The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1920. THE NEW MIDDLE EAST.

Auckland Star, Volume LI, Issue 125, 26 May 1920, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1920. THE NEW MIDDLE EAST.

Far tke «•*«• Out* imeU Mitolnef, for the' wronjr tAct need* reaUtamoe, for the /«tvre to (ike di»to»ee. And the good that tee cam <U-

The amount of interest, not to cay apprehension, that has been aroused in London by recent developments in Persia and the Trans-Caspian region may serve to remind us once more that one immediate consequence of the Allied triumph has been the assumption of certain responsibilities by Britain throughout the Middle East. In Palestine, in portions of Arabia, and in Mesopotamia we have practically undertaken the reorganisation and defence of widespread though thinly peopled areas whose needs will throw a considerable additional strain upon even the colossal administrative capacity of the British nation. In Persia the case is somewhat different, but we have only to consider the terms of the agreement recently negotiated between Britain ana Persia to realise that everything that happens henceforth in thie part of the world must carry for us grave political significance. We have bound ourselves to reorganise and equip Persia's army, and to reconstruct its internal finance, while at the same time guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the country; and it follows of necessity that our influence end authority in Western and Central Asia will depend very largely on the way in which >we discharge the duties we have tfssumed in regard to Persia. And since the war closed there has .been no lack of eigns and omens pointing to the urgent need for maintaining the dignity and prestige of Britain's Imperialism in these regions by every means in our power.

We may observe in passing that Britain gets very little in the way of direct material advantage out of her bargain. For the only pledge to which the Persian Government has committed itself is a promise to revise the Customs tariff—which has been strongly proRussian—in our favour. But clearly our Imperial statesmen must have had some very definite policy in view when they made such a compact with Persia; and the explanation which naturally suggests itself is that, 'because of the. many dangerous contingencies in Western Asia, which the incidents of the great war have co plainly revealed, it is desirable to strengthen our position there by close and friendly association with the most important of the Oriental States which lie between Eastern Europe and the Indian border. But here we are confronted by what seems to 'be a curious paradox in our Imperial policy. Hitherto it has been a tradition of our Imperial statecraft that as rulers of India we must secure its safety by keeping a firm hold upon Afghanistan; and forty years ago the then Amir of Afghanistan ; bound himself to "follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain In matters affecting the foreign relations of i Afghanistan without reserve." Last year, however, the Afghan frontier tribes engaged in active war with us, and when matters were finally adjusted the Indian Government, which arranged the settlement, announced that "Afghanistan is left free and independent in all its affairs, both internal and external." Thus at the very moment when we appear to be making, vigorous efforts to safeguard "the road to India" by allying ourselves closely with Persia, our attitude in regard to Afghanistan has undergone a change which at first sight certainly suggests that we have abandoned any idea of maintaining a policy of Imperial defence in. Western Asia.

But this is not the end of the story. In view of the present position of affairs in Russia, it is clear that Persia may be at any moment exposed to serious danger from the north; and to this point we will recur immediately. But as soon as ever the Anglo-Persian treaty was published it was officially announced that the British army of occupation was to be removed from the TransCaspian region, and as a. matter of fact it was at once withdrawn from the line of the Trans-Caucasian railway. This line, running from Baku on the Caspian to Batura on the Black Sea, covers the approach to Persia from the north, and is thus the military key of the situation in that part of the world. Thus by the recognition of the complete political independence of Afghanistan on the one hand, and the refusal of Britain to make any further effort to hold her ground in Trans-Caucasia on the other, Persia wae left completely isolated on South and North at the very moment when we ■ inaugurated a new line of policy by pledging ourselves to reorganise her defences and to guarantee her territorial integrity against all possible dangers. Whether the menace of Bolshevik aggression or intrigue is immediate or not—and news ie ominous— it is certainly there, and if Britain does not take steps at once to grapple with it, the industrial and political unrest so assiduously fomented by the Bolsheviks may, in the present disturbed condition of Oriental racial and religious feeling, assume a startling and disastrous form. If we may venture a conjectural explanation of all these etrange anomalies, we may suggest that Britain's withdrawal from Trans-Caucasia was an attempt to propitiate the Bolsheviks or, rather, their British sympathiser**, and the release of Afghanistan from her political dependence was an attempt on the part of the Indian Government to 'conciliate Moslem sentiment and so; jj&e it9-pwn^saek-e«jier ? . £gfe|yfe*j

I facts we have detailed it is easy to trace I three entirely distinct and inconsistent lines of foreign policy, and it must be for ouj statesmen to adjust and reconcile them before it w too late.