THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1916. HINDENBURG IN COMMAND.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 208, 31 August 1916, Page 4

THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1916. HINDENBURG IN COMMAND.

The removal of General yon Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, and the appointment of Marshal yon Hindenburg, is evidently a reeult of the intervention of Rumania. It was only the other day that Hindenburg was appointed to the command of the armies facing Brussiloff in the southern part of the Eastern front, and he has scarcely had time to familiarise liimsell with all the details of nis new command before he is called upon to undertake the supreme direction, under tho Emperor, of the German armies on all fronts. Hindenburg is tho third general to hold this position during the war. When the war began tho Chief of Staff was General yon Moltke, a nephew of the famous Marshal who won Bismarck's wars of aggression. Moltke was not a mau of outstanding ability. His appointment in. 1906 was I received with a good deal of doubt and speculation, and it was stated that the Emperor, intending to be Ma own Chief of Staff, had selected him as""a convenient figure-head. Moltke took over the standing plans for the crushing of France by invading it through Belgium, and the wrecking tff those plane by the defeat at the Marne cost him Ms position. He was succeeded by General yon Falkenhayn, a much younger man, who had been Minister of War for two vcars.

It is said that in the German Army the machine is greater than the man, > but the success of German arms in 1015 must have been to some extent due to the ability of the new Chief of Staff. Falkenhayn, however, began with a bad blunder. The Staff decided in the autumn ol 1914 that the Channel port* must be won; but instead of concentrating at one point against the weak Allied line, Falkenhayn attacked almost simultaneously at four points, and persisted desperately in the attempt for three weeks. Had he broken through at Arras, which he probably would have done had he concentrated there, he would have cut off the whole of ( the British and Belgian armies and part of the French forces, and forced them back" ttf'Hh'e coast. Concentration at Ypres could hardly have failed to force the British right back, for, ac it was, it was just as much as our heroes could do to hold the line. "Tt is never wise to underrate the Intelligence of the enemy," says Mr. Buchan in his volume on this, phase of the war, "and all that we can say at present is that the German strategy is inexplicable. They may have been so confident of their numerical superiority that they believed that they had the strength to spare to carry all four positions. But economy of effort is in itself a doctrine of wise strategy, and on "this assumption here was a reckless squandering of strength. ,. In a later volume, however, Mr. Buchan describes this strategy outright as a gigantic blunder. Falkenhayn's second failure was the Russian campaign last year, but it was, a failure only because the Russian armies, through superb generalship and dauntless courage, eluded his grasp. Measured by territorial gains, the German Staff's achievement was great. The world had never before seen operations on such a vast scale, conducted, with such wonderful co-ordination. A little more inspiration, a little more dash, and the Russians migfht have suffered much more severely than they did. But though the ambitions of the German Staff iwere grandiose, their dispositions highly skilful, and their organisation perfect, the honours of generalship were with the Ruasiane, and in the end Falkenhavn was left face to face, far from his frontier, with a Russia not only unbeaten but regenerated and determined upon victory. His most complete success was achieved in Serbia, but the odds against Serbia were so great that there wae nothing to be proud of in overrunning the country. With all their superiority the enemy did not prevent a large remnant of the Serbian army from escaping.

In appointing Hindenburg the Kaiser lias probaibly been influenced l>y moral as well as military considerations. Hindenburg is the most trusted of all the generals. He has been a national idol ever since Tannenberg. The confidence of the people will have been rudely disturbed by Romania's entry into the war and Italy's declaration, added to the Russian and Anglo-French offensives. To "send foT Hindenburg" ie an obvious antidote to this depression. But the appointment will not disturb the Allied generals in the least. Hindenburg'a ability is freely acknowledged in Allied countries, but he inspiree neither fear nor awe. On the Russian side alone there are several abler generals. Even if he were a much greater man than, he is he couM not avert the impending catastrophe. A comparison is often drawn between this -war and the Ameri:can Civil War. In the American war the South had in their interior lines and far superior generalship, advantages ■which for a long time.more than 4»alanced the greater number* and wealth of the North. Germany has had the advantages of interior lines, long preparation, and unity of control. When the North found a very able general In Grant, and gave him a free hand in th« disposal of their superior nuabem; vie-

tory.-was assured, though the Southern armies continued to i>e commanded by the greatest soldier of his age. Lee'e greater ability could not compensate for numerical superiority directed by a man of Grant's capacity. The Allies have, however, besides numerical superiority, abler generals than the Germans. The advantage that the enemy ihae in unity of control is being gradually lessened as co-operation between the Allies is developed. Hindenburg has a tremendous task. He has won his reputation in attack, but he has now to show that he can stand on the defensive, and that on four fronts, and with an army that every day grows weaker relative to the enemy.