The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. WEDNESDAY. MAY 29, 1918. THE NEW OFFENSIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 127, 29 May 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

WEDNESDAY. MAY 29, 1918. THE NEW OFFENSIVE.

For the cause that lacks assistance. For the wrong that needs resistance, For tjie distattce^'.' And the good that ice can do.

After a cessation of some weeks, during which we may assume that the Germans have made every possible effort to accumulate men and munitions au.l perfect their preparations, the enemy offensive is again in full swing. We must guard against possibilities of error in regard to these new operations, for it i≤ quite conceivable that with the large reserves at their disposal the German leaders may be striking tentative blowe in various directions, and that the full weight of their attack may finally fall in some other quarter. But so far the German "push -, has been directed chiafly against the southern front of the great salient east of Xoyon, between Soissons and Rheims. With the information at present available we can safely afford to treat the attacks in the Ypree and Amiens sectors as subsidiary for the time being, and to concentrate our attention on the German movements along the Aisne front. Without covering in detail the gTound that has been so often traversed already, we may remind our readers that from '.he period of the firet battle of the Aisne (September-October, 1914), for more than two years, tlin Allies made but little progress in this region, and the German lines bctwnen Soiesons and Berry-au-bae followed closely the edge of the high ground which forms the northern boundary of the river valley. Then came the great French offensives last year, -which resulted in pushing the enemy back from these strong positions, thus allowing the French to seize the Chemin dcs Dames, the great road running eastward along the ridges of the Aisne Valley toward the Champagne. This gain represented an important strateeital advantage, and it is asserted on good authority that, if Njvelle had been allowed to drive his attack home last year, regardless of cost, he would have seriously jeopardised the position of all the German armies. Indeed, it is asserted that before political influence at Parie checked NiveßVs advance orders had already been issued by the German High Command for a general retreat to the line of the Mouse. However this may be, the positions thus gained by the Allies north of the Aisne and along the Chemin dcs Dames wers a serious menace to the Germans, and it is not surprising that the enemy should now concentrate his strength with a view to recovering lost ground there.

The question -which chiefly interests us in regard to this offensive is whether it represents a merely subordinate phase of the German strategic plan, or whether it is meant to initiate an advance toward a new objective. Of course the main purpose of the enemy must etill be to break up the Allied armies and to dnvn them back upon Paris and the eea coast. For the time at least the advance toward the Channel ports by way of Amiens. or Ballieul is help up. and it is only natural that the Germans should revert to their original plan and attempt another '•'drive" to-

■ward Paris along a line where the defences may seem to them less effectively organised. Aβ a matter of fact the positions which the French won last year north of the Aisne, while they provided a useful base for further offensive operations against the German armies, were not in themselves easy to defend. From. the eastern end of the riilge known as the Chemin dcs Dames, the ground slopes rapidly down toward the open country of the Champagne; and it is thus easy to outflank and isolate these positions, if an attack were made in sufficient force and pushed horn« regardless of eacrifices. There are indications from Sir Douglas Haig"s reports, and from what is known of the disposition of the French and British troops in this sector before the offensive began, that the Alliee recognised the weakness of their advanced lines here, and had , made no very elaborate prepartions for holding them in great strength. Under these circumstances it is not very surprising to find that the Germans have been able to pueh the Allied troops hack from the northern heights of the Aisne, and even to cross the river itself. Tne result so far as the operations have gone is simply that the enemy hafl deprived us of a point of vantage from which we could threaten him with a dangcTous attack, but which otherwise was a matter of relatively small importance, and had little bearing upon the general military situation.

But the question now naturally ariers. if the Germane have been able to force us back at certain points across the Aisne. is not this advance likely to develop into another "drive -, in the direction of Paris? anil is the enemy more likely to succeed in punning home his attack upon the capital by this new route than by the route that he tried unsuccessfully to follow two months ago? far no decisive opinion can be offered on these points, but present indications do not suggest that this attack is a prelude to the long-advertised and longdelayed onslaught upon Paris. The front covered by the attack is hardly broad enough for operations on a large scale, even if the Germans should succeed in breaking through, and in any case, the chancre of any definite encmv

sniccess in this quarter are highly problematical. The weeks that have inter-; vened since the great German offensive began have afforded the Allies ample opportunity to mass their reserves and to prepare for all possible contingencies; and the movement toward Paris, which was brought to a standstill weeks ago in the Noyon salient, is even lees likely to succeed now. We may therefore fairly assume that the advance of the Germans across the Aisne makes so far no practical difference to the main objectives of the campaign. It is possible that the Allies have had to abandon come of their guns, and have suffered with some severity in retiring ac.ros-s the river; and it is likely that if the German advance is pushed further, somo of the important railway communication which connect the Noyon sector with the Champagne may be threatened. But losses of this kind are inevitable incidents of such a war as this, and so far as the offensive in thie quarter has gone, it gives no ground for anxiety. The experience of tne last four years proves that such successes can always be purchased at a price, and the Allies have always been ready to concede relatively unimportant points when they ibeuame too expensive to hold. So far as the general outlook is concerned, the nations of the Entente may look with unshaken confidence to o:ir gallant armies and to our Commandor-in-Chiof, w-;io is well aware that he holds the balance of military strength in his hands, and cm be trusted to strike his blow with his utmost force when the right moment comes.