RHINEGOLD PROBLEM.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 258, 28 October 1916, Page 13

RHINEGOLD PROBLEM.

LORRAINE'S IRON AND COAL

A QUESTION FOR THE ENTENTE.

(By PHILIPFE MILLET.)

' There is a problem of the Rhinegold, and the French industrial world has given it a good deal of thought since the beginning of the war. It has been discussed for several monthe in the French reviews and daily papers. A. member of the Fxench Chamber, who i», aloo a distinguished economist, M. Fer-: pand-Engerand, lias devoted to it, under the title "L'AUemagne ct le Fer," a remarkable book. Queerly enough, the British public does not seem to have realised yet that fehie problem concerns Great Britain nearly, ac much as France. I even believe very few thinking Englishmen are aware that such a pronlen) exists at all.

The question of Alsace-Lorraine has two sides. From the point of view of sentiment it ie entirely a French question. I need not emphasise that the whole of the nation, including the Socialists, is unanimous in its will to reconquer the two provinces which were stolen in 1871, and have since then remained French at heart.

But there is also an industrial side of the question. That part of Lorraine which Germany captured in 1871 contains the largest deposits of iron ore in Central Europe. The little valley of the Sarre, which spreads out on the northern border of Lorraine, is an important coal field. Such is the treasure which Nature has ominously placed at the doore of the Prussian Nibelung.

It is only by keeping thie fact well in view that history, past and recent, becomes quite clear. The whole of the treasure was French in 1814. A year after, at the Vienna Congress of 1815 Prussia availed herself of Napoleon's second downfall to lay her hands on the Sarre valley. Then came the war of ' 1870-71. Thie time Prussia took hold of what she thought was the whole of the industrial wealth of Lorraine. She would have asked for Briey as well had she known then that Western Lorraine also contained important deposits. However, what elie took in IS7I was sufti eiently important to become the foundation etone of the whole of her industrial imperialism. This is not a lucre metaphor.

1 GERMAN DEPENDENCE OX j LORRAINE. I Every Englishman ought to know the following figures:—Out of 28.6 million tons of iron ore which Germany extracted from her coil in H>l3. 21 millions came from Lorraine. Out of 2.500 million tons, representing the iron deposits of Germany, the German engineers admitted that Lorraine alone contained 2,100 million.

What does this mean? It means, that the Lorraine treasure has, for the leet 45 years, been the main source from which German metallurgy has derived its strength. But German metallurgy is not only the most important of all 'German industries; it is the very key to the whole of German industrial development, for it was by using their supremacy in steel that the Germans tried and began to dominate the market*, of the world. 1 Moreover, Germany owes it to Lorraine that she has been able to supply her aimiee with an enormoue amount of shells in spite of the blockade. The Germane have eaid 60 themselves. "If the output of the minette (iron ore) of Lorraine were to be disturbed, eaid a manifesto issued in September, 1915, by *ome of their industrial associations, "the war would he as good as lost." Indeed, if Prufseia had not possessed Lorraine she would very likely not haw; dared to go to war at all.

The primary interest of Britain in the matter is therefore quite obvious. The Lorraine treasure hus been in the hands of Prussia the main weapon with which she has tried for years to strike ac her great industrial rival, the British I'mpire. There will be no industrial peace for the British Empire—nay, there will be no peace in the common sense of the word —until Lorraine has returned to its legitimate rwsseesofc

| This restitution, however, does not suffice in itself, not even if the Sarre iyalley, which is Lorraine's natural dependency, is given -back to France. For even then Germany's position remains a threatening one unless England comes to the rescue.

FRANCE'S NEED OF COAL. Roughly speaking, toe position will be tbie. Already before the war France suffered from a shortage of coal and wae importing 21 million tons out of 62. Now, the coal output of the Sane fields would make up for that deficiency, did not the.mere contiguity of German Lorraine to the present French iron deposits increase the future needs, in coal of the French industry to » 'V«iy' ; lligh figure, which, according to the best experts, would leave a new deficiency of 36 million tons; If the general conditions of shipping and railway freights'? which ob--I*te«l N beftire~ iiot I altered almost the -whole of this extra supply will have to be got from Germany, as it will be impossible for British coal to compete in Lorraine with Westphalian coal.

This would lead to an obvious danger. Of course, France would be in a position t-» deprive Germany of her iron supply in case of another impending war. But from a mere industrial point of view such a state of things would completely tie French metallurgy to German metallurgy. It would make French industry as a whole more or lese dependent upon the goodwill of the Germans. The Rhinegold would work against the economic alliance of France and England. Besides, Great Britain would have no say in the most vital question of Central Europe—a question which concerns her future welfare, and which already has caused, more or lese directly, so many of her sons to lay down their lives.

THE WAY OUT. It is not for a layman to say what can be done in order to solve such a technical problem as thie. The best thing he can do ie to point out the difficulties and ask all far-seeing Englishmen to think about the best way of meeting them.

There is, however, one practical point which, I think, no Englishman will dispute. When peace comes Great Britain must insist that the Rhine should be made an international waterway, with all the adjoining rivers and canals. The day when a British barge will be allowed to take a load of coal from Newcastle to Lorraine and take back a corresponding load of iron ore, that day the Rhinegold problem will cease to leave France face to face with Germany. Why! Herr Thyssen has been good enough to show us the way. His ships took Westphalian coke over to Caen, in Normandy, and brought back iron ore. There ie no reason why Knglnnd should not do the same once she has secured free access by water to Central Europe.

It can be done. It ought to be done. Only the problem is an intricate one, and must 'be faced without delay.