CO-ORDINATING THE ALLIES, EFFORTS.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 45, 21 February 1918, Page 5

CO-ORDINATING THE ALLIES , EFFORTS.

POWERS OF THE WAR COUNCIL OF VERSAILLES.

REASONS FOR CHANGES Hf BRITISH HIGH COMMAND.

MB. LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS THE SITUATION.

(:Received 10.25 a.m.)

I,OXDOX, February 20 - Mr. Lloyd George addressed a crowded sitting of the House of Commons to-day upon,the recent army changes. He said that the retention of General Robertson as chief-of-staff had-latterly become incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that the Allies had

suffered in the past through lack of concerted and co-ordinated efforts. The Government deeply Tegretted that General Robertson's position was no longer compatible with the policy decided on at Versailles, but if that policy were right, no personalities, however valuable, important, or distinguished, should stand in the way of its execution. (Checre.) If the policy -were wrong,

no personalities and no Governments ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated.

CONCENTRATION AND UOTTT OF EFFORT,

The Premier emphasised that there was absolutely no difference between our policy and the policy of France, Italy, and the United States. In this respect the policy was based on the assumption that the Allies had hitherto, aa he had already stated, suffered through lack of concerted and co-ordinated effort, and our purpose and policy had been to get concentration and unity of efl'ort. It was only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly the same pet of circumstances, inevitably diminishing the power and concentration which would otherwise have been possible in order to counteract the efforte of the

Germans and the Russian collapse.

It was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority to exercise direction over war policy, and that that authority must be interallied and must have executive power. The only difference of opinion vaa over how that authority ehould be constituted. But agreement on this point was also reached. The Premier proceeded to mention several proposals which had been considered and rejected. One was that the central authority ehould be composed of the chiefe of staffs, but this irea. was unworkable. It was fert that the new body must not only know the conditions of its own armies and its own fronte, but all tho conditions on all the fronts and in all tho armies. The Versailles Council was now the repository for such information, which had been co-ordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information. The Premier proceeded to give cogent reasons why the chiefs of stafl'e in various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. The Supreme Council unanimously rejected this proposal.

XJNANIMOXrs DECISION AFTER INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION

The delegation then separated and considered the matter independently, with the very remarkable result that next morning each delegation submitted exactly the same proposal—namely, the proposal which now held th« field.

He would have liked to liave read to tho House the document in. which the American delegation cogently put the case for the proposal which was finally carried, but he could not because it was mixed up with the plan of operations. The Americans presented their ense with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours' disciißsion, in which there was no single dissentient voice so far as the plan was concerned. Sir Douglas Huig drew attention to a weak point or two, and the Government undertook to remedy them, but these were not points affecting the root of the proposal.

Upon returning here General Robertson reported to Cabinet that he thought the plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Army Council made certain criticisms from the constitutional viewpoint. He considered those carefully with Earl Derby, who throughout put General Robertaon's case before Cabinet. HAIG AGREES TO NEW ARRASGBMEKT. Tlie Premier emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should be accepted wholeheartedly by all the Anylo-Frencb military authorities, and especially that Sir Douglas Haig should be satisfied. Therefore, before the agreements were made, he talked with General Haig, who said he would work under the new arrangement, which was that the British permanent military adviser on the Council of Versailles ehould become a member of the Army Council, should constantly communicate with the Chief-of-Staff, and should be absolutely free in the advice he gave. »

The Chiel-of-Staff would have the same powers as his predecessor, General Robertson, and would remain the supreme military adviser of the British Government. He would accompany Ministers to meetings of the Supreme War Council as adviser, and would have the right to visit France and consult with the military representatives. The representative at Versailles must have absolute perfect freedom to discuss and recommend pltins. If the Commandrr-in-Chief did not approve, or if there was a difference of opinion among various representatives, then the Government would decide. There waa no derogation of authority by the Government, but the Chief-of-Staff would be chief advisor to the Government in the event of any such difference of opinion.

It was oiily after the Government decided to offer General Robertson the position of representative at Versailles that the Premier realised that General Robertson objected, on military grounds, to the system which the Versailles Court had decided unanimously to adopt. General Robertson suggested that the representative at Versailles should be made a deputy of the Chief-of-Staff, but the Government rejected the suggestion, because the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make the .British representative inferior to other members of the Council. •., . PWEA FOR MTTTTTAI, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. A voice: What about General Foch* The Premier pointed out that General Foch was within twenty-five minutes of Versailles, and could bo consulted in the event of. emergency. The Premier reiterated that the Government very deeply regretted that it was obliged to proceed without General Robertson. Thu choice between carrying out unanimously the policy of the military advisers of the Allies ajid retaining the services of a most distinguished and very valued public servant was very painful, but in view of the magnitude of the policy the Government was bound to stand by the arrangement with its allies.

Mr. Lloyd George dwelt on the natural difficulties of securing military unity among the Allies. Some thought that the new arrangement would secure political unity but imperil the unity of the armies. The Government proposed to invite, suggestions from the highest military authorities in regard to the best means of removing anxiety tbjit the new scheme might impair the efficiency of our Army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the scheme. National feeling, historical tradition, and suspicion so militated ogainst every alliance, while there were also other difficulties, due to professional conservatism. He pleaded for mutual trust and confidence, which, were the very eoul of victory.

"We discussed and re-dificusaed this plan," continued Mr. Lloyd George, "in order that our whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break the moet terrible foe with which civilisation was ever confronted. We faced terrible realities. The enemy rejected the most moderate terms which the whole of civilisation accepted as reasonable. Why had the enemy rejected them? Because he was clearly convinced that the Russian collapse gave him power to achieve a miliary victory and impose Prueeianism forcibly on Europe." GBAVEST HOXTB OF BBITABPS BISTORT. The Premier begged the House to turn down all controversy and close the ranks. (Loud cheers.) "If the House disapprove of the Versailles policy, let it put in a Government who will reluee to accept that policy, but it must be another Government. (Cheers.) The Government is entitled to know, and know to-night, whether the House and the nation wish to proceed with the policy deliberately settled with a view to organising our forces to remit the advance, of the foe.

"I have endeavoured to discharge ihe-teriible functions of my position io my utmost capacity and strength, i Cheers.) If the Bouse to-night repudiate that policy for which I am responsible, and on -which I believe the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but ojie regret—that 1 have not had greater strength and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest hour of her history." (Loud and prolonged cheers.)■<—(Keuter.)