CAMPAIGN PROSPECTS

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 126, 28 May 1918, Page 5

CAMPAIGN PROSPECTS

A QUESTION OF RESERVES.! I I LAST WEEK REVIEWED. j AUSTRALIANS' FINE WORK. GREAT AERIAL ACTIVITY. (JJy Telegraph.—Press Association.) WELLINGTON, this day. The following lins been received by the Governor-General from the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr Walter Long) regarding the operations for the week ending May 23:— There arc four point 3 of special interest in connection with the week's operations on the western front. The first is the continuous and remarkable success of the Australians in the angle of the rivers Soinine and Ancre; the second, the very brilliant little operation whereby the French rectified and advanced their line between Seherpenberg and Komruel Hills, south-west of j Ypres, so as to give themselves the full i benefit of several minor actions in that sector whicli they had successfully carried out during the last few days; the third is the very marked ascendancy in the air which thp Allies have established over the pnvmy; and the fourth, the almost complete lack of enemy initiative. their few undertakings being confined to local counter-attacks, all of which were unsuccessful. GATHERING FOR A SPRING. While then; may bo considerable connection between the two latter points, the general impression produced is that the enemy is> gathering himself together for a renewal of his offensive on a grand scale. It is now seven weeks since the , i?omme offensive came to a standstill, and four weeks since that of the Lys, or for the latter five weeks if the taking of Keminel Hill is regarded as a separate operation. This is possibly time enough for the enemy to restore hie .men and dumps to a sufficient standard, but it is very doubtful if he can have satisfactorily established his necessary transport arrangements. It is probable that the Royal Air Forco contributed to delay the enemy in this matter. WHILE AMERICANS ARE TRAINING. The Americans are steadily arriving, and Mr X. D. Baker (Secretary for War) announced that half a million were already in France, and the rate would be increased: hut the enemy knows that , there must be a necessary interval before the troops now arriving from America can be put into the firing line, a consideration which does not apply to the trained men which he himself is constantly transporting from the eastern front. He may, therefore, conclude that his present superiority is in no immediate danger of being disturbed; and, besides, since the next attack may be his last, he will not launch it until he is absolutely ready. If, however, the enemy should open attack in the immediate future, it will be at the disadvantage of over-hastily made preparations, and under the force of other than purely military considerations. ALU3ED MAN-POWER. Aβ regards the prospects of the campaign, it is already frequently pointed out that this is entirely a question of reserves. The reserved may include not only man-power, but also time and space, for every week's delay brings the Allies" acquisition of American strength, while every yard of ground exchanged for enemy casualties may also be put to the credit of the reserve." Apart from the American aid tlie man-power situation • is more in the Allies' favour than when the German offensive began on March 21. This is due to two causes. At that time the enemy wae able to concentrate a numerically greater superior force opposite the British front, thereby leaving parts of the French front comparatively lightly held. This could be countered either iiy the French front attacking- some such part of their own front, or .by the French army correspondingly concentrating ite divisions to form a general reserve. For a number of reasons the latter, course was adopted, but since the initiative was with the enemy, and he was on interior lines, the French could not move or commit an equal number of divisions to those moved by the Germans. On this next occasion the Allies will have the same choice, but with the added advantage of unity of command. Secondly, the enemy lotees in the first part of the campaign have been greater than those of the j Allies. The casualties he incurred in the fighting were very nearly equal to his reserves in the depots. Thus, on now replacing- casualties from the depots, he j will have a very email reserve left. On j the other hand, the Allies' reserve is at , least equal to tUat of the enemy. Their I fcactica in defence are such as to reduce their own losses to a minimum, while mulcting the maximum on the enemy and again time is with them. J ACTIVITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. I The Air Ministry reports that the im- | proved weather conditions on the U estern front during the pact week led to greater activity among aircraft, an exceptional amount of work being accomplished. Approximately 186 tons of bombs were dropped in the battle zone, and the neighbourhood of Bruges. Zee- | brugge, and Ostend, and nearly 137,000 I rounds of small arm ammunition were J fired with excellent results on different ground targets. Over 15.000 photographs were taken. Air fighting wae generally severe, and hostile scouts made persistent but unsuccessful efforts to deny our bombers and reconnaissance machine* access to their objectives, or failing this to intercept them when returning. The most notable results of these tactics have liren heavy increases in the German casualty lists, 148 enemy aircraft being brought down in air fighting or by other meine. nnrl 30 driven down out of control. Fifty-four of our mariiiiifs failed to return during the week, which is a relatively »mall figure when considered in the light of the nVirchers of hours flown, and thp amount of bombing and photographic and reconn.iissaiicn work accomplished. The enemy naval bases on the Belgian coaet. ZeebruETKP, Ostnnd, and the important centre of Drugee with its interconnecting canal j system were again sobjeetefl to incessnn attack, hits being secured on quays, docks, and enemy shipping. Reports received state that most important j material d-.image was caused. RAIDS INTO GERMANY. ' The weather alloweti the resumption i of long-distance operations into Ger- ' many, and the Royal Air Force took full j advantage of the improved conditions, raids being carried out into Germany on five days out of seven. Important rail-

way communications at Diedenhofei? and Thionville were bombed on three occasions, and the station and siding? at Metz were twice attacked. Raidf were also carried out on the important military objectives of Saarbrucken. Cologne, and Landau, north-west of Karlsruhe. Good bursts were observed in the course of these raids, and a number of fires and explosions caused. All the evidence continues to point to the demoralising effect of frequent penetration of the German frontiers, particularly in the Rhine Valley, where llvs'y dissatisfaction was expressed with the authorities owing to the failure of the anti-aircraft measures. Our activities this week brought home once again to the enemy in German territory the fact that only during periods of "unfavourable weather can lie hope to eniov immunity from attack. RATIONING'S SUCCESS. The Food Ministry reports that rationing has undoubtedly proved successful, lessening the rate of consumption despite the leakage which naturally accompanied its inauguration in some districts. Owing to improvement in the imports the ration of Butcher's meat, has been raised to a pound per head weekly. This increase has shown that the rationing system is elastic, and has done much to convince the public that the restrictions on consumption will be relaxed when circumstances and considerations of future safety permit. Steps are being taken to restrict bringing to market home produce stock at present immature. The. shortage of cheese causes considerable hardship. National kitchens are being established in increased numbers, and where properly managed effect a great savins in food without, loss to thp municipality. The Board of Trade reports that the British Government contracted to purchase from tJe Zinc Producers' Association Proprietary. Limited, of Australia, stocks of zinc concentrates existing at the end of 1917. less reserves subject to the reasonable protection of Australian requirements, and also the production from the bejrinning of 1918 to a maximum extent of 250,000 tone per annum during the war,and one year after, and 300.0C0 tons per annum for the subsequent nine years.—(A. and N.Z. Gable.)