JAPAN'S BULWARK.

Auckland Star, Volume 304, Issue 304, 23 December 1926, Page 16

JAPAN'S BULWARK.

ON THE ASIATIC MAINLAND. • KOREA AS OUTPOST OF IfIPPOIf , THE NATIVE UNDER TUTELAGE. (By JAY HAYDEN.) fS__ctal correspondent of the "Auckland Star" and the North American Newspaper 1 Alliance.) 1 SEOUL, KOREA, Sept. 30. \ Even before the precipitous headlands i of Fusan are sighted, the traveller ( approaching Korea from the south is ( forcefully reminded that here is the ( frontier of Japan. A few miles off the ( coast the ship passes the twin islands of j Tsuchima, famous as the base from which _ Admiral Togo's fleet operated against the ( Russians, and to-day one of the several . island Gibraltars that stand as the outer . sentinels of the Japanese Archipelago. . Conditions in Korea must be viewed . in the light of the one predominant fact i that this peninsula is for Japan the bul- . wark against all her potential Asiatic s enemies!" Through these mountains have ] been fought most of the wars of Eastern t Asia, and more particularly the two great wars oi present day Japan against j China and Bussia respectively. c Much has been written as to the stern- . ness of Japanese administration in Korea ■< and the presence of an iron hand is t quickly discernible to any foreign visitor, t Tbe Japanese themselves do not deny t that they maintain a firm grip on ail _ things Korean. But before criticising t this policy it is important io understand c the Japanese point of view, and par- s ticularly to consider it in the light of t the present day menaces of Bolshevism ( in Bussia and revolutions in China that s ring the Korean border and the vital 1 pan Korea must play in defence of the s Japanese islands against any enemy that s might approach them. 1 From the financial point of view c Japanese rule in Korea has been a dead J loss. Far from producing any economic * profit for Japan the annexation has 1 occasioned a steady increasing outlay from the Tokyo treasury. The provincial debt of Korea, for which the Japan- . ese Government is liable, has increased •, from £2,250,000 in 1910 to £22,800,000 < in 1924, and the provincial budget for < 1923 (the last year for which detailed ' translations of statistics are available) ] showed loans and grants from the Japanees public treasury of £4,600,000 required j to meet current annual expenditures. Actually Korea must be considered as f one of the major items of Japanese mili- . tary expense. The great majority of the s public works for which the Government _\ is spending money, while they ostensibly T are intended, for the economic develop- £ ment of the territory, also have a dis- « tinct military purpose. In the period ] from 1910 until 1922, for example, the _ railway mileage wa3 increased from 674 t to 1777. Every foot of railway in Korea i has been built by the Japanese and i even- foot of it primarily with a mili- . tary end in view. There is only one . means of approach of a modern army to- j wards Japan from the Asiatic mainland and this is by way of the network of < railways which run from China, Man- 1 churia and Bussia, all of which have . their southern and eastern termini inll Korea. Any army coming towards ' Japan from Asia could only proceed - along the line of the railways and this ' only after reaching the Korean border ' through a succession of .narrow valleys • and mountain passes, which, for a distance of 500 miles, form a natural fort- < ress. , Recently Japan has been planning railway extensions into the most north" : erlv section of Korea. Ostensibly these ' lines are for the purpose of opening to < development the timber regions in the ' vaLeys of the Yalu and Amur Rivers • and the coal and other mineral deposits i tnat are believed to exist there. Actually, however, it is apparent that rail- ' ways into this region would permit an extension of the Japanese military frontier. ' , Just a s public works in Korea have been built primarily with an eye to military needs, the attitude towards the native population has been influenced by the same purpose. It has been the intention first to get a grip on the Korean people so firm as to minimise the possibility of effective revolution either independently or as an adjunct to attack by an outside foe. It is certainly not surprising that, in the light of the -trained political condition which existed in Asia in the years immediately preceding the European war, the Japanese should have become suspicious of all varieties of white foreigners, who were operating in Korea, as they would of anyone who interfered with the rapid consolidation of what they regarded as a vital military position, and possibly to spy upon their movements. i In the period since the European war this situation has considerably changed. Japan for the time being has no fear of anyone who might attack her from the Asiatic mainland. By grace of the debacle in Europe, she has been granted 15 _o 20 years at least in which to consolidate her Korean position, and, this heine so, she can resort to leisurely methods. To-day she is attempting to win the goodwill of the Korean people, and one of the ways to do t.Ti.g is to get the support of the missionaries. The Christian churches, schools and hospitals are now working in apparent harmony with the Japanese authorities. There is more evidence to-day of growing suspicion of the Korean people against the missionaries, because of their friendliness to the Japanese conquerors, than there is . antagonism between the missionaries and .' the officials. So far as Korea is concerned. Japan is gaining the confidence that goes with long possession. The increasing kindliness of her administration is the best possible evidence that she regards her military position in Korea as at last firmly established.