LUDENDORFF'S THREAT

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 208, 31 August 1918, Page 17

LUDENDORFF'S THREAT

BRITISH ARMY'S DEADLY PERIL BOW THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY WAS FOIUBD. Probably few people realise bow nearly successful was ihe great German offensive that commenced in Murch last, liow narrowly the British forces escaped disaster, or bow the "splendid strategy" of Ludendorll' was baffled and the brilliant counter-offensive now in progress made possible. The story ie told in ••Collier's Weekly" by General Malleterre, a great French strategist who was on the staff of General Joffre in the early months of the war. "Having once decided to attack where nlone victory could bo found, lmdendorlT sought"for the weak spot of the western front. The arrangement of the British and French armies pointed out to him this -weak spot. He knew that the British army had recently taken over the lines up to the Oise, and that the Oise thus separated the front into two great sectors, the British army occupying the one on the left between the Oise and the Channel. The British had remained a long time on a front much more limited, first, as far as Arrae, then as far as .Snint Quentin, and in the last operations in Handera they -were still supported by a French army. The regular increase in the size of the Brtieh army and its progress in fighting value had "permitted little by little the diminution of the aid that the French General Staff was lending generously to its ally, and it is thus that in February last the French army was able to narrow its front to the lines of the Soissonnais, Champagne, Lorraine, and Alrace. UNREALISED UNITY OF COMMAND. u Ludendorff knew all this and abo that unity of command had not been Tealbed on the western front because of the unfortunate pride of certain Englishmen. The Inter-Allied Council of Versailles, established after the Italian defeat, was succeeding in co-ordinating the operations under the leadership of General Foch—there was the beginning of a real entente, 'between the .English and the French General Staffs.

"Recent incidents, such as the affair of Cambrai, had showed that the British intended to keep their independence of action in certain circumstancea. Do we not remember the British tanks which spewt over the Hindenburg line before Cambrai and brought the Tommies to tlie gates of the city—a. success unfortunately not sustained by reserves? It J was a sporting chance, an experience which ended in a German counter-offen- j sive very costly for the British. The surprise would have become, on the contrary, disastrous for the Germans if it had been exploited in concert with the French General Staff. But the French had not been notified beforehand that the attack was to be made. THE BRITISH ARSIY MENACED. '"After Cambrui the British army had its own front, wholly autonomous, in Picardy and in Flanders. The little Belgian army was faithfully guarding the Yser. The liaison with the French army was effected on the Oiae, between Noyon and Tergnier. The left -wing of the French army hold the northern slopes of the hille at Saint Gobain, north of the Aisne. The weak spot was at the junction of the two Allied armies, in the region of Saint Quentin, classic battlefield. But, for Ludendcrrff, the weak •point was especially the British army, which he believed to be inferior t© the French. These considerations led him to strike it.

"Were tie British Aney overtfemm fry a powerful attack, were it corn-pulled to bend, to retreat, it ran the danger of bring thrown into the sea, and that under conditions very serious if the victorious attack crowded it into the narrow triangie of the Artoie and Belgian Zanders, north of the Sonime against Calais and Boulogne. But it was necessary to forestall the intervention of the French armies going to the aid of the British. The new arrangement of thp Allied lines, after the first period of thr German offensive, showed how the French divisions were obliged to cross the Oisc and to assume the protection of tbe region between the Oise and Amiens by Montdidier to menace on the flank or behind the advancing Germans. A GREAT CONCEPTION. "On the map this strategy appeared splendid. To overthrow and crush the British right wing by a very powerful effort in the direction of Saint QuenbiniMontdklnr to interpose immediate]v a defensive line along the Obe as far an Compiegne, to prevent the intervention of tbe French, and then with the principal attacking mass, fighting in the open, to continue driving back the British right by Amiens and DouUene, while another mass would attack and forco the lines of Arrar; and complete the encirclement of the British centre—what a conception ! Even if the British wore to reform and propose a desperate resistance north nf the Somme, the disintegration of thp British Army wonld be such tliat the German General Staff could hope, by using- all its reserves, to push the British to the sea. "There was a moment, on March 24 and 25. when the German General Staff was able to believe that it had indeed fonnd its way between the two armies in the district between Roye and Noyon. For the retreat of the "Fifth British Army took a wrong direction toward Montdidier, leaving uncovered the way to Compiegne by Noyon and an undefended strip up to Lassigny. Yon Hutie.r, commanding the right of the group of armies of the German Crown Prince, pushed in here immediately, to form the defensive line planned for against the French Mt wing. HOW THE FRENCH FOItIED IT. "But the French General Staff was watching. Warned immediately of the violence of the attack and of the retreat of (he British right, Generals Petain and Foch threw on the bank of the Qise infantry divisions brought in antentrucks and a cavalry division. These- troops took their position on the heights north of Noyon. The battle was engaged so brnsquely that the auto-trucka were landing the poilus within rifle range, and the infantry entered the struggle almost without the support of artillery. "This rapid movement surprised the Germans. They attacked to the limit of their reserves with the advantage of numerical superiority. But the defence of the French divisions was more than heroic: it was intelligent. The soldiere. fully as much as their leaders, under etood the value of the sacrifice they were making.

SUCCESS AND FAILURE. "On April 1, if the strategic plan of the Germans had been realised, we should have seen the mass of their armies crossing the Somnic, between Picquigny and Corbie, and the Anore between Albert and Arras, and a decisive battle engaged in the neighbourhood of Doullens, while the French armies would be hurling themselves in vain against the Crown Prince's offei»ive line between Breteuil and Noyon. But this did not happen. The Germans were holding with great difficulty Noyon, Roye, Montdidier, Albert. Amiene was not taken. They had failed before Arras. Tbe AngloFrench front remained solid. "The first phase ended on April 1. None would deny the tactical success of the Germans, but their strategical failure was equally evident. The British Army win neither outflanked nor disorganised. The French army remained in liaison with the English Army and Bucccsefully resisted the Germans."