what stores were left, and these have deteriorated. Apparently there are plenty of blankets in Auckland, but what of such necessities as saddles, harness, range finders, glasses, uniforms, boots and all the rest? There does not appear to .be provision made in the estimates for the replenishment of these. The Defence Department has suffered considerably through economy, measures in other ways. They have not known what money they were to be allowed until after the time had passed when it was necessary to buy equipment for which the vote was needed. Duties of Land Forces. The duties of a land force should be considered. It is known that the defence authorities have worked out plans for the defence of Auckland and Wellington. But the difficulty is that there are not the men available to make any scheme practicable. It is an open secret that the peace-time establishment of thfe Ist Battalion of the Auckland Regiment is between 500 and 000. The strength—on paper—is between 200 and 300. The actual strength is much fewer than that. That is to say, that if an enemy landing were reported this afternoon, about 150 trained infantrymen might spring to the defence of a city of, say, 260,000 people—and that figure is not ungenerous. In 1914 the coast defences were manned to 9S per cent of the establishment within 24 hours of the outbreak of war. A wartime establishment of the Auckland Regiment is about 900. What percentage of 900 is 150* It is far from 98 per cent. The coast batteries are below strength. The infantry have officers and N.C.O.'s, but far too few men. The artillery and engineers and other specialised groups have officers and enough N.C.O.'s and about sufficient men for peace establishment. The mounted rifles have officers,, N.C.O.'s and enough men. But the men are untrained because their only effective training is a camp of six days annually. The condition of some specialised units is wors£ than that of others. The plain fact is that at the present time no part of New Zealand could be defended against an armed landing force; and even if there were the men, there is not enough equipment. Further, what equipment there is is old and much of it is in need of replacement.