The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED MONDAY, JULY 1, 1918. THE WESTERN FRONT.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 155, 1 July 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED

MONDAY, JULY 1, 1918. THE WESTERN FRONT.

For the cause that lacks assistant*. For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

At tlie present .moment, when the Germane are said to be massing all their forces for a final effort to reach a decision before the Americans can bring their full strength to bear, the question of the disposition of the French and British reserves becomes one of paramount interest and importance. We know that tho 'Germans have always kept a fighting reserve, or striking force, estimated at fifty divisions, and this fighting force was employed against Rumania, and later against Russia, and it is possible that it was employed in part in the great offensive against Italy. Host authorities seem inclined to believe that it has already been drawn upon for operations in the West, but that with the divisions withdrawn from Russia the Germans still have a reserve force of something liko fifty divisions, though some of the troops are of inferior quality, and the fighting power of the reserve is not what it was when the offensive against Rumania was undertaken. When the Germans launched their great attack on March 21 it was commonly supposed that they had about 200 divisions available. A hundred divisions were identified as having been employed in tiie great offensive at the end of March, and forty divisions were identified as having been employed in the northern attack along the valley of the Lye. This left sixty divisions etill in reserve. The German casualties in both .attacks have been put at 350,000, or, cay, thirty divisions, which would still leave them with one hundred and seventy divisions, and it is believed that they could still draw a further ■twenty divisions from Russia. The combined French and British losses during tlio same period have been put at 300,000, or within 50,000 of the German losses. The Germans may elect to throw all their available forces into the fighting lino in their next great offensive, and in that case much will depend on whether we can keep a reserve in hand for a counter-attack, of whether ■we ehall be compelled to use our reserves for the purpose of holding the German offensive. Xaturally the number and disposition of our reserves have boon kept a profound secret, but some writers are inclined to think that the British have not been able to keep more than local tcserves owing to the heavy drain on our forces through tho necessity of providing troops for the Palestine,, Mesopotamian, and Macedonian campaigns, and tho heavy drafts made for garrison work in the British Isles, Egypt, and India. The enemy Press put tljs. French strategical reserve at forty to fifty divisions before the March offensive. Some colour is lent to this idea about British reserves by the ■fact that French reserves have been thrown into all the critical parts of the line during the recent German offensives. The Germans were able to gain initial successes by reason of their holding the interior lines and pushing home their attack before the French reserves could be brought into action. Previous to the great offensive at tho end of March the French were expecting the main blow to fall on the Rheinis sector, and the reserves were placed to meet an attack in this quarter. Consequently it was somo little time before the troops could be moved up to the scene of action. But now. that the whole Western front is treated as one, under a supreme command, it is probable that the reserve*are disposed so as to be more readily available at any threatened point, and the Americans have materially increased both the fighting and reserve forces of the Allies, and are increasing them with every week that passes. If, therefore, the Germans do elect to throw all their forces into one great effort to achieve a decieion we ought to be able to meet than with something like equal numbers, and still have from thirty to forty divisions in reserve for tho mass of manoeuvre. In war, however, much depends on having superior numbers at the decisive point, and the Germans have

such an enormous advantage from the position they occupy on the inside of the circle that it ie possible they may yet gain further initial successes before our fighting reserves can be brought up to the scene of conflict. The French bore the brunt of the losses during the first two years of the war, the British have had the heavier losses during the last two years, ami the Americans are preparing to bear the brunt of the next two years, if the war lasts a3 long. German strength is declining, and the quality of the bulk of the troops brought from Russia i 8 inferior. American strength is increasing, and the flower of the American army is untouched. Germany's allies are exhausted both as regards men, money, and supplies; we have an ally with resources practically intact. Tile Allies are working in perfect harmony, and with a full appreciation of each other's 'bravery and devotion. The same can hardly be said of Germany and her allies, since the friction between Vienna and Berlin seems to grow greater as tho war proceeds, 'while Bulgaria and Turkey have lost all enthusiasm for the war, and appear to have adopted an attitude of fatalist resignation. We must expect critical times during the next few montlis, since Germany will make every effort to break our line, but with the spirit of perfect hnnnony that prevails in our ranks and the ever-increasing jhclp that is coming from America we can await these times with confidence and calm.