ARMS, POLICY AND STRATEGY.

Auckland Star, Volume LIV, Issue 57, 8 March 1923, Page 4

ARMS, POLICY AND STRATEGY.

The announcement by the Prime Minister of Great Britain that a committee is to be appointed "to inquire into tl«! co-operation of the three services from the point of view of national and Imperial defence," opens up a wide vista. It suggests problems of tactics and strategy of the highest importance. Until 1914 Britain always waged war in two elements*; but, considering what success or failure meant to the Motherland and the Empire, the amount of study given to the question of co-ordination between sea and land plana was surprisingly small. It was left to Mahan, an American, to write the classic work onthe importance of sea power. When the Great War came, the plan of forcing the Dardanelles—strategically sound and even brilliant—failed primarily because adequate co-ordination of thought and data between Admiralty and War Office wag lacking. Sow there is a third element, the air, operations in which, threaten to revolutionise methods of warfare. There are experts who declare that it is useless to build battleships, yet the Empire's first line of defence Jβ still based upon the capital ship. The new committee will have its hands full. One of its first inquiries—much will depend upon the order of reference and the rulings of the chairman —may be into the Dominion's part in Imperial defence. Tlie whole question is etill in a very unsatisfactory state, and the plain warning , of Britain that she cannot go on bearing a disproportionate share of the burden, has not been retracted or modiiied. The committee may go further, and consider the relation of policy to strategy, and attempt to lay down rules for the guidance of future Governments in their dealings with military and naval commanders. Sir Frederick j Maurice raises this question in a very 1 important contribution to the "Spectator." He says thst despite our recent experiences the principles that should govern the relations between the statesman and the fighter remain unsettled. It is essential, he contends, that strategy should be controlled by policy, that the combatant should be controlled by the statesman, but it ie equally essential that the statesman should know where his functions end and those of the soldier and sailor begin. History is strewn with disasters that have followed violation of these sound principles. The teaching of history is plain, yet in every war it is ignored. Sir Frederick Maurice admits that while the principles are simple, their application is difficult, and he pleads for a thorough and non-party study of the'problem In the light of our experience in the Great War. For example, in his opinion the Asquith Government was justified in sending Lord Kitchener to France "to clear up the situation" when Sir John French r»-

treated out of the Allied line, but in certain of his interferences Mr. Lloyd George was not justified. Sir Frederick Maurice lays it down that if a Prime Minister loses his confidence in his generals he should remove them, but Mr. Lloyd George actually declared his lack of confidence in Haig publicly, but did not remove him. Moreover, according to Sir Frederick, lie interfered, before the offensive of March, 191 ft, in a purely technical question on which he had no right to any opinion. Sir Frederick contends that all this is a vital matter, and that the same kind of mistake has been made since the war. He would have the Prime Minister call the leaders of the Opposition to the Committee of Imperial Defence and set that committee to formulate principles governing such civilian-military relations, which principles should be made public and accepted by the services and by both political parties. Perhaps Mr. Bonar Law has something of the kind in his mind.