THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume LXI, Issue 101, 1 May 1930, Page 23

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR.

: POTSDAM COUNCIL "LEGEND."

Many thanks to your correspondent "Bystander" for his lengthy reply to my criticism. I am still unpersuaded, I am afraid, and would like the opportunity to rebut some of his arguments, but before doing so I owe him an apology fur my inaccuracy regarding the "Lusitania" article. My quotation of his remarks w;as made from memory and I" now withdraw that whole paragraph unreservedly. In dealing with the question of the Potsdam Council legend, "Bystanders" arguments are impressive but do not, in my opinion, demolish the arguments in my previous letter. In this attempt at rebuttal I suggest retaining, for convenience, the five points I used beiore. (1) The officials present— Wangenheim's statement, as reported by Margenthan, detailed definitelv the heads of general staff and the navy, the important ambassadors, and the" captains of industry. It is not denied, as I have already pointed out, that Moltke, VValdersee and Tirpitz were not present, hut neither were the ambassadors to London, Vienna, Paris and St. Petersburg—surely the important ones. Nor was the head of the Krupp munition works, or the head of the big HamburgAmerican shipping line. The suggestion that the absentees were represented by "acting heads" is a very different story from Wangenheim's, and from "Bystander's" remarks in his column in February. (2) The selling of securities —Professor Sidney Fay in his book "Origins of the World War," 1928, Vol. 11. p. 77 ff, gives the results of a thorough investigation of the New York Stock Exchange figures for that period, and quite squashes this argument. Interesting corroboration comes from London. Sir William Pendler, Comptroller of "Enemy Banks, London Agencies" during the war, made a report to the House of Commons regarding unusual sales of securities in July, 1914. After a very thorough investigation of the books of German banks he "did not find any unusual transactions, nor anything to suggest that the banks shipped securities or bullion from London." (3) Margenthau did not report this ""valuable" information to his Government—"Bystander" suggests that Margenthau assumed his Government would have received direct information at the time. The very fact that it did not hear of it at the time is an indication to me that the legend had no basis in fact. In addition Sir Horace Rumbold, who was in charge of the British Embassy in Berlin early in July, had no inkling of a meeting of this kind, and did not believe the story when he heard it years afterward. (4) and (5) The Socialist's disclosures of the archives—"Bystander" lightly assures me that the Kaiser and his friends left no reference in the Imperial archives, and at the same time he believes the Reichstag's Investigation Committee's report, on the same documents, that there was a conference of acting heads, which is "quite enough to justify my confidence in the general "truth of the story." As a matter of fact "Bystander" seems to have two different stories mixed. The Kautsky documents proved conclusively that there was no •'•"Crown Council," and the Reichstag committee's report brought to light the exact details of who was and was snot present at Potsdam on July 5 and 6. The real story of the Potsdam meetings is 'a3 -follows: On July 5 the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szozvenv brought .a letter to the Kaiser from Emperor Francis Joseph. -At lunch the Kaiser authorised him to report that Austria, in connection with action against Serbia, could probably reckon on Germany's full support, but he could not say anything definitely without seeing the Chancellor. The Kaiser realised that while it was not probable that Austria's action would kindle a European war, it was possible. It was •likely, -at any rate, to give rise to rumours of wars during his absence, on a planned lolMay trip, and therefore he deemed it prudent next day quietly to inform representatives of the army and navy who happened to be in Berlin of his interview. These people were questioned by the Investigation Committee, and replied that they talked separately with the Kaiser, that he did not expect any warlike complications, and that he did not order any military preparations, and in fact none were ordered until after July 23, when Austria presented her sudden ultimatum. As a matter of fact the three weeks' delay in .the presenting of this ultimatum was due solely to Austria's need for converting the Hungarian premier to hostile action. This is well authenticated. .

W. E. KINGSTON. [We have been obliged to curtail our correspondent's letter. —Ed J