HOW SYDNEY FLOCKED TO THE WATERFRONT TO SEE THE FLEET

Auckland Star, Volume LVI, Issue 188, 11 August 1925, Page 11

HOW SYDNEY FLOCKED TO THE WATERFRONT TO SEE THE FLEET

a squadron of auxiliaries and minelayers known as the "fleet base force." and a powerful expeditionary force formed out of the marine corps. There is, at first sight, nothing very remarkable in this. llv the Washington Agreement the United States was expressly granted the right to keep its fortifications at Hawaii, and it seems natural that these defences should be tested from time to time. There is no need to comment upon the strategical importance of Hawaii: it is the only protected base which the United States possesses away from its own coasts. Why. then, should these manoeuvres have caused .such genuine alarm in the Japanese Press ? The matter has to be looked into rather minutely. Purpose of the Manoeuvre. In the first place, it is very remarkable that there should be such a complete disparity between the attacking and defending forces. Hawaii was assaulted by a naval force which no possible opponent 'could muster for such a purpose, and defended by a few submarine llolillas. The purely defensive character of the Japanese navy proves it to be intended primarily 'for the protection oi Japanese waters, and if the Japanese naval staff —possessed with madnesswere ever to send an expedition against Pearl Harbour, they could not possibly assemble a force equivalent to tin- "lilue" wiiiailnin. wlii.-li i- nitlipr num« pWerfnl

than the Dritl&li, anC a vast programme rf reconstruction was urged in very undiplomatic language. The political significance <>f these mameuvrea was. therefore, undoubted: they had been designed to a>sist a campaign for more building, and the lessons to lie learned from them had been determined beforehand. If antecedent circumstances are any iniide at all. the Japanese have, therefore, every reason to fear that these Hawaiian maiui'iivres was the first move in a campaign which i- of ill omen to themselves. A Definite Policy. Their underlying purpose is not difficult to guees. Some months ago Majorgeneral Lejeune made an elaborate statement about tlie purposes for which the marine corps was intended. "If." said he. "we contemplate a naval advance or progression . . . the possession and occupation of naval bases becomean essential part nf our plan. On both flanks of the Pacific are numerous islands suitable for utilisation by an enemy. . . . .All must lie mopped up as progress i.-; msuU , .' , Lanfrua«v like this throws n beam of Usrht on tli" t>r»«P!it ipiestion. V .\=sinmthat the '"blue" foroc with its aiftdliariP= -nd landing partips. is roiVlv the Ameiici!i flppt: assume, further, that Hawaii «-it'i its weak defences and submarine flotilla, is some undefended Japanesr pnasespion. earriSfiiied nt the la j - 'linment. and what becomes of the present manoeuvres? Tlipy simnlv appear nnn exercise in that fitnlply '•'nro<rrfK3ion' - intn distant wntp'-s which. Vnior-fienprnl T.pjpjipp u]U !■-. i- inri of tii« Amnripflp \V:.v . lit.