THE OFFENSIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 131, 3 June 1918, Page 4

THE OFFENSIVE.

To-day's news throws more light on the reasons for the enemy's success on tho Aisne front, and the problem with which General Foch is faced. The attack on the front north of tbe Aisne was expected, hut the time of the attack and the weight thrown in seem to have surprised the Allies. The French lino was overwhelmed, and the Germans had an easy advance to the Aisne and beyond. Fortunately, the Allied resistance on the wings—the British on the right and the French on the left —was much

stronger, otherwise the break in the line might have been a good deal wider, and consequently much more serious. Rheims by this time may have fallen, but the heroic resistance of the British divisions defending it during the past week has gained valuable time fcrr the Allies. Apparently the intention of the Germans is to use the Marne to guard their flank, and 6wing towards Paris, at the same time striking hard towards the same objective along the valley of the Oisc, where they have already gained some ground. The latest news at the time of writing indicates that the situation has improved; the enemy is being held. The fact that he has made little or no progress westward since he reached the neighbourhood of Chateau Thierry is a good sign. This dirpct threat to Paris has given rise to criticism of the Allied strategy in the Press of the capital. The "Matin" declares that the events of the last two months have shown defensive tactics to be a failure, and M. Gustave Hervc says that to be victorious to-day "it is necessary to believe in the superiority of the offensive over the defensive." Hitherto, so far as we know, the Paris Press has trusted Foch, approving the strategy of wearing down the enemy's reserve and conserving your own, but the third success of the Germans in making a breach in the Allied line, and making that breach so as to threaten Paris, seems to have weakened the faith of two journalists. This criticism is not fair to the generalissimo. The Paris newspapers wanted a Generalissimo, and thought Foch was the best man; they should trust him now. He did not take over the supreme command until the Allies, through tbe first German offensive, had lost the initiative; he had to accept things as he fonnd them and make the best of them. Whether the Allies were wise in allowing the Germans to attack in the first instance is another matter; probably political as well as strategical considerations were involved. We take it that Foch accepted the position on condition that he was not hampered by the politicians. He knows quite as well as his critics the value of the offensive in war, and he may surely be relied upon to make the best use of whatever opportunities he gets for its use. Just now he has to deal with an offensive that has achieved considerable success, but may develop into something much greater, or may be followed by an attack on some other part of the line. His difficulties may be judged from the fact that the line of battle is now more than twice as long as it was when the attack began a week ago. Suppose he had rushed all his available troops to the front south of the Aisne, the enemy might have gained even more serious successes elsewhere. The dominating facts of the situation are that the enemy has used a large part of his reserves, but still has strong forces available, either to develop this offensive or to make a new one. while apparently only a few of out reserves have been thrown in. Foch dare not compromise himself deeply until he knows what the Germans are going to do with the rest of the reserves. Whether or not the strategy of the last two months has been a failure cannot be judged now. That is a question to be settled only at the end of the campaign, and that end is a long way Oil.