"AMBIGUOUS."

Auckland Star, Volume LXVI, Issue 265, 8 November 1935, Page 8

"AMBIGUOUS."

VERDICT OF JURY

ECHO OF " MR. X " CASE

CONVICTION OF SEMB.

MOTION FOR A RETRIAL.

Holding that the jury verdict was ambiguous concerning Reginald Morton Semb, one of the four people convicted at the Supreme Court in conncction with a conspiracy to defraud a man of £75. his Honor Mr. Justice Fair this morning agreed to a request that the matter go to the Court of Appeal, ■where a motion for a retrial will bo argued.

At the trial two women named Peggy Jackson and Mima Armstrong, and two men, Semb and Mathevv Edward Daubney, were all found guilty on a charge of conspiring by deceit to defraud a man ■ —known throughout the hearings as Mr. X. —while, with the exception of Semb. they were also found guiPv of a false pretence. This p-ptenee ' was that it was represented that Daubney ■was the husband of the woman Armstrong. whom Datibney and Semb found in the bedroom of a city flat with Mr. X. Semb was found not guilty on this count.

The other prisoners were sentenced by his Honor last Tuesday, but Semb was remanded pending the hearing of motions by his counsel, Mr. Slipper, that the matter go to the Court of Appeal, where submissions for a retrial might be made. The motions, which involved, first, the point of law as to the consistency of the verdicts in the two counts, and, secondly, a submission that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, were heard by his Honor this morning.

Mr. Slipper submited that the evidence in respect of Semb concerned •what he did throughout the transaction. From this the jury deduced that he was guilty of conspiracy to defraud, the first count. But on the second count, which involved the same facts, the jury had found a verdict of not guilty. This must be taken to mean that Semb had tno guilty mind in the second count. If he had no guilty mind in the second count, then he could not have had a guilty mind in the whole transaction, said Mr. Slipper.

After hearing Mr. Slipper and Mr. JTi-'iMe. the latter for the Crown his Honor said that the law was clearly exemplified by a number of cases that where the jury's verdict was ambiguous, and left in doubt what the jury actually found about the facts, then application could be made for a retrial or to have the conviction quashed. Where, as in this case, the jury had considered two counts, slightly different in the indictment, then the findings had to be considered in relation to the directions given them by the judge. His Honor said that he had told the jury that if they found all the accused guilty on the first count they might not find it necessary to consider the second charge so fully. All the accused, except' Semb, had been found guilty of both offences. . _

Mr. Slipper, continued his Honor, had submitted that the evidence before the jury, if accepted by them, was sufficient to justify a verdict against Semb on the second charge just as much- as the first. But as the jury had found Semb guilty on the first charge and not guilty on the second, then their verdict must be considered inconsistent and ambiguous. That was what Mr. Slipper wished to submit to the Court of Appeal. Evidence at Trial. The evidence on which the verdict of guilty of conspiracy was returned against Semb was that he accompanied Daubney, the originator and chief actor in the conspiracy, to the rooms where the altercation took place with "Mr. X," and that he was present while Daubney pretended to be Armstrong's husband and threatened proceedings. In the course of what happened there Semb was referred to as a private agent and a witness, which references he did not disclaim. The Crown had asked the jury to draw the inference that this was a false pretence and that it took place by arrangement of all concerned. If the jury took that view it meant also that it must accept that he was a party to the obtaining of money frftm "Mr. X" and. therefore, was also a party to the offence in the second count. It was clear, added his Honor, that there was good ground for the opinion that the verdict was ambiguous. His Honor made an order reserving the point for the Court of Appeal, which ■will sit in Wellington next month. Semb Allowed Bail. On Mr. Slipper's application Semb was allowed bail of £150 on the same terms as were granted prior to the Supreme Court hearing. When Mr. Slipper mentioned his other ground for taking the matter to the Court of Appeal—the verdict being against the weight of evidence—his Honor agreed that a retrial on such ground be considered along with the point of law raised.