THE ALLIED ATTACK.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 159, 5 July 1916, Page 4

THE ALLIED ATTACK.

In attacking on a line just north and south of the River Somme it is probable that the Allies are actuated by ' three main motives. In the first place < this part of the German line has never < been very strongly, held,, and the Ger- ' mans have relied for its defence on their ability to bring up reinforcements from ] other parte of the front, and this they , have been able to do hitherto with ! success, owing to the excellent railway , system with which this part of their s line is served. On previous occasions ' when this sector was threatened they ] rushed troops to its. defence from j the Lille and Ar£onne...di6trjcts, but at i present they hardly dare weaken their ' forces in these two regions, since the , country round Lens is the weakest I point, on their, .western, line, and- any ! weakening of their forces in the region round Verdun would .be fatal to- any ; hopes they may; Still entertain nf tieing ■! able to, take the town. : -But it:7appeais J that rather than wea.ken.their northern line, where any British advance on a large scale would mean the evacuation of a large part of Belgium, they have elected to bring up reinforcements from the Champagne area, and this must, in time, imply a considerable slackening of the Verdun offensive, as the troops thus withdrawn can only be replaced by bringing»men from the region of the Argonne and the Meuse. With a view to such replacement being made necessary the French immediately made numerous reconnaissances in the Champagne," thus causing the Germans to fear for the safety of this .part of their line, while they were further prevented from sending men from the north by similar reconnaissances in the Loos sector, where the important town of Lens is directly threatened. At the time of the recent attack the Germans were concentrating all their efforts on a final attempt to force their way to Verdun, and the Allied offensive on the Somme is calculated to disturb very considerably the enemy operations on the Meuse, and thu6 relief may well be brought to the • gallant troops who have resisted 60l long,and so bravely, the .desperate.Ger-j man onslaughts round Yaux and the | Mort Homme. i A second reason for Uie choice of this.} sector for attack is probably to be found in the form the German line assumes at this point. It. is technically known as the '-elbow"" of" the line because just south of the . Sorame the. German line, turns sharply round in an easterly direction, and "thus round the region of Compiegne forms a pronounced salient. This ha« prevented them from attacking Paris fr»ra this quarter, though it is the nearest point to the French capital. Indeed so near is it that you can motor Out from Paris to the trenches;' spend an hour there, and be back in Paris all between breakfast and lunch. But to attack, here would mean, attacking .from the inside of an angle and trying to break it at its point, a thing which no commander would attempt to do unless he was really desperate. But this weakness from the German point of view is a source of strength to the Allies, since by attacking on one 6ide of the angle, as they are doing at present, they can squeeze the enemy in, and if the attack is pushed with sufficient vigour and success the opposing armies may be compelled to retire along both 6tde3 of the-angle-and atraightentheir front. A successful attack in this region would also seriously threaten the Ger : man lines of communication north of the river Aisne. Pennine would be endangered, and Peronne is the main German supply centre for the armies opposite Albert. Our news to-day. -re- , cords the capture by.the French,.of the village of Flaucourt, which is less than three miles from Peronne. An advance . beyond- Peronne might put the headquar- : i ters at St. Qnentin in. peril. But' tbe , ground in front of the British, is none too eaey, as the Germans appear to be posted on 1 the high ground east of the Ancre valley. The French have the extensive Hat -south--of- the -Somme for their operations, and the defence is con- J sequently at a disadvantage here as J compared with the region further north.: 1 The present attack cannot fail to be extremely disconcerting to the Germans, .since the? can oirijepe^^^--TO_akeii-_

ing their forces elsewhere, and that is the very thing they can least afford to do-at present; '-The-whole situation in the' West is, of course; obscure, but the reports and continents suggest that-the Allies mean to'continue -the Somme offensive. The lull in the attack indicated in to-day's French communique is a natural pause to consolidate positions and. bring up supplies, while bad weather is interfering with the British operations. What London describes as the studied moderation of. Sir Douglas. Haig's reports must have' struck many of our leaders. "The' Commander-in-Chief will say no "more than .that the situation is promising or satisfactory, and he admits that the success of the assault was not uniform. This wise tone tends to prevent undue elation. Sir Douglas Haig knows better than any of his countrymen, that this is • only the beginning of a long and very. difficult business. It will be time enough to talk of victory when we really Ureach'the German line. In the meantime-'everybody should take his attitude from the Commander-in-Chief. This is a time for patience, a long view, and a sense of proportion.