WHEN IT WAS DARK.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 250, 21 October 1919, Page 4

WHEN IT WAS DARK.

Dark days of tlio war arc recalled by to-day's messago in which roference is made to the mutiny in the French Army in 1017. It will probably be news to most of our readers that there was such a mutiny. The truth is that the condition of France during the greater part of 1017 was much more serious than the outside world was allowed to know. There were indications at the time that till was not well, and students of the war had some inkling of what was wrong, but it is only comparatively recently that the truth has been allowed to emerge. Through the summer of 1917 despondency reigned in France, and "defeatism" in various forms moved hither ■and thither, insufficiently cheeked, among soldiers and civilians. The result of Xivelle's offensive in the spring was a cruel disappointment. High hopes had been built on it, and the reaction was severe. The moral situation caused by this was exploited to the utmost by Germany and those Frenchmen who wanted a patched-up peace. The Army becamo disaffected, and soldiers demonstrated against the war. It is only fair to that Superb army to say that we have never seen anything to show that more than a small section of it was infected with this poison, but no doubt it was the condition of the Army's morale as well as its losses that led to the abandonment of any idea of a further offensive by the French that year. The effect of this on the British Army was very serious. Haig's plans were dislocated by the failure of Xivelle's operations, and it has been put forward —and we think witli a good deal of justification—that his persistence in the Ypres offensive in the face of appalling difficulties and heavy losses was dictated largely by political motives. Something had to be done. Russia was out of the war, the French Army had to remain on the defensive, and France was gravely despondent. The British Army was the only force that could attack, and so brighten the situation, and so the attack was maintained. That, at any rate, is the theory, and it will be interesting to see how far history will support it. What would have happened if Clemenoeau had not taken the reins into his firm hands towards the end of 1017 can only be conjectured; one does not care to think much about it. Mr. Frank Pimondfl w very definite on the point. Cleinenceau, he says, came into power " when treason was at its height, and the Alliee all but lost the war. His personality, his courage, his steadfast confidence just sufficed to save the Allied cause in the critical days immediately preceding and directly following the great German bid for victory in the \\ est." Clemenceau at once set himself to restore the morale of the Army and the nation. He instituted proceedings against the gang of '"defeatists," from the small fry to Caillaux, with whom no one previously had had the courage to grapple, lie stamped out sedition and " defeatism," stopped political interference with the generals, restored confidence to the Army, and with amazing energy and force proclaimed the necessity lor victory. France at last had a strong man at the helm, and she responded to his guidance. "You ask mc my war aims," he said, in reply to his Parliamentary critics. " I reply that my aim is to be victorious." This was in November, 1917, and in the critical months to come, until in July, 1918, the tide turned so dramatically and definitely, he upheld this ideal with magnificent ardour, skill and courage. Tt was Foch who made the plans that brought fternmny to the dust, but if Clemenoeau had. not" dispersed tlie darkness of those critical days in 1017, Focb might never have had his opportunity.