WAR AND THE PROPHETS.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 163, 10 July 1918, Page 2

WAR AND THE PROPHETS.

THE PERIL IN THE WEST. . PUZZLES IN THE EAST. (From Our Special Correspondent.) LONDON, May 7.

Kor the time being, apparently, the Germane lind themselves unable, to continue their savage prcsßure on the northern section of the Western theatre ot v?ax. Undoubtedly in the most recent fighting the enemy hae suffered very grievous losses, and there is plenty ot evidence in such German papers as Unci their way across the frontier, that the failure to carry out the llindenburgLudendorff programme of victory has caused grievous disappointment - and foreboding in the Fatherland. Also we learn that the enemy people are being warned to prepare for a further reduction in their already very limited rations—especially in such thingts a» bread, potatoes, and fatty substitutes of all kinds, whilst the prisoners recently taken on the front complain bitterly of the shortage in their rations. Hut to-day we know full well what value to place upon the loose talk about ""starving Germany," and also upon the optimistic articles which eeek to prove that the enemy has suffered so severely in his recent advances that he has reached, or nearly reached, the end ot hie offensive tether. LudendortY has certainly not played all his cards; indeed, it may bo doubted whether he has yet led hie long euit, and the present pause in his offensive can only be taken ac a prelude to further fierce and repeated efforts to break the Allied Armies. The pause, however, is no doubt very welcome to the Allies. They also have had a very big strain thrown upon them, and were very ready for "a breather" and the opportunity for materially adding to their powers of resistance.* If -we can place full iaith in the assurances of the War Cabinet spokesmen, our own loeaeci in men and material during the recent severe fighting have been much more than made good, and we are in a much j better position to-day to parry and counter the coming thrusts than ever ■before; that, indeed, the enemy lias little chance of making any real impression on our front, and that the longer he delays a resumption of his offensive the worse he will suffer when he makes his move.

But the same sort of thing hae been said times without* number, and we cannot forget that every really serious effort the Germans have made to force we back has achieved some measure of success. Hitherto many of our military ■writers have i, ggeetrd that the ground lost by the in the various enemy "pushes" migui have been held if our -commanders had cared to ea-eritice men, but this eort of talk cannot be indulged ill now, for we have Sir Douglae Haig's own statement that we are now "fighting with our batiks to the wall," and a glance at the map ehowe only too clearly that the days of yielding ground to aave men are past. Any further retreats, in the northern Bevtivn. at any rate, cannot be accepted with equanimity, and if we fail to hold the present line the outlook will -be pretty dark. To-day we have none too much, room behind our forces in Flanders, and any considerable narrowing of the space will be fraught ■with all the evils that come of want of elbow room, to cay nothing of bringing One or more of the Channel ports, vital to the adequate supply of our troops with the necessities of war, within the zone of the enemies' long-range guns— not the "fancy" 80 milere. but the everyday and very businesslike heavy artillery in common use by the Germans. It is no uge blinding oneself to facts, and an outstanding fart in the present situation on- the Western front eeems to be that we have renched a point at which •we must! cither, .hold the enemy firmly, or stand in peril of having to abandon the remnant of Belgium and a further considerable slice of northern France, including Calais, and. at the worst, possibly as far south as the line St. Valery-Abberville-Amiens.

As regards our losses of ground in the recent German offensive, a good deal of explanation is required in view of the teci__tliat such songs were made about our prepare.dnees for the onslaught and i the '"impregnability" of our positions. Xo explanation hoe yet been forthcoming of how the important position of Kemmel was suffered to fall into the enemy's hands. Weeks and weeks prior to the German move all our military ' •writers and "commentators" were drumming into our ears the enormous importance of Kemmel. They insisted that tiiis -was a "koy" position which must be retained at all ooete. They assured us that the strength of our defences at this vital point wae such that the enemy had nothing better to hope for in an attempt to force his waythrough here than vain and bloody sacrifice. But Kemmel fell, the troops defending it being overwhelmed after a long struggle, and. so far as the ordinary non-military reader of official and non-official communiques can gather, the position was lost ermply because there were none of those nnieli-talked-of reserves near enough to give the over-preseed defenders adequate support at the crucial period. The impressiou left on the minds of people at Home woe that if Kemmel was really such a vital point as we had been taught to believe, there had been a ghastly underestimation of the enemy's power of offensive in this section, or else some dire blunder in the disposition of the Allies' reserves which prevented the timely support of the defenders. Tt is a pity that more information as to the causes of Kemmel's fall has not been vouchsafed, because, in the absence thereof, some very startling and discomforting stories hay«; obtained circulation and credence, and do not lose their powers for mischief because they may not be printed.

THE NEXT MOVE. The Germans are believed to be approaching the completion of their preparations for another great onslaught, and most of our milrtary scribes seem quite certain that the capture of Ypres hills and Amiens will be again their main objective; in other words, the enemy has made no essential modification of the plan he commenced to carry out a couple of months ago. That was to destroy the Britieh Army by continual sledge-hammer blows, to divide the French and British Armies as much as possible, by driving in a wedge in the neighbourhood of Amiens and, with luck, to so cramp us in the north by the capture of the last remaining hills in Flanders, and by depriving us of the free use of roads and railways that we may have to draw back from the northern front.

Meanwhile the enomy is Juet showing sufficient activity to maintain pressure on our line, and to screen his own dispositions. If he really concentrates on the points of attack our "experts" have selected for him, failure should certainly-

be his lot, for we have had time to immensely strengthen the defence in these important sectors. He may —probbably will—try elsewhere, but it should not be easy for him to take the Allies by surprise at any point at this time of day. Meanwhile w e are sending forward reinforcements for the British Army at a rapid rate, and the. advent of American troops haß also been very considerably accelerated. We .are not permitted to know in what numbers the Americans are coming to hand, but common gossip alleges that for some time past the great Republic has been landing at least 20,001) men per weok in France and it has been stated that during a certain recent period reinforcements for our own army were crossing to France at that rale per day, with all the necessary adjuncts. To send 20,000 men per day across to France is perhaps not a vc-ry startling achievement, but 20,000 soldiers "ready for business" \b a vastly different, matter, even if they be '"only infantry." Jn this caee. however, it was a case of "all arms," bar, perhaps cavalry, for which our needs on the front do not seem to be particularly urgent for the time being.

Whilst wo arc •waiting for further dovelopuments on the western front, our eyes naturally turn to theatres farther east. Krom the Salonika arena we hear prucioua little—so little, indeed, that those who have not near and dear ones engaged in that locality seem to be in danger of losing sight of possibilities in this direction. Fighting hereabouts seems to have been eoirlined to "local flirtations" for a long time past; but the milliner ,in which the •'comb" is being applied to certain non-combatants in the Mediterranean area suggeste that either a very much ■•livelier" state of affairs ia anticipated in the Salonika region preISimtly, or that the British forces here are 'ln'ing freely drawn up for the purpose of I'alestine and Mesopotamia!! campaigns. Apparently the Palestine adventure— the further prosecution of which puzzles most people, as they cannot see, any adequate objective—is likely to develop into a much more serious campaign than was generally believed. Thus far this year the news from this theatre has !x-en unfuriuly good, but the latest developments suggest that the further we advance the stouter will be the enemy's resistance, and it would surprise nobody who has kept an eye on this campaign to find the progress of our forces barred in the Es Salt district by a much more substantial Turkish army than they have yet encountered. Tt looks, indeed, from the latest communique, as though our Army lias already found itself confronted by enemy forces capable of ''hitting back" with good effect. The enemy's recent surprise attack on a. "watching force," •which necessitated the abandonment of nine guns, coupled with a withdrawal of our troops operating on the eastern side of the Jordan, is certainly suggestive of formidable reinforcements having reached the enemy.

From Mesopotamia we receive littli.' news from which anything can bo deducted, and the further prosecution of this campaign ip also a point upon which many people would dearly like some official explanations if they could be given without "giving away" any secrets. It would be really intero.Bting to know whether there is any definite geographical objective or limit set to either the Meeopotamia nor the Palestine adventures, and why it has been considered necessary t<i pursue the former beyond Hiigdud and the latter beyond Jerusalem.

Remains the Italian front, which is perhaps the biggest puzzle of all. For the present neither «ice seems to be in a position to do mor.j than " hang on" to the ground of which they are in possession, and the Wiva from this front mainly concerns aerial activities and mutual raiding of trenches. It has been suggested that tiie anticipated Austrian spring offensive has. been " hung, up," owing to her ally's need* on the Western front, but thus far there is no evidence whatever that any Austrian troope are facing the Franco-Briti»h lines, though it is believed that, certain heavy artillery unite of Austrian origin are assisting the Germans in the big gun duels in Northern France. Speculation is rife as to the intentions of the enemy on the Italian front. The fact that the Austrians have made no move during the fateful struggle in Northern France has caused a good many writers both here and in France to indulge in considerable optimism concerning tho weakness of the- Austrian army, unaided by the Germans. Other " commentators" on the war hold a vevv different view, and predict that iih soon as the Alpine passes are in a favourable condition for the passage of great bodies of troops and raasßcs of artillery, a formidable offensive nil] be hurled" against the Kalian Army on the Piave and the hills simultaneously. That seemg to be the Italian view, and is more likely to prove correct than that of the optimists here and in France.

The Aufltrians have, of course, a choice between two military policies. They may hurl themselves upon the Italians at the most favourable moment in full force, and this, in the opinion of the writer, is what they probably will do. Or they may keep the Italians on the gui vive, but reinforce the C.ermans in France with some of their hest divisions. The second policy would be very unpopu. lar in the Austrian army and nation, nor ■would it coincide with Austrian intereats, unless, indeed, the Gormang fell into such a critical military situation in Franc- during the next few weeks that the whole position of tho Central I'owcra became In that cn.se the Austrian* would have to assist their partner. But tho chances of Austria having to seriously jeopardise her position on the Italian front in order to attempt to redress tho balance in the West appear* somewhat remote at the present time even to the optimistic among us. i