STRATEGY AND POLITICS.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 45, 21 February 1918, Page 4

STRATEGY AND POLITICS.

Strategy, according to the official textbook of the British infantry, ia the art of bringing the enemy to battle, while tactics are "the methods by which, a commander eeeke to overwhelm him when battle 'is joined. This distinction between strategy and tactics etill holds good, but in the present war purely military problems have been ro complicated 'by their relation to questions of policy that a new term ihae had to be found by which to express the whole art of coordinating military and political action, and most writers have accepted fhe phrase '"higher strategy" as best suited for the purpose. In this higher strategy 'both the commander and the statesman must play their part This is the more true in the present war since we have to consider the domestic and the foreign policy of our Allies in making decisions in regard to the disposition of our forces. It is a common mistake to suppose that war is a matter purely for the professional soldier. With tactics the politician has no concern, nor has he with the details of military practice But in proportion as we recede from those details to more general points, in that proportion general knowledge and power of mind come into play, and it may , happen even in military matters that an unprofessional person possessed of wide knowledge may judgfc more correctly of the general conduct of a campaign than the commander whose mind is engrossed with the detail of some one portion. Strategy cannot move altogether untrammelled by politics and linance, and political and financial considerations may not present themselves in quite the same light to the soldier ac to tie statesman- In the last resort the higher strategy must be more under the control of the statesman than of the soldier.

This is true of all "ware of any magnitude; it is doubly true of the present war. We have to consider the difficulties, the resources, and the wishes of Italy, France, and the United States. We cannot play a lone hand, and purely military considerations must sometimes give place to questions of honour and sentiment. From the military point of View our holding on for so long to the salient in front of Ypres was indefensible. We held on to this point of danger out of an honourable regard for our Belgian ally, and a sentimental desire not to surrender the last foot of Belgian soil. Only by chivalrous sacrifice of personal gain to the common cause can our European alliance hold together. For that reason consultation among the statesmen of the Allies as well as among their eoldiera is necessary if the needs of all the Allies are to receive due consideration. It k, perhaps, inevitable that there should occasionally be differences ibetweea statesmen, and purely profcaeiDnal opinion..

Purely professional opinion advocated the abandonment of both Ypres and Verdun. Statesmen have to consider more than the merely military situation. They have to take into account the moral factor, both as it affects their own country and the countries with which they are allied.