THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1919. SYRIA AND THE POWERS.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 252, 23 October 1919, Page 4

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1919. SYRIA AND THE POWERS.

The difficulty that has arisen over the I adjustment of rival claims in Syria, is only one of many problems which the Powers who drafted the Treaty of Versailles have still to solve. But though this particular question concerns a small and relatively uncivilised country, it may easily involve serious consequences if tho Powers allow matters to drift mudi longer here, without adopting a deeisiva policy. It is a curious fact that the most illuminating comment made recently upon the situation, as described in recent cable messages, is the remark of tho Emir Feilaul, that the withdrawal of British troops from the region north of Palestine would disturb "the status quo inaugurated by Lord Allenby." This, of course, means that if Britain, in terms of her recent agreement with France, withdraws her troops from "the terri- ' tories between Syria and Palestine" by November 1, she will run the risk of undoing much of Allenby's work and forfeiting the fruits of his splendid victories. For the effects of Allenby's triumphs in this part of the world were two-fold—the Turkish tyranny in these regions was crushed, and at the same time all tribal jealousies and local rivalries ceased in the presence of this manifestation of what the Orientals regarded as invincible determination and strength on the part of the Western Powers. It is a painful though perhaps inevitable fact that within the past twelve months the necessary withdrawal of British troops from Turkish areas has given great confidence to the Turks, who are already striving to re-establish the old sanguinary despotism in Armenia: and at the same time it has discouraged the Arab tribes who have fought for us and correspondingly encouraged their enemies Clearly it is time for Britain and France to look the facts in the face, and to come to some definite understanding which may. so far as is necessary, maintain the prestige and authority of both Powers in the Xear and Middle Fast, and will at the same time secure the enforcement, of that principle of nationalism on which the reconstruction programme of the Allies is supposed to be founded. To make any attempt at understanding the Syrian situation in all its manifold complexities, we. must go hack to the agreement arranged between Britain, France and Russia in lf)lfi. It was one' of tlic~e "secret compacts" which have always been a curse to humanity and a menace to the world's peace; and quite apart from its secret character, it was open to grave objections iv almost every clause. The " Manchester Guardian" declares that " there is not a sin against the principles of the Allies which is not committed by this unhappy pact"; and even if this criticism is not wholly unprejudiced, it is impossible to deny that the treaty involves certain grave errors in political judgment. The general idea of this compact, so far as it concerns this part of the Turkish dominions was that Syria was to he divided into two parts; one half, including the. Lebanon district and the coast, to be placed under French protection, and to possess certain rights of local self-government; the other half, including the great cities of Damascus and Aleppo, to form a separate province which would be attached to the new Arab confederacy, and would thus form in effect part of the dominions of the king.of the Hedjaz and his son, the Emir Fcisul. Now, this arrangement is open to two serious objections. In the first place it destroys completely tie unity of Syria. Most

people are aware that the Syrian tribei —for instance, the Druses and the Star onites—have been torn by internecine riv alrieo and religious wars for many cen turies, and no doubt the authority o .France would give the people of thesi distracted regions peace and security such as they 'have never known before But the fact remains that all the Syriai tribes are bound together hy a sense o: unity which it would be a grievous mis take to ignore or to defy. Further from the'standpoint of the French Gov eminent, it is a serious , question whethci •the inclusion of Damascus and Aleppo in the new Arab confederacy will not rol the French protectorate of all real value; and if the mandate issued by the League of Nations, which France expects to re ceive, is to be more than an empty phrase, the French may well object to a settlement which would deprive them of any real authority in the most important part of Syria, and would make it impossible for them cither to keep the peace there or to civilise the people and develop the resources of the country. It is not to be inferred from all thil that the system of mandates has beei devised to benefit the protecting Powers without considering the interests of th< "little peoples." On the contrary, we believe that Britain and France are botl actuated by a sincere desire to proteel and benefit the subject races that have suffered so terribly at the hands of the Turks. But unless the conflict which lias so shaken "the frame and huge foundations of the earth" is speedily tc be renewed in an even more acute form it will be necessary to take precaution? in these regions against any revival oi the insidious and menacing policy which precipitated thin terrible struggle. Britain and France must be in a position to maintain the balance of power here on behalf of Western civilisation; and so far as their rival claims are concerned no serious difficulty is likely to arise between them. For Franco has been the dominant European Power in Syria and Asia Minor ever since the days of the Crusades. Her protectorate over the Maronites haa been in force, eince 1250j slie has enjoyed special economic advantages in the Turkish Empire ever since the sixteenth century and the days ot Francis T.: and she has in Asia Minoi extremely valuable commercial interest* which Britain hns always frankly Acknowledged and respected. For these reasons Britain is willing to stand aside and lot France assume in Syria the doml nant position to which as a protecting Power she will be entitled. But those who speak for France maintain that, as we have said, the attachment of Damas cus aud Aleppo to the Arab dominion; will render France's acceptance of a man date in these regions quite illusory. Al the same time, British statesmen have been asking whether Mosul, which undei the IOKi compact was to be attached tc the French zone, should not rather b< linked up with Mesopotamia as tin natural outpost of British ascendancy at Bagdad. For the war has proved clearly that Mesopotamia and Egypt an the two pillars of the gateway through which an enemy would open the road tc India. Nor is the situation rendered less perplexing by the fact that, as the Emir Feifiul has clearly indicated, the Arabs would rather see Britain than France the dominant Power in the Middle East. But Britain could not, even if she would, accept the added responsibility of a mandate over Syria, and so, in face of the need for instant and energetic action, the whole question remains a highly complex problem which will demand the most conscientious and judicious statesmanship to solve.