The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORORATED The Evening News, Morning Nwes and The Echo. SATURDAY, JANUARY 8, 1916. GREECE'S DILEMMA.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 7, 8 January 1916, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORORATED The Evening News, Morning Nwes and The Echo.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 8, 1916. GREECE'S DILEMMA.

Tor the cause that lacks assistance, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the fvture in the distance. And the good that we can do.

The situation in Greece has improved, naturally, from the point of view of the Allies, for the hesitation of the enemy, and his long delay since the Serbian armies were defeated, have given the Anglo-French expeditionary force ample time to complete the defences of Salonika. But the King and the Government f Greece are still facing the unpleasant alternatives that have caused 1216111 co much apprehension all along. They mnst either defy the Allies or they mast incur the fcitter hostility of the Central Powers; and for a long time the Sing of Greece was convinced that Germany would ■win. In considering the policy that Greece 'has followed since the Balkan crisis began, we must Temember in the first place that Constantine is, for effective purposes, the Greek Government. "Xo one now counts in Greece but the King," cays a well-informed correspondent at Athene. "The Cabinet may come to decisions, but they count only -when the opinions they develop are identical with the King's views; and the King, in his present condition of nervousness, is liable to do or to change anything. Until quite recently, it will be remembered, the Central Powers seemed to be winning all along the line in the Balkans, in a military as well as a diplomatic sense, and Constantine is chiefly anxious to keep his country free from war. Now, however, the failure of the Central Powers to make any good use of their successes in Serbia, and the evident determination of the Allies to organise a Balkan campaign on a large scale, have clearly made an impression upon him; and we may assume also that fche unexpectedly successful withdrawal of a large part of the Gallipoli force and Russia's successful offensive along the Austrian border have helped to produce the conviction that the Central Powers cannot now look for final victory. It seems to us that most of the people who have criticised Greece so vehemently for refusing to join the Allies entirely fail to 'appreciate the terrible risks that the Greeks have to face. The case for neutrality was put with great force by XI. Rallis two months ago in an interview with Mr J. M. Jeffries, the "Daily Mail" correspondent at Athene. In reply to Mr Jeffries' suggestion that the Greek nation wishes to side with Britain, M. Rallie pointed to a lurid war-picture—a full page photograph of a heap of headless and mutilated Greek corpses and of sacked villages, taken after a Bulgarian raid some time ago. "There," said the Greek Minister, "the wish of the country is to avoid that." And it is impossible to deny that M. Rallis had strong arguments to urge against the intervention of Greece when the Allies first landed at Salonika. "You want us," he protested, "to succour you when no English soldiers have shed their blood in Serbia, when scarcely an English rifle has been fired. Your Government, having piled fault on fault and delay on delay, now when you have only a few thousand troops to help us. wants to force us to etep in and die. Wo do - not wish to be another Belgium or another Serbia. Serbia! We love Serbia; but when father or wife or brother or someone who is dear to you is drownin) you would like to jump in yourself, bu first you must be snre that the depths are not too great for you and that your effort is not a uselees sacrifice." Practically the same line was taken by Constantino in his conversation with Mr. Jeffries less than two months ago; and the King did not hesitate to assert that the only safety for his country lay in strict neutrality. " They tell mc," hs said, " that I am between the devil and

the deep sea, and that I may as well throw in my lot with the Allies, who3J pressure can be immediate. That is all very well, but France and England, whatever happens, will never be too severe with my country, and Germany will be. implacable. Germany will be implacable," he repeated, "and my duty is to save my country from the horrors of Belgium." The plain truth, is that King Constantine, as one of his admirers has said, if lie must make enemies, would rather have gentlemen than brigands and murderers as his foes, and he has adjusted his policy accordingly. But within the past few weeks the situation as regards Greece has undergone certain important changes. Greece ha 3 always been sympathetically inclined towards Britain and France, out of gratitude for the help that she received from them in winning her independence. On the other hand, the bitterest enemies of the Greeks are the Turis and the Bulgarians, and if the Greeks even indirectly assist the Central Powers they will be. in effect lending aid to their cruellest foe*. So long as the alliance between the Austrians and Germans on the one hand and the Turks and Bulgare on the other was not forcibly obtruded upon the notice of the Greek people, the vacillating policy of the GTeek Government was rendered tolerable to the nation by the knowledge that their country was thus being saved from the horrors of warfare as conducted by the modern Attila and hie Huns. But now that the fortune of war hae brought the Central Powers within striking distance of the Greek frontier a very critical situation has been created. The Germans realise that if the Turks, or more

particularly the Bulgare, once dtoes the boundary of Greece in pursuit of the Allies or with the object of attacking Salonika, it will be practically impossible to restrain the Greeks any longer. This difficulty accounts for the long delay of the Central Powers since the invasion of Serbia was completed. For the Germans have no men to spare for a campaign that would involve practioally an invasion of Greece, and they do not dare to urge the Bulgarians openly to undertake-such an operation, because the approach of these detested and inveterate enemies would at once drive the Greeks into the arms of the Allie3. All these facts account for the remarkable state of things described in our cable messages to-day—three Greek army corps on the verge of mutiny and threatening to turn upon their own officers if they are prevented from defending their country against the hated Bulgars and their allies. It is, of course, conceivable that Constantine's unwillingness to oppose Bulgaria may be due not only to bis fear of Germany, but to some secret understanding with Czar Ferdinand, which has been often hinted at before, and which seems to be indicated in the latest intelligence cabled from Athens. But it- is not necessary to assume this to account for the King's reluctance to -risk the destiny of hie country by taking sides against Germany before he is perfectly sure that the Allies will win, and that in any case Greece will be safe from the Kaiser's vengeance.