The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1918. THE RESUMED OFFENSIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 126, 28 May 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1918. THE RESUMED OFFENSIVE.

For the cause that lacks assistanoe, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we <sin do.

The German offensive lias been resumed in great force at two points, the Soissons-Rheims front, north-east of Paris, and the front south-west of Ypres. The first is much the bigger attack, for the front is over thirty miles. against Jive miles (between Locre anil Yoormezeele, near Ypres. This thrust in the direction of Paris is un offensive

on a. new front; the line from near La Fore, north of Soissons, to Rheims, has been comparatively inactive during the' last two months. We are witnessing now on this front, not a resumption of the offensive so much as n new movement, which probably is more formidable in weight of men and guns than anything eince the initial blows in March. The subsequent attacks on the Amiens line were miule with imperfect communications, and consequently imperfect supply, but thU is an attack on ii front where nil the machinery for a movement lias existed for many months. On the western part of the SoissonoRheims line the French hold very strong positions. North-east <.f Soi-eons runs the famous Chemin dei- Dames ridge, for which the French and .Germans fought lung and bitterly last year. The Gcr-

maud had a footing on it, and tried over and over again to capture till of it. their assaults resembling those at Verdun; the French resisted splendidly, and in the end cleared the whole ridge as a

result of their brilliant operation in October on the left of the ridge, in which they advanced towards the Ailette ii lid the Aisne-OUe Canal. Behind the French on the Chemin dcs Dames line are the heights fulling to the Aisne, where the Allies were halted in their pursuit (if the Germans after the Marne, and up which Xivelle forced hit* way in his offensive in the spring of last year. A direct assault here would be a very difficult and coatly business fur the enemy, but unfortunately the French positions on the right half of this sector

are not so strong. East of Craonne the line bends to the south-east past Rheims, and an advance in this part might turn the Chemin dcs Dames position and force the French -Imi-k on the Aisne. Some critics thought that the opening German offensive this year would fall on the line near Rheims.

The Chemin dcs Dames is about seventy miles from Paris, but these seventy miles are 'well adapted for defence. However, it is too i-arlv vet to

say whether or not Paris is tl bjec

the. The narrow front of the, attack near Vpree suggests that this may ho not much more than a local affair— though success might give the enemy Ypree—and there may still be another blow in preparation against Amiens. It is on this front that a resumption of the offensive »a« expected, and it is , there that the enemy is nearest to a success that would seriously embarrass the Allies. At the time of writing there is little to indicate how the battle is going. The Germans are reported to he gaining ground at several points, which is to bo expected in an offensive of this magnitude. The German success in March was due to the failure of the Fifth Army to hold ground which they had lately taken over, and consequently were not familiar with. But the French know every inch of the Soiseons-Rlieims line. Since Sir Douglas Haig issues a communique about the fighting on this front, and uses the term Anglo-French, it may be that there are some British uni , i there, hut the bulk of the defending force and the direction of the defence will be French. If there are British there it is another sign of the interweaving process that has been going on in the Allied armies since the great offensive began.

An interesting review of the situation in the weekly summary issued by the Colonial Office appropriately eoiucidei' with the resumption of the offensive. The review contrasts the prospects of the Germans at the opening of the offensive in March and their prospects to-day, and says that the enemy has not the same chances of success now as then. It ls all

;>. question of reserves, in which are included time and space as well as men, and the position of the Allies is ibetter now than it was two montlis ago, and that of the Germans is worse. It is better even if American help is left out of consideration. The review suggests (it was written before the offensive was resumed) that the German would be compelled to begin again before he was ready. The Amiens and Ypres fronts would be in the compiler's mind, for there, and especially opposite Amiens, a great deal of reconstruction work had to be done, and large supplies accumulated, before a move could be made with hope of success. On the SoissonsRheims front the lines of communication have long been in full working order. But the enemy's unreadiness might extend to the men he employs on this fully-equipped front. The Allies have the great disadvantage of the exterior lines. Look at the map and see how much more difficult it is to reinforce points so far distant from one another as the Rokifons-Rlieims and Ypre* fronts than it is for the Germans to strengthen any point on the angle between Ypres and Rheims. Reinforcements, say, from

j Amiens to Rlieims would have to go round the Montdidier angle, by ii longer route than they would have taken before the attack in March. But the Allies

now have complete unity of command, which they did not possess when the campaign opened, and they have had some weeks of comparative inactivity to take advantage of this improvement in direction. The lines will have been strengthened, divisions rested, reserves formed and stationed at handy points, and while correspondents have described the difficulty of knowing what the enemy was going to do, it is probable that, owing to our superiority in raiding , and our still more marked superiority in the air, the Allies know more aibout his dispositions and plans than he does of theirs.