WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1916. THE IMPERIAL PROBLEM.
The full discussion of so complex and comprehensive a problem aa the reconstruction or the preservation of the British Empire ie obviously impracticable within the limits fixed by the conditions of journalistic -controversy. However, in view of the immense importance cf the whole question, and the interest clearly aroused here by Mr. Curtis , expositicn of his views, wo wiLl attempt 011C2 more to answer briefly various objections that havo been raked by some of Mr. Curth , supporters in reply to our criticism. Mr. i Sturge, in his last letter, tells us that colonial politicians are asking for more direct control over Britain \-> foreign policy. The answer of course is thateven if the Dominion as a whole woull like to be consulted about such develop ments of foreign policy as directly con- [ cern us, still it by no means follows that anybody in ■the Dominions would be ready to accept β-uch "control" as is practicable on such terms as Mr. Curtis proposes. Mr. Curtis maintains that every . phase and aspect of British fc'. - eign policy concerns the Dominions, and we admit it; but it is none the les* tiue that there is a great deal of it which the Dominions would be prepared to leave entirely to Britain's discretion for an indefinite time to come. As to the assumption of general principles, Mr. Sturge of course knows that no hypothesis can be accepted as satisfactory till it has etood some practical test, and if Mr. Curtis' "postulate" leaile us into direct conflict with the rights ol etlf- government and self - taxation, founded as they are on the long and bitter experiences of the past, it soems to us that it is the "postulate" and not oUr faith in democratic autonomy that irust go to the wall. As regards our reference to Mr, Sturge*s "absurd sug gt-stion,'" what we regard as preposterous io his assertion that England had in the past .defended the Empire "unaided." In view of what the Dom n ions have done by way of naval subsidies and other contributions, and by mi.itary ] aid to assist Britain, it ie an absurd misrepresentation to say that Britain will not in the 'future 'be prepared to defend' the Empire "unaided"; as if she had done so in the past, and more par ticularly as if she had ever done so solely lor the sake of her oversea Dominions, and not chiefly for her own prote:fon. This last comment points towards a special feature of the proposals we are combating which seems to us to pervade the whole of the arguments employed by Mr. Curtis and his friends. They state the Imperial Problem strictly from the English, as distinct from the colonial, standpoint, and they look at all the questions involved almost exclusively fronJ the point of view of a centralised authority desiring to see it 3 powers increased rather than limited. Those of our readers 'who are familiar with the literature of this interesting question will hardly need to be reminded that Mr. Curtis' scheme up to a certain point follows the lines of various Imperial Fedej ration programmes put forward in the past. The fundamental arguments on which they, all rely are,, it seems to ue, adequately answered in such a 'book as Mr. Richard Jebb's "Britannic Question," which traces at length the historical growth of the Imperial Federation movement, shows clearly to what a large extent it depends on the assumption that the Imperial authority ought to strengthen its control over Britain's dependencies, and contrasts with it other forms of Imperial development which would leave the existing rights of the autonomous Dominions practically unimpaired. Of course, Mr. Curtis and Mr. ] Sturge tell us that all other possible schemes have been analysed and dissected by the "Bound Table" groups during the past four or Svc years, and that as these have ail in turn been Tejected our only conceivable alternative is the special scheme which they have devised. The best answer to can make to tliia is that we would be inclined to look upon Mr. Ourtis , suggestions more sympathetically if they -were not so dogmatically expressed. The- "Round Table" groups may 'have rejected all other schemes ol Imperial reconstruction, tout it by no means folio we that the Dominions are compelled to follow their lead. More than this, in view of the astonishing proposals put forward by Mr. Curtis and his friends as to the possibility of taxation of the Dominions by an external authority, and the enforcement of euch taxation in caee of default, we venture to doubt if the advocates of such a scheme can possibly (be in dose or sympathetic touch -witih. public and national feeling throughout Britain's overeea dependencies. We have no deaire to depreciate the valuable work done by Mr. Curtis and the "Round Table" groups in rousing public opinion on Imperial topics, but we must confess that their reiterated assertion of their supreme confidence in their own views is a little wearing to the nerves. As a mild counter-Mast, we may quote from Mr. Jebb's "Britannic Question" a few comments on this point. Discussing the tone of the "Hound Table" review, he says: "Foreign affaira and Imperial defence are consistently treated in euch ft way as to suggest the notion «
that the only path of safety lies in centralised control. Constitutional mechanism is discussed with the same bias; the striking development of the Imperial Conference being treated with a scant indifference which seems to betray an instinctive dislike of that typical product and potential instrument of the Britannic Alliance." After commenting on the extent ■to which a contributor to the "Round Table" has been permitted "to . misrepresent with equal flagrance and innocence the Tariff Reform movement, of which evidently he has omitted to ascer- - tain either the Imperial attraction or the economic reasoning, or even the mere electoral fortunes," Mr. Jebb observes that the secret of the influence exercised i by the "Round Table" is that it is welcome to the Conservatives because it „ supports centralised authority, and to the Liberals because it opposes any form of Imperial Preference or Reciprocity; and he concludes that "its value does not reside in its philosophical standpoint, but rather in its service as an agent of Britannic communion, particularly in 1 stimulating reflection on foreign affairs." 3 In quoting these remarks we are not ' precisely endorsing all that Mr. Jebb has ' said, but we are anxious to suggest to '• our readers that the point of view 1 adopted in the "Round Table"—which is c virtually the mouthpiece of the new * Imperialism expounded by Mr. Curtis— t is in certain aspects definitely partisan, l The school of political thought it represents is clearly committed to the idea of • centralised authority as the necessary s foundation of a permanent and stable i Empire, and it is as definitely opposed 3 to that gradual enlargement of autonos mous rights which seems to us the t natural destiny of the oversea DomiI, nions. We need not argue this case at . length, for our present purpose is simply to point out that Mr. Curtis and his t friends have frankly adopted a certain attitude toward all colonial and Imperial questions which is at least open to critin cism. We therefore suggest to our 0 readers that there is no need to take too '■ literally the repeated assurances of the 0 spokesmen of the "Round Table" that : " they have in their investigations cxti hausted all other conceivable alternatives, R and that Britain and the Dominions are •f necessarily and inevitably limited for the i. future to the one course which the d votaries of this new Imperialism have s finally approved. * But when all is said and done, we come * back of necessity to our starting point r —the utter impracticability of such a r- plan as Mr. Curtis has worked out. Wo s have no space to dwell upon the imposd sibility of confining an Imperial Cabinet p or an Imperial Parliament to the discus--1 sion of foreign policy in the strict sense ■s without, trenching on tho right of intery nal eelf-governmcnt in the various Dod minions. The question has been discussed n at immense length in the Imperialist 0 literature of the hist two or three dee cades; and we will now confine ourselves • simply to the most obvious blot on the v scheme —tho attempt to assess taxation ; of the Dominions through a body on , which the representative of each Dominion would be in a small minority, and to exact the levy if necessary by orce. We must confess that on this topic we find it difficult to understand how Hr. Curtis and his fricnd3 can so far misconstrue our meaning. According to Mr. 1 Mahon tho chief lesson of the American Revolution • and of the British struggle j for constitutional liberty may be ex- , pressed in the phrase "No taxation without representation"; and the infercjence he apparently draws is that with representation any sort of taxation is practicable and desirable. But surely this is flagrantly illogical; in fact, it in • yolves one of the commonest fallacies in conditional reasoning. Is Mr. Mahon c prepared to assert that if the American colonies had received representation in j an Imperial Cabinet in which they might 8 be invariably outvoted, they would have } _ quietly agreed to pay taxes for Imperial purposes levied by what they might have held to be a hostile majority, in defiance a of their protests and without regard to their own domestic rights and needs? I The question answers itself, but in real ■ 3 ity the case in our favour is far stl onger r than this. For the Dominions have now b' grown to the rank ; of nations, and they c I have behind them many years of prac- ,_ tically absolute and unconditional selfr _ government. To surrender their right c of self-taxation and to permit the conse- ,. quent interference in the management of .. their own internal affairs would be a t far harder step for the Dominions to j take to-day than it would have been for c the American colonies a hundred and 1 # forty years ago. In fact, there is no ia analogy between the two cases, and we n have referred to Mr. Curtis' use of this ~ misleading parallel only to emphasise the y true lesson of the American Revolution c —the impossibility of forcing upon a if free,people fiscal burdens which they are 0 not inclined to accept If there were no c other objections to Mr. Curtis' scheme, c we would still be unable to conceive the g possibility of surmounting this obstacle d —the assessment of Dominion taxation t - by an external body which, under some J circumstances, might (in the words that h one of our greatest judges has used of c the Privy Council) "manifest all the a characteristics of an alien tribunal," and ~ the enforcement of such taxation J against the will- of the nations oversea, a We commend to the attention of Mr. Curtis , supporters two sentences in Mr. c Bloodworthfe hist interesting contribu--1 j tion to this controTersy—"You may per--5 suade democracies to do silly things, but c it is very unwise to attempt to force ■- them to do even sane things. To atr tempt to enforce the decisions of an Imc perial Cabinet on an unwilling people f would quickly solve the problem of the - Commonwealth, because it would be the ;. end of the Commonwealth." And though " we are far from agreeing with Mr. i Curtis' views, we are euro that this is i tho very last thing that he would deajelrg. Vb ■ j
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Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 213, 6 September 1916, Page 4
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1,948WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1916. THE IMPERIAL PROBLEM. Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 213, 6 September 1916, Page 4
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